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Chapter one 
General introduction 
1.1 How do people make travel mode choices? 
This dissertation deals with the question how people make travel mode 
choices. Specifically, the present research aims to examine the psychological 
antecedents of travel mode choice, and the decision processes underlying this 
type of choice. 
In everyday life we use all kinds of travel modes in a variety of circum-
stances. For instance, for journeys over short distances we either may walk or 
cycle. But, as the distance increases, physical and time constraints force us to 
consider alternative modes such as the car or train. Then we may want to use 
the car instead of the train because of several reasons. We may think, for 
example, that the car is faster and more convenient than the train. Thus, when 
confronted with the need to travel, people may first take the circumstances 
under which the trip has to be made into account, subsequently elaborate on 
the advantages and disadvantages of various travel mode alternatives, and 
eventually decide which travel mode to use. Generally speaking, travel mode 
decisions may be preceded by weighing the pros and cons of available options. 
It may however be questioned whether people always consider the 
consequences of the use of available travel modes in selecting one for a 
particular trip. When we go shopping in a nearby supermarket, are we really 
trading off the perceived travel time, costs and cargo capacity of the car and the 
bicycle before deciding which to use? When we use the car in order to visit a 
friend in a nearby town, have we consciously rejected other travel mode 
options, or was our decision to use the car rather automatic? It seems plausible 
to assume that travel mode choices can often be characterized as routinized or 
habitual actions, especially for journeys where we have used the same travel 
mode over and again in the past. 
To summarize, the question addressed in this dissertation is how people 
make travel mode choices. The present research aims to investigate the 
psychological antecedents of travel mode choice behavior with an emphasis on 
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the processes that intervene between the moment individuals are confronted 
with a particular journey and the moment they decide which mode of transport 
to use. 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter an overview will be given of 
the main theoretical issues. I will first discuss theories and research that 
conceptualize travel mode choice behavior and related behaviors in terms of 
rational choice theory. In the next section I will discuss the role of past behavior 
and habit in the prediction of later behavior. Subsequently, the focus is on the 
processes underlying individual travel mode choice. Specifically, attention will 
be directed toward the decisional processes that precede the selection of a 
choice option and factors that influence the elaborateness of these processes. 
Finally, a preview will be given of seven studies in which the decision 
processes involved in travel mode choice behavior have been empirically 
investigated. 
1.2 Rational choice approaches to the prediction of travel mode choice 
behavior and related behaviors 
During the past 30 years much research in the field of travel mode choice has 
focused on the development and testing of mathematical models that describe 
how individuals make travel mode choices (see for a review Ben-Akiva, 1992; 
Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985). Originally, travel mode choice behavior was 
conceptualized in terms of rational choice theory, e.g., the Logit Model 
(Domencich & McFadden, 1975). The latter model, which is based on micro-
economic utility maximalization theory, assumes that an individual uses some 
value function to evaluate alternatives among which a choice must be made. 
More specifically, the Logit Model considers choice behavior as a stochastic 
process, in which the probability of choosing a particular option from the 
choice set increases as the utility of that option increases. 
Early models of travel mode choice were mainly based on observational data 
(Richards & Ben-Akiva, 1975). That is, objective measures of system attributes 
(e.g., travel distance, travel costs and travel time) were recorded and related to 
actual travel behavior (the so-called revealed preference approach). However, 
although these observed 'objective' system attributes may be predictive of a 
change of travelers' transport mode behavior as a function of changes in the 
objective situation (e.g., higher travel costs), some transportation researchers 
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have argued that this approach does not provide an adequate account of the 
processes underlying individual travel mode decision making. As Levin and 
Louviere (1981) stated: "It may well be the case that individuals independently 
attend to time and cost, but observational studies do not allow a clear 
assessment of how such variables are weighted and combined by the 
individual traveler in decision making and choice" (p. 38). The alternative 
approach, based on this individualized conception of choice, has led to a body 
of research emphasizing the incorporation of subjective variables in models of 
travel mode choice behavior and decision making (e.g., Dobson, Dunbar, 
Smith, Reibstein, & Lovelock, 1978; Gilbert & Foerster, 1977; Hartgen, 1974; 
Recker & Golob, 1976; Reibstein, Lovelock, & Dobson, 1980); that is, perceptions 
of attributes were obtained and related to preferences toward travel mode 
options (the stated preference or attitudinal approach). 
The Logit Model can be seen as a specific elaboration of a class of models of 
rational choice behavior which have a long tradition within psychology and 
behavioral decision making literature. Such approaches are generally referred 
to as 'expectancy-value' theories (see for example Abelson & Levi, 1985; 
Feather, 1982). Perhaps the best known model in this literature is the 'Subjective 
Expected Utility' model (abbreviated as SEU; see Edwards, 1954). According to 
the SEU model, the estimation of the utility of alternatives can be calculated by 
adding the products of the subjectively perceived likelihoods and values of 
various consequences associated with each alternative. Essentially, the SEU 
model is concerned with the assessment of utilities of options (i.e., attitudes). 
With regard to behavior, the model assumes that the alternative with the 
highest utility is chosen. 
Within the domain of social psychology, Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975; Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980) attitude - behavior model, also known as the theory of reasoned 
action, constitutes an influential and well documented expectancy-value model. 
The theory of reasoned action postulates that, prior to the execution of an act, 
individuals trade off the perceived positive and negative consequences of that 
act, and thus decide to perform or not to perform the behavior. The way in 
which perceptions of these consequences (attributes) are combined into a 
general judgment (i.e., an attitude) follows a linear combination rule. That is, an 
attitude is considered to be a function of the sum of the expected values of the 
consequences of the behavior. Thus, Fishbein and Ajzen's approach to attitudes 
parallels the SEU model discussed earlier. In their attempt to explain the 
underlying psychological processes of human behavior, Fishbein and Ajzen 
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(1975) formulated a model in which attitudes toward performing a behavior, 
together with subjective norms (representing the experienced social pressure), 
are considered to be the antecedents of behavioral intentions, which in turn are 
supposed to precede behavior1. 
Thus, by and large, the model of reasoned action emphasizes the deliberate 
character of individual choice. The theory of reasoned action seems to assume 
that choices are made consciously, e.g., people use the private car because they 
have consciously decided to use it; their decision follows from their belief that 
using the car is likely to have more favorable consequences than other options. 
The predictive value of the model is solid (Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 
1988), and it has been applied to a large variety of domains, such as consumer 
choice behavior, health behavior and voting behavior. Figure 1.1 shows how 
the model of reasoned action may be applied to travel mode choice behavior. 
attitudes 
towards travel 
mode options 
travel mode 
choice 
intention 
travel mode 
choice behavior 
subjective norm 
Figure 1.1. Model of travel mode choice behavior, based on the theory of 
reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) 
In a great deal of studies on travel mode choice, investigators have primarily 
relied on psychological measurement techniques to identify perceptions of 
travel mode attributes or to determine whether utilities or attitudes of travel 
mode options predict choices made at any future decision point. However, 
1
 Some researchers have claimed that behavioral intentions are also determined by other variables, such 
as perceived behavioral control (Ajzen, 1988), personal moral beliers (e.g.. Lane, Mathews, & Prestholdt, 
1990; Schwartz & Tessler, 1972), self-identity (e.g., Biddle, Bank, & Slavings, 1987; Chamg, Piliavin, & 
Callero, 1988) and affect toward the behavior (e.g., Triandis, 1977; 1980). However, although these 
extensions to the model of Fishbein and Ajzen may improve the understanding and prediction of 
behavior, they nearly all assume that behavior is guided by rational considerations, that is, the most 
proximal cause of behavior is the intention which "... represents the person's motivation in the sense of 
his or her conscious plan to exert effort to carry out a behavior" (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 168). 
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empirical research on subjective norms as an explanatory construct for travel 
mode choice behavior is rather scarce (see Thomas, 1976; Van Knippenberg & 
Haak, 1982). Therefore, one of the studies reported in this dissertation (see 
Chapter 6), examines the role of subjective norms in the domain of travel mode 
choice behavior. 
When considering travel mode choice behavior, the model represented in 
Figure 1.1 seems to ignore one important aspect of mode choice, i.e., its 
repetitive nature. That is, if one day individuals make a journey by a particular 
mode, they are likely to use the experiences of that journey in a decision 
concerning a similar trip on the next day. In other words, travel mode choices 
are influenced by experiences gained from previous journeys. Although 
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) acknowledge that previous behavior may influence 
later behavior, they presume that behavior produces feedback that can 
influence subsequent attitudes (p. 16). Or, as they stated: "One important source 
of stimuli for "attitudinal" responses is the person's own behavior ..." (Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 1975; p. 44; see also Bern, 1967). Thus, they suggest that the impact of 
past behavior on later behavior is, within the confines of their model, mediated 
by attitudes and intentions. However, in the next section we will see that this 
line of argument may not apply to behavioral domains where the behavior 
under consideration seems similar, if not identical, to behaviors performed 
many times before. 
1.3 Predicting behavior from actions in the past 
One of the first empirical investigations into the influence of past behavior was 
reported in Bentler and Speckart's (1979) article on students' self-reported use 
of alcohol, marijuana, and hard drugs. Bentler and Speckart used a causal 
modeling approach in which they contrasted the theory of reasoned action with 
alternative models concerning the relationship between attitudes and repeated 
behavior. Their approach aimed to take into account actions learned in the past 
that may affect subsequent behavior without the mediation of attitudes or 
intentions. Attitudes, subjective norms, intentions and past behavior (self-
reported frequency of behavior in the past 2 weeks) were measured at one 
point in time. After 2 weeks the behavior was assessed again. For all three 
behaviors (i.e., the use of alcohol, marijuana, and hard drugs) the results of this 
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study dearly showed that past behavior does influence subsequent behavior 
directly as well as indirectly (that is, through the mediating role of intentions). 
The direct relation between past behavior and future behavior underscores 
the behaviorists' maxim that behavior is influenced by habit (e.g., Hull, 1943; 
Tolman, 1932; Watson, 1914). Behavior that has been performed successfully 
and satisfactorily many times tends to become habitual. As a consequence, 
subsequent behavior may be simply guided by stimulus - response associations 
and therefore may be enacted without the person's conscious awareness and 
without mediation by an elaborate decision process. Ronis, Yates and Kirscht 
(1989) propose that the habitual nature of repeated behaviors is established 
only "... if the behavior has been repeated both frequently (at least twice a 
month) and extensively (at least 10 times)" (p. 213). Obviously, many travel 
mode choice behaviors meet these two criteria2. Thus, although repeated or 
habitual behaviors, by a self-perception process, may inform people about their 
attitudes or intentions (e.g., I am always traveling by car, so I must like it and 
therefore I intend to use the car again next time), the low level of awareness 
that accompanies these kinds of behaviors may explain why the impact of 
frequency of past behavior on future behavior is not fully mediated by attitudes 
and intentions. 
The work of Bentler and Speckart discussed above has stimulated many 
other investigators to scrutinize the model of reasoned action in the context of 
repeated behavior. And indeed, studies that included a measure of past 
behavior or self-reported habit suggest that in the case of repeated behavior 
attitudes and subjective norms are insufficient to account for the variability in 
intentions and actual behavior. A substantial body of research has shown that a 
measure of past behavior or habit contributes to the prediction of intentions 
over and above attitude and subjective norm (e.g., Bagozzi, 1981; Bentler & 
Speckart, 1981; Eiser, Morgan, Gammage, & Gray, 1989; Fredricks &c Dosset, 
1983; Manstead, Proffitt, & Smart, 1983). Moreover, measures of past behavior 
or habit may contribute to the prediction of future behavior, in addition to 
intentions, as has been demonstrated for a variety of repeated behaviors that 
seem relatively habitual, such as seat belt use (Mittal, 1988; Sutton & Hallett, 
1989; Wittenbraker, Gibbs, & Kahle, 1983), teachers' interpersonal behavior in 
the classroom (Landis, Triandis, & Adamopoulos, 1978), students' class 
attendance (Fredricks & Dossett, 1983), physical exercise (Bentler & Speckart, 
As do many other behaviors that spring to mind. 
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1981; Valois, Desharnais, & Godin, 1988), blood donation (Bagozzi, 1981; 
Charng et al., 1988), condom use (Boyd & Wandersman, 1991; Kashima, Gallois, 
& McCamish, 1993), shoplifting (Beck & Ajzen, 1991), and voting for a political 
party (Echebarria, Paez, & Valencia, 1988). Apparently, in the case of repeated 
behavior, habits are operating at the time individuals have to decide whether or 
not they perform the behavior (e.g., responding to questions about their 
intentions) and when they actually execute the behavior. 
It is worth emphasizing that in the studies reported above the term habit has 
often been used interchangeably for past behavior. Obviously, habit formation 
is strongly linked to frequency of past behavior. Any skill, perceptual, motor, or 
cognitive, requires less and less mental effort and conscious attention the more 
frequently and consistency it is engaged in, and, eventually can operate 
automatically (e.g., Anderson, 1982; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977). Consistent with this argument, some researchers measure 
habit strength by observing the frequency of ongoing behavior (e.g., Landis et 
al., 1978), or by objective registration concerning the occurrence of behavior 
(e.g., Fredricks & Dossett, 1983). 
From a practical point of view, observing behavior may be a very time-
consuming enterprise, or may even sometimes be impossible. Most researchers 
therefore operationalize habit as self-reported frequency of past behavior (e.g., 
Triandis, 1980). However, although self-reports of past behavior provide 
adequate information in many contexts, subjectively reporting on the frequency 
of past behavior may yield less accurate responses than one would wish (cf. 
Pearson, Ross, & Dawes, 1992). Potential biases may arise from two sources. 
First, self-reports of past behavior must be based on concrete instances of the 
behavior involved. To the extent that habitual behaviors may be performed 
rather automatic and may, therefore, constitute non-salient events, memories of 
having performed the behavior in question may be difficult to evoke — except 
maybe by presenting the very travel goals that instigated the behavior. 
Secondly, reporting 'frequency' of past behavior presupposes that subjects can 
produce accurate counts. It may be conjectured though that, apart from 
frequency of occurrence, the subjects' estimates of frequency may also be 
affected by heuristics such as vividness of memory or representativeness 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Some researchers have proposed another operationalization of the 
measurement of habit. They ask subjects to report on how frequently they 
performed an act in the past "without awareness" or "by force of habit" (e.g., 
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Mittal, 1988; Wittenbraker et al., 1983). However, such measures may be even 
more problematic. First, one may question the reliability and validity of 
retrospectively reporting on such internal psychological processes like having 
done things without awareness (see Greenwald, 1992; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
Furthermore, self-report measures of habit like acting "without awareness" or 
"by force of habit" seem to be a contradiction in terms, i.e., subjects have to 
become aware of events and actions of which they usually are unaware. For the 
time being, self-reported frequency of past behavior therefore still seems to 
constitute the most appropriate procedure to measure habit strength. 
To conclude, the research discussed so far suggests that in the case of 
repeated actions, subsequent behavior is determined by intentions on the one 
hand and by habit strength on the other. Furthermore, there is also ample 
evidence indicating that habit predicts intentions over and above attitudes and 
subjective norms. Because an average person faces the opportunity of choosing 
a mode about a thousand times a year (at least in the Netherlands; CBS, 1994), 
the habit of choosing a particular mode must play an influential role in guiding 
behavior in this domain. Therefore, mode choice habit might be an important 
variable in the explanation and prediction of travel mode choice behavior. Thus 
apart from attitudes, subjective norms, and intentions, habit may be included in 
a model of travel mode choice. In Figure 1.2 such a model for the prediction of 
travel mode choice behavior is presented schematically. 
attitudes 
towards travel 
mode options 
subjective norm 
travel mode 
choice habit 
strength 
Figure 1.2. Model of travel mode choice behavior, including the concept of 
habit (adapted from Bentier & Speckart, 1979) 
travel mode 
choice 
intention 
travel mode 
choice behavior 
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Generally, research that tests and applies the model presented in Figure 1.2 
is concerned with the measurement of attitudes, intentions, habit, and later 
behavior. Conclusions on causality tend to be based on the observed statistical 
relations between the measured constructs. Unfortunately, in such studies the 
processes mediating the relations between antecedent conditions and the 
resulting choice and behavior remain hidden. Theoretically, on the one hand, 
the relation between attitudes toward options and choice intention suggests a 
decisional process in which the consequences (pros and cons) associated with 
each option are weighted and combined according to a specific evaluation rule 
before a choice is made (cf. Sheppard et al., 1988). On the other hand, the 
assumed impact of habit strength on later behavior suggests that more or less 
habitual decisions are preceded by simplifying shortcuts, that is, the behavior 
in question is guided by a heuristic or less elaborate decision making process. 
The next sections focus more explicitly on the process of individual choice and 
decision making. Attention will be directed toward different types of decision 
rules, the intervening steps that occur between the introduction of the decision 
problem and the final decision (i.e., the decision making process) and factors 
that influence the elaborateness of this process. 
1.4 The decision process underlying travel mode choice 
In the present research it is assumed that the decision maker has the oppor-
tunity to choose between at least two travel mode options. The subjective repre-
sentations of these choice options comprise sets of attributes characterizing 
them (the choice is therefore usually referred to as "multiattribute choice"). For 
instance, the choice between car and bicycle for a short distance journey may 
depend on the outcome of the trade-off between information about travel costs 
and travel time on both options. The decision strategy individuals employ to 
make multiattribute choices, however, may differ in complexity and mental 
effort required. The two major types of strategies described in the decision 
literature are compensatory and noncompensatory decision strategies (e.g., 
Abelson & Levi, 1985; Betunan, Johnson, & Payne, 1991). 
Decision rules for multiattribute choices 
A compensatory decision strategy implies that an unfavorable score on one 
attribute of an alternative can be compensated by a favorable score on another 
9 
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attribute of that alternative. Consequently, an alternative with one or two 
unfavorable characteristics need not be immediately excluded from further 
consideration because other attributes of the alternative may restore the 
balance. In choosing a travel mode, for example, a decision maker may sacrifice 
some travel time for a decrease in travel costs and environmental pollution 
(e.g., by selecting the bicycle over the car). The previously described choice 
models (i.e., the Logit Model, the SEU Model as well as Fishbein and Ajzen's 
attitude model) all assume that the decision strategies people apply to 
multiattribute decision problems follow the compensatory principle. For 
instance, according to the SEU model, choices are based on a linear additive 
rule, in which each attribute utility (outcome) is weighted according to its 
likelihood of occurrence, and these weighted utilities are summed to form an 
overall utility index. This weighting scheme is applied to each alternative in the 
choice set. Thus compensatory decision rules involve a process of trading off 
between attribute values and require that for each alternative the same set of 
attributes is given some weight. As a consequence, the application of these 
rules is relatively difficult and cognitively demanding. Decision theorists 
concerned with optimal decision making usually consider compensatory 
decision strategies as normative in order to make multiattribute choices (e.g., 
Edwards & Tversky, 1967; Frisch & Clemen, 1994). That is, compensatory 
models are prescriptive rather than descriptive, because they prescribe how 
individuals should make decisions and not how they actually do make them (see 
Bell, Raiffa, & Tversky, 1988). 
Research in cognitive psychology has demonstrated that individuals have 
rather limited processing capacities. People usually do not process all the 
information available before they decide how to act, because this would exceed 
their attentional and computational capacity (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Simon, 
1956). Moreover, because people make dozens of decisions each day, it may be 
at least inappropriate to assume that they always engage in elaborate decision 
making. Rather, decision makers frequently adopt less complex, heuristic 
decision rules (i.e., simplifying shortcuts) to make multiattribute choices which 
may result in different outcomes compared to using a compensatory decision 
rule. Theory and research on behavioral decision making has described several 
heuristic decision rules, also known as noncompensatory decision strategies, 
such as proposed by the lexicographic choice rule (Tversky, 1969) and the 
elimination-by-aspects rule (Tversky, 1972). The major characteristic that most 
heuristic decision rules have in common is that an alternative will be rejected 
10 
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when it has a poor score on an important attribute, irrespective of its scores on 
other attributes (hence, noncompensatory). For instance, the elimination-by-
aspects rule begins by determining the most important attribute. Then, 
according to a cutoff level for that attribute, alternatives that do not meet the 
cutoff point are removed from further consideration. The process continues 
with the second most important attribute, and so on, until one alternative 
remains. Recent theories of attitudes postulate similar heuristic information 
processing principles in forming attitudes and arriving at decisions (e.g., the 
construction-by-aspects rule proposed by McGuire, 1985). Returning to the case 
of travel mode choice: a person who makes a trip to a nearby post office may 
select the option with the shortest travel time, regardless of travel costs and 
pollution (which may, e.g., result in taking the car rather than the bicycle). 
Heuristic choice models have been tested in the field of transport research and 
proved to be useful in predicting travel mode choices (e.g., Foerster, 1979; 
Gensch & Svetska, 1979; Young & Brown, 1983). Accordingly, in describing the 
decision strategies preceding travel mode choice, the emphasis in transport 
research seems to shift from compensatory to noncompensatory or heuristic 
decision rules. 
So far, I have discussed two major types of strategies individuals may 
employ to evaluate and combine pieces of information in making a travel mode 
choice: compensatory and noncompensatory strategies. Since many decision 
rules have been described in detail elsewhere (e.g., Bettman et al., 1991; 
Svenson, 1979), I have presented only the most important ones. For the present 
purpose, however, it is important to note that the process of information use 
involved in the two types of strategies differs in complexity and cognitive effort 
required: compensatory rules are relatively more complex and more effortful to 
execute than noncompensatory rules. 
Predecisional information search 
Research on multiattribute decision making has traditionally been concerned 
with the question of how choices or attitudes are formed on the basis of 
information that is given or supposed to be known by decision makers. Various 
mathematical models are used to describe the relationship between stimulus 
and response or between input and output. For instance, in studies of 
compensatory models, subjects are asked to make a number of decisions on the 
basis of a set of attributes. Furthermore, the content of the attributes is 
systematically varied, resulting in a large set of attribute combinations. Then, 
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linear multiple regressions are performed to determine the attribute-weighting 
scheme that represents how decisions are made by the person. In other words, 
by describing the structural relationship between the attributes and the 
decisions the researcher attempts to capture the subjects' decision making 
policies (e.g., Brehmer & Joyce, 1988; Fischhoff, Goitein, & Shapira, 1982). 
However, although these research methods may be useful to test the use of 
attribute information in judgment and choice, they do not directly measure the 
cognitive processes underlying decision making. Contrary to this traditional 
approach, most current models of decision making posit that information 
processing accompanying choice behavior is generally characterized by four 
stages: (1) observation and acquisition of relevant information; (2) encoding 
and storage; (3) retrieval or recall; and (4) utilization of information (e.g., 
Bettman et al., 1991; Denisi, Cafferty, & Meglino, 1984). Thus, information use is 
considered to be the final stage of the decision making process, while 
information acquisition seems to be situated at the beginning of it. Decision 
research has become more process oriented by developing different techniques 
of experimentation that focus explicitly on the decisional processes that occur 
between the introduction of informational input and the decision outcomes 
(e.g., Payne, 1976; Svenson, 1979). One of these techniques is to record 
predecisional information search behavior, which usually involves the 
following procedure (see for a review Ford, Schmitt, Schechtman, Hults, & 
Doherty, 1989). 
A person is confronted with a decision problem in which he or she is 
requested to select one or more options from a set of available choice options 
(e.g., from a set of automobiles, select the one which you would like to buy). 
The decision maker has access to an external information environment, 
containing information that is relevant for solving the decision problem (e.g., 
information about attributes of available choice options, such as price, safety 
and economy). The decision maker is allowed to gather any piece of informa-
tion available in any order he or she wishes in order to make a decision. It is 
assumed that predecisional information search behavior reflects subjects' 
decision making strategies (see Jacoby, Jaccard, Kuss, Troutman, & Mazursky, 
1987; Payne, 1976). 
In a study on travel mode choices, Polak and Jones (1993) investigated the 
acquisition of pre-trip information among inhabitants of Birmingham and 
Athens before they chose between bus or car for a trip to the City Center. By 
means of a computer, subjects were able to gather information at home about 
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several types of information related to travel times for both options, at different 
times of the day. The results showed that subjects were rather selective in the 
amount and type of information they gathered about aspects of travel mode 
options. On the basis on their results, Polak and Jones concluded that the 
process of information acquisition preceding transport mode decisions may be 
guided by simple heuristics. Although this study demonstrated the utility of an 
information acquisition task to capture the decisional processes underlying 
travel mode choices, it remains unclear what actually determines the use of 
simple heuristics to guide information acquisition in travel mode choices. 
Some researchers maintain that the types of information search and decision 
strategies individuals employ to solve multiattribute decision problems reflects 
a balance between maximizing the correctness of decisions one has to make, 
and minimizing the cognitive effort involved in using a particular decision rule 
to make these decisions (e.g., Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Bettman et al., 1991; 
Payne, 1982; Russo & Dosher, 1983). From this perspective, many factors may 
determine which strategy is used. Three major classes of factors have been 
distinguished: characteristics of the decision problem (e.g., task complexity, 
response mode), the context of the decisional environment (e.g., consequences 
of the decision, time pressure), and person characteristics (e.g., prior 
knowledge, cognitive ability to process information). Thus, in response to 
specific circumstances of the choice situation, and as a function of one's own 
motivation and cognitive capabilities, people may choose from a wide variety 
of possible strategies when making a decision; strategies that range from highly 
analytical or effortful (e.g., maximizing expected utility) to very simple 
strategies (e.g., repeating previous responses; minimizing effort). A number of 
process tracing studies have corroborated these notions in a variety of decision 
contexts, such as brand selection in consumer decision making, choice of 
apartments, and selection of job applicants (see Ford et al., 1989). It has been 
shown that, for instance, as the number of choice options increases, individuals 
search for less information and adopt less complex decision strategies (e.g., 
Billings & Marcus, 1983; Payne, 1976). Similarly, effects of context and person 
characteristics on the decision process have been established by the findings 
that, for instance, high levels of decision importance (e.g., Billings & Scherer, 
1988; Klayman, 1985), or low levels of prior knowledge (e.g., Gilliland, Wood, 
& Schmitt, 1994; Jacoby, Szybillo, & Busato-Schach, 1977) increase the depth of 
information search and the complexity of decision rules. 
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In sum, researchers have identified various factors that affect the depth of 
information search and the elaborateness of strategies used by decision makers. 
In the following sections I will return to the decision process underlying the 
choice of travel mode. One important psychological factor which is crucial for 
the present research will be addressed, specifically, the habit individuals have 
developed in choosing a particular travel mode (e.g., choosing the car over 
public transport). 
1.5 Habit and decision making 
Generally, psychologists conceptualize habits as the learning of sequences of 
acts that have become automatic responses to specific situations, which may be 
functional in order to achieve a given result, or to obtain certain goals or end 
states (e.g., James, 1890; Triandis, 1977; 1980; Ronis et al., 1989; Watson, 1914). 
Habits thus comprise a goal-directed type of automaticity; they are instigated 
by a specific goal-directed state of mind in the presence of triggering stimulus 
cues, for instance kissing one's spouse when coming home from work, or as in 
the present context, taking the car to travel to the supermarket. Once evoked, 
the behavior will run to completion without the need for attentional control of 
the process. Habit strength is proposed to increase as a result of repetitions of 
positive reinforcements. 
For instance, when a particular journey is made by car, the satisfaction of 
using the car reinforces the choice of this particular mode and thus, contributes 
to the strength of car choice habit. With continued reinforcement (only possible 
when the car is available each time the same trip is planned; cf. Banister, 1978) 
in the form of satisfactory outcomes, the learned sequences of acts associated 
with car use become more stable and habits are formed. Then, although some 
minimal level of awareness may precede travel mode choice, in subsequent 
comparable travel situations deeper deliberation is not necessary to make such 
decisions. In other words, habits may enable us to make mode choices in a 
rather mindless or automatic manner. The view that individual travel mode 
choices may often be characterized as habitual rather than rational has been 
adopted by several authors in the field of transport research (e.g., Banister, 
1978; Goodwin, 1977). 
Langer (1978) makes a similar analysis of the formation of a habit when she 
states that "A continuum of awareness varies directly with the degree of 
14 
General introduction 
repeated experience that we have with the activity. The more often we have 
engaged in the activity the more likely it is that we will rely on scripts for the 
completion of the activity and the less likely it is that there will be any 
correspondence between our actions and those thoughts that occur 
simultaneously" (p. 39, italics added). Thus, Langer (1978; 1989) suggests that 
habits are under the control of scripts (e.g., Abelson, 1981; Schänk & Abelson, 
1977), i.e., cognitive structures that contain the appropriate sequence of events 
in order to satisfy certain goals in a particular situation, acquired on the basis of 
repeated behavior and other types of learning (e.g., script for driving from 
home to work). Once activated by a script-evoking context, these well-learned 
scripts may automatically guide attention and behavioral decisions, and direct 
action within the situation with a minimum of effort or attention necessary 
(Bargh, 1989; Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978). 
Also, much recent research on the significance of attitudes in the explanation 
and prediction of behavior assumes that actors do not always base their 
behaviors on rational considerations (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Tesser & 
Shaffer, 1990). For example, Ronis and colleagues (1989) suggest that attitudes 
may sometimes be irrelevant in guiding behavior, namely when the behavior 
has become habitual. More specifically, when the behavior is performed many 
times, subsequent behavior may be associated with and automatically triggered 
by the specific stimulus cues that normally precede it. As a consequence, the 
behavior will be based on only a fraction of the information (pros and cons) 
that the person actually has about the behavioral alternatives. This less 
thorough or more heuristic way of information processing might constitute the 
reason why behavior becomes relatively independent of attitudes. 
Triandis (1977; 1980; see also Ronis et al., 1989) proposed a model that 
describes the relationship between habit and decision making in terms of an 
interaction between intention and habit in the prediction of later behavior. In 
his model the probability of an act (P„) is a weighted function of habit (H) and 
behavioral intention (J), multiplied by 'facilitating conditions' (F), i.e., the 
presence or absence of conditions that facilitate the performance of the act (e.g., 
the individual's ability to perform the act). This relationship is expressed as: 
Pfl = (wh.H + Wi.r).F 
The weights Wh and w¡ are supposed to be negatively correlated. New behavior 
is assumed to be completely under the control of intentions. As the behavior 
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occurs more frequently, Wh increases while w¡ decreases. In other words, the 
model implies that as habit becomes stronger, behavior is less guided by 
intentions, which are based on rational considerations of performing the act. Or 
as behavioral decision theorists would state this: Habitual decisions "... may be 
the product of an earlier, more reasoned strategy which have become 
mechanical in order to realize the economy of not having to go through the 
whole strategy selection process each time the decision task is encountered" 
(Beach & Mitchell, 1978; p. 443). The trade-off between reasoned and habitual 
action in the prediction of repeated behavior has been empirically supported in 
studies that included measures of past behavior or habit, intention, and 
repeated measures of later behavior (Bagozzi, 1981; Charng et al., 1988), and 
studies that explicitly tested interaction terms (Mittal, 1988; Montano & Taplin, 
1991). 
Consistent with the trade-off between intention and habit postulated by 
Triandis (1977; 1980), it can be anticipated that habit strength is negatively 
related to the depth of the decision process that is involved in travel mode 
choice behavior, i.e., the degree of mental effort expended and the complexity 
of strategies employed to search for and process information before deciding 
which mode of transport to use. 
Previously it has been stressed that repetition of the same behavior may lead 
to the formation of a habit. That is, after the same decision is repeatedly made 
and enacted, the behavior may occur without much thought and gradually 
become based on more simple decision rules. In addition to the formation of 
habit, however, repetitively and satisfactorily making the same decision over 
and again may have another consequence, namely that there is gradually less 
need to consider alternative choices. In other words, decision-makers' 
involvement with that particular decision decreases as they make the same 
decision repeatedly. When this motivation to evaluate alternatives diminishes, 
there is less need to deliberate actively about pros and cons of options, search 
for information (internally or externally), or otherwise expend mental effort in 
preparation for the particular trip. Similarly, much of contemporary research in 
the field of consumer choice behavior recognizes that repeated purchase of the 
same product negatively affects consumers' involvement to elaborate on the 
consequences of buying that product in subsequent purchase (e.g., Belk, 1985; 
Engel, Blackwell, & Miniard, 1993; Vaughn, 1986; Zaichkowsky, 1985). Such 
low involvement or routinized mode of buying behavior may constitute the 
main reason why advertisers have such a hard time convincing consumers that 
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their brand is the best. Just like repeated purchase decisions in consumer choice 
behavior, involvement may play an important role in the domain of travel 
mode choice behavior. One of the studies reported in this thesis (see Chapter 2) 
investigates therefore whether mode choice habits are related to involvement 
concerning travel mode decision making. 
Habit can be considered as a chronic person-related factor, which affects the 
decision making process on a recurrent basis. For instance, once a person has 
developed a strong habit of choosing the car for a particular journey, in 
subsequent comparable journeys that person is likely to use the car again, 
without considering alternatives or otherwise expending mental effort in 
deciding which mode to use. However, there may occasionally be situationally 
determined reasons that enhance decision makers' motivation to consider 
alternatives and engage in relatively effortful decision making. Such 
motivational instigation may occur when individuals are confronted with 
novelty, obstacles obstructing the usual performance of behavior or decisions 
that have important consequences (e.g., Louis & Sutton, 1991; Ronis et al., 
1989). For instance, when one is invited for a job interview, it is useful to 
consider travel mode options that ensure being there in time, no matter what 
habit one has. Consistent with this reasoning, a large body of research has 
shown that factors such as task importance (e.g., Billings & Scherer, 1988), 
personal relevance (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979), accountability 
for one's judgments or decision outcomes (e.g., Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock & Kim, 
1987; Weldon & Gargano, 1988), irreversibility of decisions (e.g., McAllister, 
Mitchell, & Beach, 1979), and shared responsibility (Weldon & Mustari, 1988) 
affect the extensiveness (and, often, complexity) of cognitive processing in 
attitude, judgment and other decision making contexts. In the present research 
an attempt is made to experimentally enhance the depth of the decision making 
process that underlies travel mode choices by introducing such situation-
specific demands. 
1.6 An overview of the studies 
The present research aims to investigate the psychological antecedents of travel 
mode choice behavior. In particular, our interest is in the decisional processes 
that occur between the moment travelers encounter a particular stimulus trip 
and the moment they decide how to make that journey. We argue that travel 
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mode choice behavior is influenced strongly by habit, perhaps even more 
strongly than by beliefs, attitudes and intentions. Consequently, habit may 
predict behavior over and above these latter variables. Moreover, it is expected 
that habit strength is negatively related to the degree of elaboration of the deci-
sion process. That is, individuals who have developed a strong habit, utilize 
less information and employ less complex decision rules in the process of 
making a travel mode decision compared to those who have not developed a 
habit. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that the depth of the decision process 
underlying travel mode choices is also contingent upon situational demands 
that motivate individuals to consider alternatives. Therefore, in several of our 
experiments we will attempt to enhance the elaborateness of the travel mode 
decision process by manipulating such situation-specific motivation. 
Chapter 2 presents a survey in which a new measurement procedure of habit 
is proposed and tentatively examined in a model for choosing the car as the 
mode of transport (Study 1). More specifically, we investigated whether habit 
predicts behavior over and above attitudes, and more importantly, whether the 
trade-off between habit and attitude in their prediction of behavior, as 
suggested by the attitude-behavior model of Triandis (1977; 1980) can 
empirically be supported. 
Next, Chapter 3 reports the results of an additional survey (Study 2), in 
which the new measurement of habit was further tested with respect to its 
validity and reliability. 
Chapter 4 describes two experiments that were designed to study the 
decision process that accompanies travel mode choice behavior more explicitly. 
That is, we examined the relation between habit, situation-specific motivation 
(i.e., perceived accountability for the choice made), and predecisional informa-
tion search. Information acquisition was observed by means of a method which 
gives subjects the opportunity to select information about attributes of choice 
options in a familiar (Study 3) and a relatively unfamiliar (Study 4) travel 
situation. 
The use of information about attributes of options is one perspective for 
studying the decision process. However, travel mode choices may be not only 
determined by information about attributes of alternatives but, perhaps to a 
greater extent, also by aspects of the trip itself or the circumstances under 
which the trip is made, such as travel distance, weather conditions and, the 
luggage which one has to carry along. Chapter 5 presents two experiments in 
which we focused on the decision process in this earlier stage. As in the 
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previous two studies, effects on predecisional information processing of habit 
strength and situationally determined motivation, i.e., focusing subjects' atten-
tion on aspects of the trip (Study 5) and perceived accountability (Study 6), 
were tested. 
Finally, Chapter 6 describes a field experiment in which the role of habit is 
investigated in the context of real-life travel mode choices (Study 7). In this ex-
periment daily travel mode choices were recorded by means of diaries over a 7-
day period. Before this period subjects filled out a questionnaire, which 
included measures of attitude, subjective norm, behavioral intention, and habit. 
In addition to the role of habit, effects of situation-specific motivation to engage 
in effortful decision making were investigated by manipulating subjects' atten-
tion to the choice process during the 7-day period when travel mode choice 
behavior was recorded. 
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Chapter two 
Attitudes and general habit as 
antecedents of travel mode choice: 
Testing a new measure of habit (Study l)1 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the results of a survey in which a model of car choice 
behavior was tested. As pointed out in chapter 1, travel mode choice behavior 
may be determined by the attitude toward mode options for a particular 
journey on the one hand, and travel mode choice habit on the other hand. In 
other words, attitudes and habit have independent effects on behavior. In 
addition, the argument of Triandis (1977; see also Ronis et al., 1989) suggests 
that there is also an interaction effect of attitude and habit on choice: when 
habit is strong, the attitude-behavior relation will be weak and, conversely, 
when habit is weak, the attitude-behavior relation will be strong (i.e., habit 
serves as a moderator variable; cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
Furthermore, it was tentatively investigated whether habit strength is 
related to involvement concerning travel mode decision making, which will be 
further referred to as decisional involvement (cf. Houston & Rothschild, 1978; 
Mittal, 1989; Mittal & Lee, 1989). In the present context, decisional involvement 
reflects the person's motivation to deliberate actively about pros and cons of 
travel mode options, search for information, or otherwise expend mental effort 
in making a decision. It was argued that successful performance of the same 
behavior over and again contributes to the automatic nature of the behavior, 
and simultaneously decreases the level of decisional involvement. Thus, habit 
was expected to be negatively related to decisional involvement. 
Obviously, in order for habit to develop, physical circumstances must be 
favorable. For example, development of a car choice habit is directly dependent 
upon the availability of a car, having a driving licence, and the number of 
competitors in a household who use the same car (e.g., Banister, 1978). 
1
 Based on Aarts, Van Knippenberg, & Verplanken (1992), and Verplanken, Aarts, Van Knippenberg, & 
Van Knippenberg (1994). 
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Operationalizations of habit 
The measurement of habit is difficult (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Ronis et al., 
1989). Whereas behaviorists measure habit by the number of times the behavior 
has been reinforced (e.g., Hull, 1943), cognitively oriented researchers often 
measure habit by having respondents report on the frequency with which they 
have performed the behavior in the past (e.g., Bagozzi, 1981; Triandis, 1977). 
However, self-reports on the frequency of past behavior may yield inaccurate 
responses, because subjects must have access in memory to relevant instances 
related to the behavioral domain of interest (see also the discussion of this 
measure in section 1.3). Mittal (1988) makes another important point 
concerning the operationalization of habit by using self-reports of past 
behavior, when he states that "Repeated occurrence is necessary for the 
formation of habit, but it is not habit itself' (p.997). Prior and later behavior 
may correlate because other determinants than habit (e.g., attitudes, external 
conditions) may operate on both occasions (Beck & Ajzen, 1991; Ronis et al., 
1989). In another attempt to assess habit strength, Wittenbraker et al. (1983), 
measuring seat belt use habit, asked respondents to indicate "How many times 
in the last two weeks when driving a car have you put on a seat belt by force of 
habit" (p.411, italics added). Mittal (1988) stresses a fundamental feature of 
habit, i.e., its occurrence without awareness and measures the habit of use and 
nonuse of seat belts by asking respondents to provide self-reports of their 
awareness of using and not using seat belts (e.g., "During the past few weeks, 
when I got into my car, I was not even aware and I put on my seatbelt", Mittal, 
1988, p.1001). We agree with Mittal's (1988) objection to the use of (self-
reported) frequency of previous behavior as a measure of habit. One may 
question the validity and reliability of subjective reports on past behavior, and 
in particular retrospective reports on psychological processes such as "acting by 
force of habit" or "level of awareness" (see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Moreover, 
self-reported habit may confound habit and frequency of past behavior (Ronis 
et al., 1989). 
Another aspect concerning the measurement of habit that has not been 
addressed so far is that habit may not be restricted to one particular behavior in 
a specific context (cf. the concept of 'stimulus generalization' in learning theory; 
e.g., Hull, 1943). In the domain of travel mode choice behavior, we rarely use a 
particular mode for one purpose only, but instead, use the same mode of 
transport in a variety of circumstances and for many different travel goals (e.g., 
work, shopping trips, leisure time activities, and social visits). Choosing the car 
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may thus be determined by a general habit of car use, rather than by habit with 
respect to one particular journey. Therefore, in that case predicting specific 
behavior by general habit may be more powerful than focusing on journey-
specific habit. 
In this study we have taken a different approach to the measurement of 
habit than has been done by other researchers. We have attempted to construct 
a measure of car choice habit that (a) does not rely on retrospective 
introspection concerning frequency of past behavior, (b) is more general instead 
of being specific for one particular journey, and (c) is easy to administer. We 
have presented our respondents with a number of short statements that 
globally indicate all kinds of journeys (e.g., "going to a supermarket", "visiting a 
friend in a nearby town"). For each destination, they are requested to mention 
as quickly as possible the first mode of transportation that comes to mind as the 
one they would use (e.g., car, bus, bicycle, train). The frequency of choices for 
one particular travel mode (e.g., car) serves as a measure of habit strength for 
choosing that behavioral alternative in general. The rationale underlying this 
operationalization is that when subjects are asked to respond quickly to global 
stimuli, which are presented with a minimum of detail, there is little possibility 
of engaging in making elaborate trade-offs between pros and cons of travel 
modes. We expect that subjects' responses are guided by relatively 
automatically retrieved mental representations of past travel behavior (cf. 
schémas or scripts; Abelson, 1981; Kahle, 1984; Langer, 1978). That is, when for 
example an individual habitually chooses and uses the car for a great variety of 
travel goals, these travel goals may become capable of activating car use 
automatically. Habitual travel behavior may thus be conceived of as mentally 
represented structures in which a travel goal is strongly associated with the 
habitual chosen travel mode (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1995; see also Bargh & 
Gollwitzer, 1994). The imposed time pressure and instruction to mention the 
first mode of transport that comes to mind may further facilitate the automatic 
nature of responding and the reliance on cognitively available structures 
concerning the behavioral domain of interest (cf. Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). 
Thus, when habit with respect to car choice in general is strong, the choice of 
car as travel mode may constitute a dominant element in the mental represen-
tations of travel behavior (i.e., a direct association between many travel goals 
and car use), which is supposed to be reflected in a relatively large number of 
car choices across the presented journeys. Because response frequencies toward 
globally described stimulus trips serves as a measure of habit, we will further 
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refer to the instrument as the Response Frequency measure of habit, so as to 
distinguish it from the traditional self-report measures. 
A conceptual model of car choice behavior 
In the present study a model of car choice behavior was tested. Self-reported 
car choice was predicted by the attitude toward choosing the car and the 
attitude toward choosing an alternative travel mode (i.e., train) for a particular 
journey on the one hand, and the measure of general car-choice habit on the 
other hand. Although attitudes and habit were supposed to be correlated, it 
was hypothesized that both attitude components and habit have unique 
predictive value with respect to car choice behavior. In addition, it was 
expected that there is a trade-off between the weights of car attitude and car 
habit in the prediction of car choice (i.e., a unique contribution of their 
interaction). A relatively high correlation between attitude and behavior was 
expected for individuals who have a weak car choice habit, whereas a low 
correlation was expected for those with a strong habit. Furthermore, it was 
expected that decisional involvement concerning mode choice would be 
influenced by car choice habit strength. Finally, habit was predicted from car 
availability. 
2.2 Method 
Respondents 
A structured interview was conducted by trained interviewers among 258 adult 
residents of the village Eist. This village is located in between two cities, 
Nijmegen and Arnhem (the distance to either city is approximately 8 
kilometers), and it could be expected that the residents of the village frequently 
visit one or both towns. A highway, which is easily accessible from the village, 
runs between the two cities, as well as a railway line serving the village 
frequently. For one half of the respondents the target behavior is choosing the 
car as travel method for a shopping trip to Nijmegen, and for the other half a 
shopping trip to Arnhem2 . 
The questionnaire contained items measuring car choice behavior, attitudes 
toward choosing the car and train for the particular trip, general car-choice 
Tbis factor did not affect the pattern of results. 
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habit, and decisional involvement. Subjects also responded to several 
demographic items, such as age, gender, number of cars available in the house-
hold, number of household members having a driving licence, and an estimate 
of the annual mileage. 
For the analyses only those respondents were selected who had a driving 
licence, and had a car at their disposal (N=199). Ages ranged from 19 to 65 
(M=39.9). There were 92 males and 107 females in this sample. The self-
reported mean distance respondents annually travelled by car was 16,022 
kilometers. 
Measures 
General habit of choosing the car as travel mode was measured by presenting 
respondents with ten imaginary situations calling for a choice of travel mode 
(e.g., "Going to the beach with some friends", "Sport as leisure activity", 
"Visiting friends", "Shopping in a supermarket"). Respondents were required to 
mention as quickly as possible the first travel mode that came to mind as the 
one they would use for each particular journey. The car choice habit measure 
was calculated by counting the number of times the car was mentioned as 
travel mode. Thus, the measure can have values ranging from 0 to 10. The 
measure correlates moderately, but significantly, with the respondents' annual 
mileage (r=.37; p<.001). There is also a sizable correlation (r=.55; p<.001) with 
one additional item, which reflects some form of habit, worded "Whether I go 
to work or go shopping, I almost always travel by car", and which was 
accompanied by a 7-point disagree-agree scale. 
Attitude toward traveling by car for shopping in Nijmegen (or Arnhem) was 
measured by averaging two bipolar 7-point items ranging from "very bad" to 
"very good" and "very unfavorable" to "very favorable" respectively (r=0.58; 
p<.001). The same items were used to measure attitude toward traveling by 
train (r=0.64;p<.001). 
Car choice behavior was measured by asking the respondents how often 
during the past two months they had traveled by car in order to go shopping in 
Nijmegen (or Arnhem) (cf. Mittal, 1988; Wittenbraker et al., 1983). Responses 
were given at a 4-point scale ranging from "never" (1) to "very often" (4). 
Decisional involvement was measured with eight 7-point Likert-type agree-
disagree items. Because decisional involvement is supposed to be situation-
specific, subjects were presented with the stem "When I go shopping in 
Nijmegen (or Arnhem), ". The items were respectively: "I want to expend 
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effort to find out which travel method is the best", "I think about which travel 
method I want to use", "there is no doubt in my mind about how I will travel", 
"I want to know in detail which pros and cons various travel methods have", "I 
think it is useless to expend time and energy to find out which travel method is 
most suitable", "I want to prepare the journey well before", "I don't need to 
deliberate about how I want to travel, because I already know", and "I use the 
first method of transportation that comes to mind". The eight items form a 
reliable scale (coefficient alpha=0.83). After reversing the third, fifth, seventh, 
and eighth item, the items were averaged into a score representing decisional 
involvement. 
Car availability was measured by the ratio of the number of cars available in 
the household (usually one) and the number of household members having a 
driving licence. This measure is commonly used in travel behavior research to 
reflect the amount of competition in a household with respect to car use. 
2.3 Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
In Table 2.1 the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of the 
measured variables are shown. 
Table 2.1: Mean, standard deviation, and intercorrelations of car choice 
behavior, car attitude, train attitude, car habit, decisional involve-
ment, and car availability 
Measure and range M SD 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Car choice behavior (1-4) 3.37 0.99 0.57*"-0.29"* 0.54*"-0.32*" 0.13 
2. Car attitude (1-7) 4.98 1.47 - -0.13 0.32*"-0.18* 0.14* 
3. Train attitude (1-7) 4.56 1.52 - -0.29*" 0.17* -0.09 
4. Car habit (0-10) 5.58 2.18 - -0.36***0.22" 
5. Dec. involvement (1-7) 2.92 1.23 - 0.00 
6. Car availability (0.20-2.00) 0.69 0.28 
* = p<.05; ** = p<.01; *" = p<.001 
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It appears that respondents relatively often choose the car as a travel mode for 
the particular shopping trip. Attitudes toward car use and train use with 
respect to the shopping trip are generally favorable, while decisional involve-
ment is relatively low. Most households have one car, which is used by either 
one or two driving licence holders. The habit measure reveals that the car is 
chosen on about half of the hypothetical trips, indicating a moderate habit on 
average. 
Path analysis 
The operationalizations of car-choice behavior, attitudes toward car and train, 
car choice habit, decisional involvement, and car availability were subjected to 
path analysis in order to test the model outlined in the introduction section. In 
Figure 2.1 the model is presented, and the standardized path coefficients are 
indicated. 
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attitude toward 
car use 
general 
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Figure 2.1: Path analysis for antecedents of car choice behavior (the numbers 
are standardized path coefficients; all coefficients are statistically 
significant at the .001-level, except the path between train-attitude 
and car-choice behavior, which is significant at the .05-level) 
The antecedents of car choice behavior account for 47.8% of its variance. 
Furthermore, all paths in the model have significant coefficients. Both the two 
attitudes and habit have unique contributions in the prediction of behavior. As 
Figure 2.1 shows, attitudes are not independent of habit, as is indicated by 
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weights of around .30. As expected, decisional involvement is satisfactorily 
predicted by habit strength. In addition, habit is predicted by car availability. 
An overall test of fit between the data and the model was obtained by using 
LISREL П (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1988), in which the analysis was based on the 
covariance matrix. The indicators of fit suggest that the model fits the data well, 
χ
2(8)=9.59, p=.295; Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index=.956; Root Mean Square 
Residual=.0443. 
Investigating the trade-off between attitude and habit 
In order to test the hypothesized trade-off between car attitude and car choice 
habit in their prediction of car-choice behavior a moderated hierarchical 
multiple regression analysis was performed (see Stone-Romero & Anderson, 
1994), in which behavior is predicted by attitude, habit, and the attitude x habit 
interaction term. In order to reduce multicollinearity bias, all variables were 
standardized before the crossproduct was computed (Dunlap & Kemery, 1987). 
The prediction of car-choice behavior by car attitude (R2=.33) is significantly 
improved by including car choice habit (R2=.47; F-change=47.16, p<.001). 
Inclusion of the interaction term after attitude and habit yielded a modest, but 
significant, improvement of the prediction (R2=.49; F-change=8.32, p<.005). 
The nature of this interaction is revealed when the sample was split as close 
as possible at the median of the distribution of the habit measure. Then, the 
correlation between car attitude and behavior was calculated for the two 
subgroups (see Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2: Correlation between car attitude and car choice behavior at two 
levels of car habit 
Weak habit (n=93) 0.64 
Strong habit (n=106) 0.32 
Both correlations are significant at .001 level 
3
 As can be seen in Table 2.1, a moderate but significant correlation is found between decisional 
involvement and car choice behavior. Because car choice behavior comprises self-reports of past 
behavior, it seems plausible to assume that frequency of car choices in the past may lead to lower levels 
of decisional involvement, and so contributes to the strength of car choice habit. As an alternative model, 
car choice behavior may influence habit strength, mediated by decisional involvement [fitting this model 
to the data yields the following indicators of fit: χ2(7)=2.85, p=.898; Adjusted Goodness of Fit 
Index=.986; Root Mean Square Residual=.024, which suggest a satisfactory model]. 
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As can be seen in Table 2.2, for both habit groups the correlation between 
attitude and behavior is significant. However, the attitude-behavior correlation 
is stronger among the subgroup with relatively weak habit compared to those 
who indicated a relatively strong habit. The difference between attitude-
behavior correlations of the strong versus weak habit subgroups is significant, 
2=2.95, p<.01. Thus, when habit is weak the attitude and behavior measures 
share 41% of their variance, whereas when habit is strong the attitude and 
behavior measures only share 10% of their variance. 
2.4 Discussion 
The results of the present study suggest that habit is an important determinant 
of travel mode choice. Car choice behavior was satisfactorily predicted from 
attitudes toward choosing available options on the one hand, and car choice 
habit on the other hand. Evidently, predicting mode choice behavior from 
attitudes only is not optimal, because car choice habit explains 14% of variance 
in addition. In this respect mode choice resembles other highly repetitive 
behavior, for which the predictive role of habit has been demonstrated (e.g.. 
Kahle, Klingel, & Kulka, 1981; Landis et al., 1978; Mittal, 1988; Wittenbraker et 
al., 1983). 
The regression results with respect to the interaction between attitude and 
habit in the prediction of behavior suggest that a trade-off between attitude and 
habit exists (cf. Bagozzi, 1981; Triandis, 1977). When habit is weak the attitude-
behavior link is stronger than when habit is strong. On the other hand, among 
the strong habit subgroup a small, but significant correlation of 0.32 between 
attitude and behavior indicates that attitudes still guide these individuals' 
behavior to some extent, even if the behavior is repetitively exhibited. Even 
though the behavior has been frequently repeated, it is conceivable that the 
reasons that originally resulted into the onset of the behavior remain valid. 
When respondents are asked to report their attitude, these reasons may become 
salient. Ronis et al. (1989) discuss other mechanisms that may contribute to an 
attitude-behavior correlation when behavior is repetitive. For example, when 
behavior is repeatedly exhibited, attitudes may be inferred from self-
perceptions of that behavior (Bern, 1967). However, the present data suggest 
that, although some correlation remains when habit is strong, attitudes reflect 
29 
Chapter 2 
behavior to a much greater extent when habit is weak, which makes a self-
perception explanation less obvious. 
As was discussed in the introduction section of this chapter, various 
operationalizations of habit are reported in the literature. The instrument we 
use to measure habit does not rely on respondents' abilities to remember past 
behavior or to remember psychological processes that are supposed to reflect 
habit. Rather, the Response Frequency measure is based on current schematic 
thinking, which is supposed to be guided by the strength of the habit 
component. A point of criticism might be raised concerning whether the 
Response Frequency measure reflects an attitude, rather than habit, given a 
moderate correlation between habit and attitude. Although we do not have 
external validation data in this study concerning our measure (but see Study 2), 
we think it reflects habit, and only partially attitude, for a number of reasons. 
First, the Response Frequency measure behaves in the model as was 
hypothesized on theoretical grounds. Second, its correlation with attitude 
would be expected to be substantially higher if the measure reflects car use 
attitude. Also, the occurrence of the (theoretically expected) interaction of habit 
and attitude in the prediction of behavior would be unlikely if the Response 
Frequency measure of habit were another measure of attitude. 
However, in order to circumvent a potential confound of habit and attitude 
concerning their interaction in the prediction of behavior, in a secondary 
analysis the attitude toward car use was partialled out of the habit measure. 
This yields a measure of habit, controlled for the attitude4. Subsequently, we 
conducted the same regression analysis to investigate whether the interaction 
of habit and attitude still produced a significant effect in the prediction of 
behavior. The regression analysis showed that habit predicted behavior over 
and above attitude, and more importantly, inclusion of the interaction term 
after attitude and habit still yielded a significant, although modest 
improvement of the prediction (F-change=4.56, p<.04). These results suggest 
that the trade-off between attitude and habit, as suggested by Triandis (1977), is 
not affected when the habit measure is controlled for attitude. Finally, some 
validating items were present in the questionnaire, i.e., self-reported amount of 
annual mileage, and the item that reflects self-reported habit. The habit 
4
 The rationale behind this analysis is that, even though respondents are required to respond as quickly as 
possible to globally described stimulus trips, these instructions do not preclude that subjects' answers are 
partially based on weighing the consequences of using the car, i.e. their attitudes toward car use. 
Therefore, it make sense to isolate that part of habit strength which is not related to the attitude toward 
car use. 
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measure correlated substantially with both items (r=.37, p<.001, and r=.55, 
p<.001, respectively). In sum, we believe that the Response Frequency measure 
has the potential to serve as an indication of general habit. 
An important condition for habit to develop is that individuals are able to 
repeat their behavior. To acquire the habit of choosing the car, a car should be 
available at least, and one should own a licence (cf. Banister, 1978). Car 
availability appeared to be modestly, but significantly, related to the habit 
measure. 
Furthermore, this study investigated the relationship between habit strength 
and decisional involvement. Decisional involvement refers to the individual's 
motivation to engage in the decision making process. In the context of 
consumer purchase behavior Mittal and Lee (1989) distinguish between 
product involvement and purchase involvement or brand-decision 
involvement. Whereas the former type of involvement refers to a consumer's 
interest in a product class, the latter form concerns an individual's interest to 
focus on making a decision. Our scale of decisional involvement parallels 
Mittal and Lee's (1989) concept of brand-decision involvement in the domain of 
travel mode choice. The present data suggest that when individuals have 
chosen the same mode repetitively in the past and thus have developed strong 
habits, they are less motivated to engage in the decision making process (cf. 
Ronis et al., 1989). This conclusion is further investigated in the next series of 
experiments. In addition, attempts are made to enhance subjects' motivation to 
consider alternatives or otherwise expend mental effort in the decision process. 
The present study certainly has its limitations. The use of questionnaires, for 
example, limits the types of measures that can be used. By using trained 
interviewers to collect the data, however, we attempted to obtain the highest 
possible quality of data. A serious limitation is that car choice behavior was 
measured by self-reports. As argued before, this measurement procedure may 
be vulnerable to biases and may, therefore, produce inaccurate responses. 
Another serious limitation is that the study comprises a cross-section at one 
point in time. The correlational data do not allow us, therefore, to draw 
conclusions on causal relations between the measured constructs. Other 
designs (e.g., longitudinal and/or experimental) are necessary to investigate 
the dynamic processes underlying the relationships between behavior, attitude, 
habit, and decisional involvement. Before focusing explicitly on these 
processes, in the next chapter we will first elaborate on the issue of validity and 
reliability of the Response Frequency measure of habit. 
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Chapter three 
A further test of the 
Response Frequency measure of habit: 
The issue of validity and reliability (Study 2) 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we proposed a new approach to the measurement of 
habit. Instead of asking subjects to remember how often they exhibited a 
particular behavior in the past (e.g., Triandis, 1980), or how frequently they 
performed an act "without awareness" or 'Ъу force of habit" (e.g., Mittal, 1988; 
Wittenbraker et al., 1983), our measure consists of a task in which subjects are 
asked to respond as quickly as possible to a number of globally described 
stimulus trips. Subjects are requested to mention the first mode of transport 
that comes to mind as the one they would use in each trip. Habit strength 
toward using a mode in general is assumed to be reflected in the frequency of 
responding with that particular mode (hence 'Response Frequency' measure). 
The results of Study 1 showed that this measure of habit behaved as was 
expected on theoretical grounds. More specifically, car use habit strength 
added to the prediction of car choice behavior over and above attitude toward 
car use (representing the personal, reasoned trade-off between pros and cons of 
mode options). Moreover, attitudes were less predictive of behavior when habit 
was strong (see Ronis et al., 1989; Triandis, 1980). 
However, even though responses were given under time pressure, it might 
be argued that this measurement procedure taps the liking for or attitude 
toward a given travel mode across a number of journeys, rather than non-
reasoned or automatic responses which are supposed to be guided by the habit 
strength to use that mode. That is, the instrument may simply tap a generalized 
measure of attitude toward choosing the car, which is presumably based on 
reasoned considerations of using the car as compared to other options. Because 
this new measurement procedure plays an important role in subsequent 
studies, it seems appropriate first to explore the properties of the measure more 
closely. Therefore, the present study was conducted to establish the validity 
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and reliability of the Response Frequency measure. The validity of the measure 
was investigated with regard to three different aspects: predictive validity, 
convergent validity, and discriminant validity (e.g., Brinberg & Kidder, 1982; 
Campbell & Fiske, 1959). 
Predictive validity of the Response Frequency measure might be established 
by demonstrating that the measure is strongly related to an external criterion 
which is probably under the control of habit, that is, mode choice behavior for 
commuting transport over short distances. Several transport researchers 
maintain that for regularly made trips travel behavior has often become 
routinized or habitual, i.e., route choice behavior as well as mode choice 
behavior (e.g., Banister, 1978; Goodwin, 1977; Lovelock, 1975). Traveling to and 
from work represents such a regularly made trip, for which individuals 
frequently use the same mode without much conscious thought, day after day, 
and week after week (cf. Lachman, Lachman, & Butterfield, 1979). Therefore, it 
may be argued that commuters' car choice behavior is likely to be guided by car 
choice habit strength, rather than by reasoned considerations (attitude toward 
using the car). 
Evidence of convergent validity may be provided by finding a high degree of 
correspondence between different indicators of the same construct, i.e., the 
Response Frequency habit measure must correlate substantially with the 
traditional self-report measures of habit. Theoretically, it may be argued that 
the answers elicited by the Response Frequency measure and self-reported 
measure of past behavior may both tap the same repository of cognitively 
represented experiences related to travel behavior in the past. Both measures 
fish in the same pond, so to speak. More specifically, since the Response 
Frequency instrument presents subjects with a wide sample of possible 
journeys, the measure may require the activation and retrieval from memory of 
those travel mode choices which were made in similar situations in the past. To 
some extent, the same modes and journeys may also be activated and 
remembered when subjects are asked to report on how often they used a 
particular travel mode in the past. However, when subjects are asked to report 
on the frequency with which an specific act is performed "by force of habit", 
answers may be only partially based on the same set of memories, i.e., the recall 
of only those instances in which the behavior in question was executed by force 
of habit (and thus without much awareness). In addition, the latter measure 
may suffer from other drawbacks, particularly the presumed inability of people 
to report accurately on the causes (i.e., habit) of their behavior (Nisbett & 
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Wilson, 1977). Accordingly, it may be anticipated that the Response Frequency 
measure correlates more strongly with self-reported past behavior than with 
self-reported habit. 
Discriminant validity is established when indicators of different constructs are 
nonredundant, that is, a measure of general car use habit does not covary (at 
least not strongly) with the general attitude toward car use. 
Finally, as an indication of reliability, the Response Frequency measure as 
well as the traditional habit measures were subjected to a test-retest analysis 
over a period of 4 months. 
3.2 Method 
Respondents and procedure 
Respondents were 30 employees of the University of Nijmegen. They were all 
residents of the city of Nijmegen who had a driving licence, and had a car and 
bicycle at their disposal. They were recruited by contacting randomly selected 
university employees from the university telephone directory. The study was 
announced as a study on patterns of mobility. The target behavior was the 
choice of car rather than alternative mode options (e.g., bus, bicycle) for 
traveling between home and work. 
The study consisted of four parts. First, employees were phoned and 
requested to participate in the research. In addition, repondents were asked 
which mode of transport they had used to travel to the university each of the 
past five working days, and to estimate the travel distance from their home to the 
university. The self-reported travel distance ranged from 2 to 8 kilometers 
(M=4.55). As a measure of car use for commuting the number of times that 
respondents made a trip by car to their work in the past week was divided by 
the number of times they had traveled to their work in that week. This 
proportion served as a measure of commuters' car choice behavior. The correlation 
between travel distance and car choice behavior was virtually zero, r=0.03, ns. 
The next day, a face-to-face interview was held to administer the Response 
Frequency measure of habit. Following the interview, respondents were 
requested to fill out a questionnaire which comprised items measuring 
attitudes, and traditional measures of habit with respect to car use for job-
unrelated trips both inside and outside the city. The questionnaire contained a 
number of other additional items, which are not relevant here. 
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Finally, in order to examine the test-retest reliability of the habit measures, a 
part of the sample (n=23) was again contacted 4 months later, in order to assess 
the Response Frequency measure in a face-to-face interview and the traditional 
measures of habit by means of a questionnaire (7 respondents were not 
available at the time of data collection). 
The measurement of car choice habit strength 
In this study we used a more extensive version of the Response frequency habit 
measure, which consisted of 15 imaginary destinations for several journey 
motives (i.e., social, recreational, and shopping). Five were short distance desti-
nations (e.g., "going to a supermarket", "meeting someone at the railway 
station"), 5 were middle-range distance destinations (e.g., "an appointment in a 
nearby village", "shopping in a nearby town"), and 5 were long distance 
destinations (e.g., "holidays in The Netherlands", "visiting relatives somewhere 
in The Netherlands"). Respondents were requested to mention as quickly as 
possible the first mode of transportation that came to mind as the one they 
would use for each destination. Car choice habit was indexed by the number of 
choices that were made for the car. 
Measures in the questionnaire 
Attitudes toward car use were measured separately for job-unrelated trips 
inside and outside the city by four bipolar 7-point semantic differential items, 
i.e., bad (1) - good (7), unattractive (1) - attractive (7), not sensible (1) - sensible 
(7), unpleasant (1) - pleasant (7). A generalized measure of attitude toward car use 
was obtained by averaging the eight items, coefficient alpha is 0.86. 
In addition, the questionnaire contained four items to obtain two alternative, 
traditional, measures of habit, namely self-reported frequency of past behavior 
(e.g., Triandis, 1980), and self-reported habit (e.g., Wittenbraker et al , 1983). To 
measure self-reported past behavior subjects were asked to indicate how 
frequently they had used their car during the last week. Self-reported habit was 
measured by asking respondents to indicate "How many times in the last week 
did you use the car by force of habit". All responses were given on a 7-point 
scale, ranging from "never" (1) to "always" (7). Similar to the measurement of 
attitudes, the traditional self-reports were measured for job-unrelated trips 
separately for inside as well as outside the city. This was done to obtain 
corresponding levels of generality of the Response Frequency measure of habit, 
attitude toward car use and the traditional measures of habit. The two items 
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concerning self-reported past car use for destinations inside and outside the 
city were summed into one score (r = 0.09, ns.)1, yielding a generalized measure 
of self-reported past car use. Similarly, a generalized measure of self-reported car 
habit was obtained by averaging the two items with respect to self-reported car 
habit for destinations inside and outside the city (r=0.45, p<.02). 
3.3 Results 
The prediction of commuters'car choice behavior 
Table 3.1: Correlations among attitude, Response Frequency measure of habit, 
self-reported past behavior, self-reported habit and behavior (i.e., 
the use of car for commuting between home and university). 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. Attitude - .32 
2. Response Frequency measure 
3. Self-reported past behavior 
4. Self-reported habit 
5. Car use for work trips 
• = p<.05; ** = p<.01; *" = p<.001 
Table 3.1 presents intercorrela lions between the measured variables. As Table 
3.1 shows, the attitude toward car use was not significantly correlated with 
commuters' car choice behavior. Moreover, the Response Frequency measure of 
car habit appeared to be significantly, and substantially related to commuters' 
car use, showing the predictive validity of the measure. This highly significant 
relationship was retained even when the attitude was partialled out of the 
1 The rather low correlation between the measures of past car use for trips inside the city and outside the 
city suggests that car use for both destinations are determined by different forces (e.g., activity patterns, 
supply of public transport). Averaging both items does not necessarily yield a statistically unreliable 
generalized measure of past behavior (see also the test-retest correlation), or a measure of habit which 
does not correlate strongly with other indicators of general habit (cf. Guilford, 1954). The low correlation 
rather suggests that the measure is multi-dimensional in nature. For the present purpose it is important to 
obtain a measure of past behavior which is on a conceptual level comparable to the other measures, that 
is, the measure must be general. 
.30 
.66"* 
-
.34 
.44* 
.54" 
-
.33 
.60*" 
.64*" 
.62*" 
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correlation, the partial correlation being 0.56, p<.001. Similarly, sizable 
correlations between habit strength and commuters' car use were found when 
using the self-reported measure of past behavior and self-reported habit, the 
partial correlations being 0.60, p<.001, and 0.58, p< .001, respectively. 
Relationship between attitude, Response Frequency measure, and self-reports 
As can be seen in Table 3.1, a moderate correlation was found between the self-
reports. More importantly, the Response Frequency measure correlated 
satisfactorily with both self-reports, and, as expected, in particular with self-
reported frequency of past behavior. These results indicate the convergent 
validity of the Response Frequency measure. 
The correlation between the attitude toward car use and the Response 
Frequency measure of habit was moderate but non-significant (r=0.32, ns.). 
Thus, it appears that the Response Frequency measure of general habit and the 
generalized attitude measure are rather nonredundant. The same pattern of 
correlations were found between the attitude measure and the traditional 
measures of habit. 
Test-retest reliability of the Response Frequency measure, and self-reports 
Table 3.2 presents the test-retest correlations for the three habit measures. As 
can be seen in the table, the Response Frequency measure was highly reliable, 
as indicated by the high correlation between the Response Frequency measures 
on two different points in time. However, the test-retest reliabilities of the 
measures of self-reported past behavior and self-reported habit were 
considerably lower. These latter results were established for the aggregated, 
generalized measures as well as for the measures with respect to car use 
separately for inside and outside the city. 
Table 3.2: Test-retest correlations for the Response Frequency measure of 
habit, self-reported past behavior, and self-reported habit. 
Response Frequency measure 0.92** 
Self-reported past behavior 0.62* (0.61/0.60«) 
Self-reported habit 0.64* (0.68/0.44 ") 
* = p<.01;** = p<.001 
я
 inside the city/outside the city 
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3.4 Discussion 
In the present study an attempt was made to establish the validity and 
reliability of the Response Frequency instrument of habit in more detail. Three 
different types of validity were investigated, namely predictive, convergent, 
and discriminant validity. Furthermore, the reliabilities of the Response 
Frequency measure and the traditional measures of habit were tested by means 
of a test-retest analysis. 
First, evidence for predictive validity was provided by the finding that the 
Response Frequency measure covaried substantially with commuters' mode 
choice behavior, i.e., an external criterion not included in the habit measure 
(r=0.60, p<.001,36% shared variance). Similar results were obtained when using 
the traditional self-reports. Assuming that traveling between home and work is 
a rather routinized process, the present results seem to indicate that the 
Response Frequency measure reveals an important part of this habitual 
process, i.e., the choice of mode of transport. 
Additionally, whereas the Response Frequency measure correlated only 
moderately with self-reported habit (r=0.44, p<.05, 19% shared variance), the 
correlation with self-reported frequency of past behavior was more impressive 
(r=0.66, p<.001,45% shared variance), demonstrating the convergent validity of 
the measure. As was argued in the introduction section of this chapter, this 
result may suggest that when subjects are responding to the Response 
Frequency measure of habit or a measure of self-reported past behavior, in both 
cases their answers may be mainly drawn from the same repository of 
knowledge about and experiences with travel behavior, i.e., decisions and 
actions executed in a wide range of travel situations in the past, stored and 
ready to be retrieved from memory upon instigation. 
Furthermore, results showed that the Response Frequency measure of habit 
can be differentiated from attitude toward car use, because there is only a 
relatively low (non-significant) correlation between the two (r=0.32, ns., 10% 
shared variance). Comparable levels of shared variance were also observed 
between attitude on the one hand, and the traditional self-report measures on 
the other. Moreover, the attitude toward car use did not significantly correlate 
with commuters' car use, suggesting that commuters' car use is largely 
determined by habit strength. These results provide support for the 
discriminant validity of the Response Frequency measure of habit in relation to 
the attitude construct. 
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Finally, inspection of test-retest correlations showed that the Response 
Frequency measure was highly consistent over time (85% shared variance), 
whereas the measure of self-reported frequency of past behavior and self-
reported habit were less consistent (shared variances were 38% and 41%, 
respectively). These results suggest that the Response Frequency measure is a 
more reliable instrument for assessing habit strength than the traditional self-
report measures. 
In conclusion, results of the present study seem to indicate that the Response 
Frequency measure of habit is both valid and reliable. The measure is capable 
of predicting an external target behavior which is presumably habit driven. 
This predictive value was virtually retained when the habit measure was 
corrected for the attitude toward using the target mode. In addition, the 
Response Frequency measure substantially converges with self-reported 
frequency of past behavior. Finally, the Response Frequency measure yields 
highly consistent responses over a relatively long period of time (4 months), 
demonstrating the reliability of the instrument. 
In the following two chapters I turn to the decisional processes underlying 
travel mode choices, i.e., the process of information acquisition and use, and go 
on to examine the relationship between habit strength and these processes in an 
experimental setting. In addition, as a further exploration of the validity of the 
Response Frequency habit measure, its effects on these processes will be 
compared with those of the traditional self-report measures. 
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Chapter four 
Habit and the process of 
travel mode choice (Studies 3 and 4)1 
4.1 Introduction 
An observation one can make when reviewing the studies that examine the 
relationship between reasoned and habitual action, is that the research methods 
employed in these studies reveal statistical associations between measures of 
habit, attitudes, intentions and behavior, but not the processes underlying these 
relations (e.g., Bentler & Speckart, 1979; see also chapter 2). For instance, the 
attitude - behavior model of Triandis (1980) suggests that when behavior is 
new, or when old behavioral patterns cannot be executed anymore, choices are 
under control of reasoned processes, whereas habitual behavior is performed 
automatically, i.e., without much reasoning or deliberation. In other words, it is 
argued that as behavior becomes more habitual the decision making process is 
less elaborate (cf. Ronis et al., 1989). However, to our knowledge there is little 
research that has actually examined the decision making processes that 
accompany habitual behavior. 
The present studies focus on the relationship between habit strength (e.g., of 
bicycle use) and the extent to which travel mode choices are accompanied by 
weighing pros and cons of available options. In an experimental setting we 
recorded information search behavior that preceded the choice of a travel mode 
in a hypothetical travel situation. The elaborateness of the decision making 
process was inferred from the amount of information that was acquired, and 
the complexity of search strategies (e.g., Ford et al., 1989; Payne, 1976). It was 
expected that, as habit increases in strength, individuals would engage in a less 
elaborate decision making process, i.e., they would search less for information. 
The "process tracing" paradigm (Jacoby et al., 1987) was applied to demonstrate 
differences in this process in terms of depth and complexity as function of habit 
strength. 
1 Based on Aarts, Verplanken, & Van Knippenberg (1994). 
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in Study 1 it was found that habit strength is negatively related to decisional 
involvement. This suggests that when the habit of choosing a particular travel 
mode is strong, people feel less need to engage in an elaborate decision making 
process than when habit is weak. However, the depth of the decision process 
may also be contingent on situational factors, which may enhance individuals' 
motivation to engage in relatively effortful decision making. For instance, 
McAllister and colleagues (1979) found that personal accountability and 
manipulated importance of the decision both led to the application of more 
complex decision strategies. Several other studies have provided empirical 
evidence for the fact that situationally determined motivation affects the depth 
of decisional processes (e.g., Billings & Scherer, 1988; Christensen-Szylanski, 
1978; Weldon & Gargano, 1988). Accordingly, it seems conceivable that even 
people with strong habits will engage in elaborate decision making from time 
to time under such circumstances. Therefore, in addition to the effects of 
chronic habit this study investigates the effects of situation-specific motivation 
on the elaborateness of the decision making process. Situation-specific 
motivation was manipulated by means of perceived accountability. Subjects in 
the accountability condition were told that they had to explain their decision at 
the end of the experimental session. It is assumed that accountability instigates 
people to scrutinize informational input for its relevance to their decision task 
in order to appear logical and more thoughtful (e.g., Tetlock, 1985; Weldon & 
Gargano, 1988). Accountability thus activates a self-presentation motive. We ex-
pected that both habit and situation-specific motivation would be related to the 
depth of the decision making process, i.e., habit strength was expected to 
decrease the amount of information acquisition, whereas accountability was 
expected to increase the amount of information search. 
4.2 Study 3 
The present study focuses on habitual use of a bicycle to travel short distances. 
In particular, the relation between measured habit, manipulated accountability, 
and predecisional information acquisition was examined. Information 
acquisition behavior was observed by means of an information display board 
(e.g., Jacoby et al., 1987; Payne, 1976). In the information display board 
paradigm, subjects are allowed to collect information about attributes of 
alternatives, and choose an alternative on the basis on this information. An 
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example of the information display board which was used in the present study 
is shown in Figure 4.1. 
/" 
walking 
bus 
bicycle 
train 
physical , , traveling , nuisance from 
discomfort d e U , y time в и п ' о п other people f r e e d o m 
10 
minutes 
READY to choose 
"N 
Figure 4.1: The information display board. 
Subjects are asked to imagine that they have to make a trip from their home to 
the town center. In order to reach this destination they can choose from 4 travel 
mode options, represented here in the left hand column (e.g., walking, bus, 
bicycle and train). Attributes of options are presented in the top row of the 
matrix. Thus, each cell of the matrix represents a travel mode option χ attribute 
combination, which is displayed when the subject selects the cell. Subjects are 
free to inspect or reinspect any piece of information in any order at their own 
pace (e.g., first some or all information about one alternative, or information 
about a specific attribute for some or all alternatives). In this way the researcher 
may gain insight into the amount and type of information subjects need in 
order to come to a decision, as well as the type of decision rules used (e.g., 
compensatory or noncompensatory rules; see Ford et al., 1989). 
4.2.1 Method 
Procedure and measurement of habit strength 
Subjects worked on PCs in separate cubicles. After an instruction about how to 
use the computer, the Response Frequency measure of habit was administered. 
Nine imaginary activities and their associated destinations were presented in 
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random order (e.g., "going to a supermarket", "an appointment in a nearby 
village"). Subjects were instructed to choose as quickly as possible the first 
travel mode that came to mind as the one they would use from four al-
ternatives, i.e., walking, bicycle, train, and bus. Bicycle choice habit was indexed 
by the number of choices that were made for the bicycle. The measure thus 
varies from 0 to 9. The mean score across the sample was 4.96, sd=1.68. The 
sample was split as closely as possible to the median of the distribution into 
subjects with relatively strong versus relatively weak bicycle choice habit. 
The information acquisition task 
Subjects were then familiarized with an information display board. In a practice 
session, an information display board was demonstrated (concerning the choice 
between refrigerators). In addition to familiarizing subjects with the 
information acquisition task, the practice session was intended to remove the 
habit measure task from the subjects' working memory. 
For the main task subjects were asked to imagine that they had to travel from 
their home to a shop in the town center. In order to reach this destination they 
could choose from four travel mode options, i.e., walking, bus, bicycle, and 
train. An information display board was shown (see Figure 3.1) with the 4 
travel options as rows, and 6 attributes as columns (i.e., physical effort, 
probability of delay, travel time, expected nuisance from other people, expected 
personal convenience, and freedom2). All attribute values were presented in 
verbal form, except for travel time, which was presented in minutes. Table 4.1 
presents the attribute values. In order to acquire information about a travel 
mode's value on a particular attribute, subjects used the 'mouse' to select a 
particular cell of the matrix, whereupon the desired information was presented 
on the screen. As soon as another cell was selected, the previous information 
disappeared. Subjects could freely inspect and reinspect pieces of information 
in any order. As soon as they felt that they had acquired sufficient information, 
they indicated their choice. The computer maintained a record of which in-
formation items were inspected and reinspected. 
¿
 Although financial cost is also an important travel mode attribute in general, it was not included, 
because Dutch students, who formed the sample, use a public transportation annual pass, which is part of 
the governmental allowance to students. 
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Table 4.1: Attribute values of the 4 travel mode options in the information 
display board 
physical effort delay travel time nuisance convenience freedom 
walk much very little 70 min. little little much 
bus little much 25 min. much very little little 
bicycle average little 35 min. average average average 
train very little average 20 min. average little very little 
In order to manipulate accountability, half the subjects were told that they 
were supposed to explain their choice at the end of the experimental session to 
the researchers conducting the study. This manipulation was implemented 
after the instructions for the main choice task, and before subjects actually 
started to work on it. Subjects were randomly assigned to the accountability 
conditions. 
After the choice task subjects were presented with each option χ attribute 
combination, and were asked to indicate the attribute value they had seen 
when they had inspected that information item during the search task. The four 
possible values were presented in multiple-choice format. If they had not 
inspected the information, they were asked to estimate the value that they 
believed to be the correct one. For each item (inspected and not-inspected) 
subjects were asked to rate how certain they were of their answer on an 11-point 
scale, ranging from "not certain at all" (1) to "very certain" (11). 
Subjects and design 
Subjects were 80 students at the University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. 
They were recruited from one particular student dormitory building, which 
was located at a distance of 3 kilometers from the town center. The building 
was within 200 meters of a bus stop and a railway station with direct connec­
tions to the town center, which were therefore realistic options. All subjects 
owned a bicycle and a public transportation annual pass (see Footnote 2). They 
did not have a car at their disposal. Subjects were paid Dfl. 10.00 for their 
participation. The design of the experiment is a 2 (Habit Strength: strong versus 
weak) χ 2 (Accountability: accountable versus not accountable) between-
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subjects factorial design. All ANOVAs were conducted according to this 
design. 
4.2.2 Results 
Manipulation check 
As a check on the accountability manipulation, subjects were asked to indicate 
to what extent they felt that they had to make a choice that they could explain. 
They answered on an 11-point scale ranging from "little" (1) to "strongly" (11). 
Subjects in the accountability condition scored higher (m=6.63) than those who 
were not held accountable (m=4.65), i(76)=3.34, p<.001. 
Information acquisition 
The average number of pieces of information that were inspected was 9.37 (sd = 
6.42). One subject did not inspect any information, and 5 subjects inspected all 
24 pieces of information. The number of ranspected items was low (i.e., 3.9% of 
all inspected items across the sample). All analyses were performed on the 
number of inspected items, thereby excluding reinspections, although 
including reinspections yielded the same results. 
The number of inspected information items was subjected to an ANOVA. As 
expected, strong habit subjects inspected less information (m = 7.25) than weak 
habit subjects (m=10.84), F(l,76)=6.28, p<.02. Accountable subjects also searched 
more information (m=10.57) than subjects who were not held accountable 
(m=7.88), although this effect was only marginally significant, F(l,76)=3.38, 
p<.07. A non-significant interaction suggests that the effects of habit and 
accountability are independent, F(l,76)=0.02. 
In Figure 4.2 the mean number of inspected information items about the 
travel options are shown for weak and strong habit subjects. Apart from 
inspecting more information overall, weak habit subjects also inspected 
information more equally across travel options than did strong habit subjects, 
who exhibited a more selective search pattern. In the traditional information 
display board paradigm, selectivity of information search across options is 
interpreted as the extent to which cognitively demanding compensatory 
strategies (low selectivity) versus less complex noncompensatory strategies 
(high selectivity) are used (e.g., Payne, 1976). Selectivity is indexed by the stan-
dard deviation of proportions of information items selected across choice 
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options. For weak habit subjects this measure equals 0.18, and differs 
marginally significantly from strong habit subjects' mean score, 0.24, 
F(l,75)=3.80, p<.06, suggesting that strong habit subjects followed relatively 
more noncompensatory choice strategies. There is no significant effect of 
accountability, F(l,75)=0.43, and no significant interaction, F(l,75)=0.05. 
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walk bus bicycle train walk bus bicycle train Figure 4.2: Mean number of inspected information items for ea h choice 
option 
Travel mode choices 
After the information search stage, subjects indicated their choice of travel 
mode. Choices for walking, bus, bicycle, and train were made by 1,3,55, and 21 
subjects, respectively. Strong habit subjects chose the bicycle versus an alterna­
tive option more frequently (81% versus 19%) than did weak habit subjects 
(59% versus 41%), χ2(1)=4.25, р<Ы, which demonstrates the effect of habit on 
choice outcome. There is no significant effect of accountability on choice for 
bicycles, χ2(1)=1.45. 
Certainty of estimated not-inspected attribute values 
One reason why strong habit subjects inspected less information in the choice 
task than did weak habit subjects may have been that strong habit subjects 
were more certain about the attribute values that they did not inspect. Whether 
or not an information item was inspected was inferred from the computer 
registrations. A mean score of subjects' judgments of how certain they were 
about the estimated attribute values of the not-inspected items was subjected to 
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an ANOVA. Strong habit subjects were more certain about their estimates 
(m=8.74) than were weak habit subjects (m=7.50), F(l,70)=10.21, p<.002. The 
effect of accountability, F(l,70)=0.26, and the interaction, F(l,70)=0.13, were 
both non-significant3. 
4.2.3 Discussion 
The results of this study suggest that as habit strength increases, depth of 
predecisional information search decreases4. Strong habit individuals 
apparently need less information about the pros and cons of available options. 
Also, holding subjects accountable for their choices tended to increase the level 
of information search, suggesting a more elaborate decision making process 
(Tetlock, 1983; Weldon & Gargano, 1988). 
The average number of inspected information items was relatively low, i.e., 
39% of the available information. One reason for this may be the fact that the 
stimulus trip, which represents a realistic situation, was well-known to the 
subjects. It is conceivable that subjects who had developed a strong habit to 
choose to travel by bicycle had done so in exactly the context that was used in 
the experiment, and therefore needed less information. In other words, strong 
habit subjects' level of knowledge about this particular trip might have been 
higher compared to the weak habit subjects' level of knowledge. The 
hypothesized effect of habit strength on the elaborateness of the decision 
making process may thus be confounded with knowledge. We therefore 
replicated the present study, this time using a relatively unfamiliar journey. In 
addition, we used the more extensive version of the Response Frequency habit 
measure, and included two alternative measures of habit (i.e., self-reports), 
which have traditionally been used by other researchers (see also Study 2). 
J
 Because subjects were asked to recall inspected information, recall accuracy could be analyzed. A 
marginally significant difference in recall accuracy between strong and weak habit subjects, 
F(l,71)=3.58, p<.07, suggests that strong habit subjects recalled the proportion of inspected information 
better than weak habit subjects. However, the interpretation of this effect is ambiguous: because strong 
habit subjects inspected less information than weak habit subjects, their mental load was less, which may 
have resulted in a memory advantage. 
4
 Subjects' responses on the habit measure may be partially influenced by their attitudes toward bicycle 
use, and consequently, effects of habit on information search behavior may be confounded with the 
attitude component. Therefore, as was the case in the previous two studies, we investigated whether habit 
yields significant effects when the attitude toward bicycle use is partialled out of the habit measure. The 
attitude component was assessed before the experimental task, by a bipolar 11-point semantic differential 
item, i.e., unattractive (1) - attractive (11). Including the residual scores of the habit measure in the 
analyses yielded exactly the same pattern of significant effects. 
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4.3 Study 4 
4.3.1 Method 
Measurement of habit strength 
Subjects first responded to the Response Frequency measure of habit, which 
was provided in the form of a questionnaire. The measure consisted of the 
same 15 trips as in Study 2. Subjects were asked to write down as quickly as 
possible which mode of transport they would choose for each destination. The 
response format was free. Bicycle choice habit was indexed by the number of 
choices that were made for the bicycle. In theory the measure could vary from 0 
to 15, although a measure of bicycle choice habit will mostly be restricted to 
variation on the short and middle-range distance destinations. Accordingly, the 
mean score across the sample is 4.69, sd=2.11. The sample was split as closely as 
possible at the median of the distribution of the measure in order to distinguish 
subjects with relatively strong versus relatively weak bicycle choice habit. 
In addition, the questionnaire contained two alternative measures of habit. 
The first was self-reported frequency of past behavior (e.g., Triandis, 1980). 
Subjects were asked to indicate how frequently they had used their bicycle 
during the last 4 weeks when going somewhere. The 7-point response scale 
ranged from "never" (1) to "always" (7). The second was self-reported habit 
(e.g., Wirtenbraker et al., 1983), i.e., "How many times in the last 4 weeks when 
going somewhere did you take the bicycle by force of habit". Responses were 
given on a 7-point scale, which ranged from "never" (1) to "always" (7). 
The information acquisition task 
Subjects followed the procedure described in Study 3, and were introduced to 
the travel mode choice task. As an introduction to the travel mode choice 
problem, the computer displayed a map of an imaginary town, showing the 
outlines of the town's center, a shopping area, the subject's location of his or her 
imaginary home, the routes of bus, train, and tram, and their stops. A legend 
indicated the scale of the map. Subjects were asked to imagine that they had to 
go to the shopping area, which was at a distance of approximately 3 kilometers, 
in order to buy a book. The weather was said to be fair, and they were told that 
they had to be home again 1.5 hours later at the latest. They were then pre-
sented with an information display board, which contained 5 travel mode 
49 
Chapter 4 
options, i.e., walking, bus, bicycle, train, and tram, and 6 attributes, i.e., 
physical effort, probability of delay, travel time, expected nuisance from other 
people, post-transportation distance (e.g., from station or cycle shed to shop), 
and freedom. In Table 4.2 the attribute values are presented. 
Table 4.2: Attribute values of the 5 travel mode options in the information 
display board 
physical effort delay travel time nuisance post-transport freedom 
walk 
bus 
bicycle 
train 
tram 
very much 
little 
much 
very little 
average 
very little 
much 
little 
average 
much 
60 min. 
25 min. 
35 min. 
20 min. 
30 min. 
much 
very little 
average 
average 
little 
0 m. 
500 m. 
150 m. 
750 m. 
350 m. 
very much 
little 
much 
very little 
average 
Accountability was manipulated as in Study 3. After the choice task subjects 
were randomly presented with each option χ attribute combination. They were 
asked to indicate in multiple-choice format which value they had seen if they 
had inspected the item, and to estimate the value if they had not inspected the 
item. For each response they indicated how ceriain they were, as in Study 3. 
Subjects and design 
Subjects were 42 students of the University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. All 
subjects owned a bicycle and a public transportation annual pass. They did not 
have a car at their disposal. Subjects were paid Dfl. 10.00 for their participation. 
The design of the experiment is a 2 (Habit Strength: strong versus weak) χ 2 
(Accountability: accountable versus not accountable) between-subjects factorial 
design. All ANOVAs were conducted according to this design. 
4.3.2 Results and discussion 
Manipulation checks 
Two items checked the manipulation of accountability. Subjects indicated to 
what extent they had made an effort to look for the best option. They answered 
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on an 11-point scale ranging from "little" (1) to "strongly" (11). Subjects in the 
accountability condition scored higher (m=7.32) than those who were not held 
accountable (m=5.80), f(40)=2.02, p<.05. Accountable subjects also felt a greater 
pressure to make a good decision (m=7.18), than those who were not held 
accountable (m=5.75), f(40)=1.79, p<.05, one-tailed. 
Information acquisition 
Subjects inspected a larger proportion of information items than did subjects in 
Study 3. The average number of information items that were inspected was 
16.83 (i.e., 56%; sd=8.29). All subjects inspected at least one information item, 
while seven subjects inspected all 30 pieces of information. All analyses were 
performed on the number of inspected items, thereby excluding reinspections. 
Although the number of reinspections was higher than in Study 3 (i.e., 23.8% of 
all inspected items across the sample), the results were the same when rein-
spections were included in the analyses. 
The number of inspected information items was subjected to an ANOVA. As 
expected, strong habit subjects inspected less information (m=14.45) than did 
weak habit subjects (m=19.45), F(l,38)=6.83, p<.02. Subjects who were held ac-
countable searched more information (m=18.86) than did subjects who were not 
held accountable (m=14.60), F(l,38)=5.62, p<.03. As in Study 3, the interaction 
term was not significant F(l,38)=0.00. The results therefore replicate the 
findings of Study 3. 
In Figure 4.3 the mean number of information items that were inspected for 
each choice option is shown for weak and strong habit subjects. The two groups 
differ more strongly than in Study 3 in the extent to which a variable 
proportion of information was inspected across options. Strong habit subjects 
searched a more variable (i.e., more selective) proportion of information across 
options, and in particular they inspected relatively little information about 
alternatives to the bicycle, indicating the use of noncompensatory strategies, 
than weak habit subjects. The standard deviation of proportions of information 
items selected across choice options was 0.07 for weak habit subjects and 0.13 
for strong habit subjects, F(l,38)=6.95, p<.02. There was no significant effect of 
accountability, F(l,38)=1.03, and the interaction was also non-significant, 
F(l,38)=0.39. 
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Travel mode choices 
No choice was made for walking, whereas choices for bus, bicycle, train, and 
tram were made by 4, 28, 8, and 2 subjects, respectively. Strong habit subjects 
chose the bicycle versus an alternative option more frequently (82% versus 
18%) than did weak habit subjects (50% versus 50%), χ2(1)=4.77, p<.03. There 
was no significant effect of accountability on bicycle choice, χ2(1)=0.76. 
weak habit subjects strong habit subjects 
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Figure 4.3: Mean number of inspected information items for each choice 
option 
Certainty of estimated not-inspected attribute values 
Mean certainty judgments about estimates of non-inspected information items 
were submitted to an ANOVA. Strong habit subjects were not significantly 
more certain of their estimates of not-inspected information (m=7.16) than were 
weak habit subjects (m=7.92), F(l,31)=3.26. There was also no significant effect 
of accountability F(l,31)=0.30, and the interaction was also non-significant 
F(l,31)=0.12. These results suggest that the finding that strong habit subjects 
acquired less information than did weak habit subjects cannot simply be 
attributed to strong habit subjects thinking they were more knowledgeable 
about the non-inspected attribute values. In other words, although a confound 
of habit and knowledge cannot be completely ruled out, and might to some ex­
tent be inherently present in research on effects of habit, the less elaborate de­
cision making process that was observed among strong habit subjects is more 
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likely to be the result of a high degree of automaticity in habitual choices than 
of knowledge about the particular trip. 
Alternative measures of habit 
Table 4.3 shows correlations between the Response Frequency measure of 
habit, self-reported frequency of past behavior, self-reported habit, and depth 
of information search. Whereas the self-reports correlated with each other 
substantially, the correlations between the Response Frequency measure and 
the self-reports were moderate, indicating that the former measure has unique 
variance, which is not shared with the two self-report measures. Moreover, 
only the Response Frequency measure was significantly related to depth of in-
formation search. This suggests that the Response Frequency measure, more 
than the measure of self-reported frequency of past behavior and self-reported 
habit, is sensitive to automaticity in the decision making process. 
Table 4.3: Pearson correlations between the Response Frequency measure of 
bicycle choice habit, self-reported frequency of past bicycle choice, 
self-reported bicycle choice habit, and depth of predecisional 
information search. 
1 2 3 4 
1. Response Frequency measure - .42** .45** -.35* 
2. Self-reported past behavior - .80*** -.16 
3. Self-reported habit - -.12 
4. Depth of information search 
= p<.05; =p<.01; =p<.001 
4.4 General discussion 
The results reported above provide evidence for the hypothesized relationship 
between habit strength and the elaborateness of the decision making process 
that guides travel mode choice behavior. When habit is strong, individuals 
searched less for information and collected the information in a more selective 
fashion across options (i.e., used more noncompensatory decision rules) than 
53 
Chapter 4 
when habit is weak. These effects were obtained for both familiar and relatively 
unfamiliar stimulus journeys. By means of the information display board 
method we have attempted to reveal this decision making process. Much 
previous research on habit has been focused on the role of habit in the 
relationship between attitudes, intentions and repeated behavior. Usually, 
these studies contain cross-sectional data at one point in time, and conclusions 
on causality are based on structural relations between habit, attitudes, 
intentions and behavior. However, such studies do not allow one to draw 
conclusions about the processes underlying these relations. 
In contrast the approach as followed in Study 1, the information acquisition 
approach followed in the present two studies reveals more of the process in 
which decisions (or intentions) are formed on the basis of information about 
pros and cons of available options (cf. Jacoby et al., 1987; Ronis et al., 1989). 
Habit appeared to affect this process in two ways. First, habit strength was 
related to choice outcome. Persons who have developed a habit to use the 
bicycle also tended to choose that option more frequently after the acquisition 
of information. This corroborates the finding that habit strength is positively 
related to the intention to perform the habitual behavior, which has been 
frequently reported in previous studies (e.g., Bagozzi, 1981; Bentler & Speckart, 
1979). In addition, the finding that habit strength is negatively related to the 
elaborateness of the decision making process suggests that choice intentions are 
formed in a less elaborate and more heuristic fashion as habit strength 
increases. 
Furthermore, in both experiments it was found that, in general, situationally 
determined motivation (accountability) increased the depth of processing 
during decision making. However, the effects of accountability and habit on the 
decision making process appeared to be independent. The fact that habit and 
accountability showed two main effects suggests that the two factors were 
related to two distinctive processes. The main effect of habit on the index of 
selectivity of information search across options and the absence of an effect of 
accountability may indicate that habit affects the decision process on a more 
fundamental level, while the effects of accountability may be more superficial 
and strategic. That is, habit strength may have determined the type and 
quantity of information subjects needed to make a choice. On the other hand, 
the accountability manipulation may have elicited a goal to gain information in 
order to become knowledgeable enough to win the approval of others, rather 
than to evaluate and utilize all the information necessary in a thoughtful 
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decision (cf. Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Leippe & Elkin, 1987). This type of 
processing may particularly occur in well-known choice situations, and people 
have already committed themselves to a course of action, e.g., choosing a travel 
mode in a familiar journey (see Tetlock, 1985). Thus, regardless of their habit 
strength, subjects in the accountability condition may have inspected more 
information than they actually needed to make a choice in order to anticipate 
questions of the experimenter (e.g., "which additional information do I need to 
be sure that I can explain why I choose the bicycle instead of one of the other 
options?"). In other words, effects of habit and accountability on predecisional 
information processing concerning attributes of options may be additive rather 
than interactive. 
The information display board paradigm used in the present two studies has 
limitations. First, the informational environment is highly prestructured (cf. 
Brucks, 1985). Secondly, the paradigm does not reveal internal information 
search that may accompany choices. Given the relatively small percentage of 
information items selected, internal search may have played an important role 
in subjects' choices as well, for instance because these choices were made in 
well-known situations. 
The next chapter presents two experiments designed to investigate travel 
mode decision making in the very early stages of the choice process, i.e., the 
acquisition and utilization of information about trip-related cues (e.g., travel 
distance, weather conditions) before a mode choice is made. In the case of 
habitual choices observing such basic features may be sufficient to make 
decisions. In addition, instead of perceived accountability, in the next study 
situational motivation was more directly manipulated, namely by focusing 
subjects' attention on the importance of trip-related cues before they made 
decisions. 
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Chapter five 
Travel mode choice habits 
and the use of information about 
characteristics of the journey (Studies 5 and 6) 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter it was found that habit strength decreased the amount 
of information inspected and the complexity of decision rules applied before a 
travel mode was selected. Although the effect of habit strength on the 
information search process was reliably demonstrated, there are at least two 
reasons why the traditional information display board paradigm, which is 
supposed to reveal the decision making process as information acquisition 
concerning attributes of choice options, may not fully reveal the effects of habit 
on the decision making process. 
First, habit might be related to subjects' level of knowledge about attributes 
of options concerning the stimulus trips used in this study. After all, as habit 
increases in strength, people have faced the decision to use a particular travel 
mode more often, which makes them more experienced and knowledgeable 
with respect to the decision problem. Therefore, the effect of habit strength on 
the elaborateness of the decision making process may be confounded with 
knowledge. Research on decision making has shown that a variety of aspects 
related to prior knowledge affect the depth of predecisional information search 
behavior, such as decision makers' level of expertise (e.g., Hershey, Walsh, 
Read, & Chulef, 1990), amount of prior information (e.g., Kozlowski & Ford, 
1991), familiarity and prior experience with the decision problem (e.g., Bettman 
& Park, 1980), and providing subjects with concrete or informative options 
labels versus rather abstract or meaningless labels (Gilliland, Wood, & Schmitt, 
1994; Jacoby, Szybillo, & Busato-Schach, 1977). 
Furthermore, in the case of habitual mode choices, information about the 
attributes of choice options may not be the only, and perhaps not the most 
important, foundation on which a decision is based. In other words, in Study 3 
and 4 we may have captured only a part of the decision making process, while 
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we may have neglected a more important stage, namely involving the 
appreciation of characteristics of the choice situation (i.e., the journey). These 
characteristics may encompass the circumstances under which the trip is made 
(e.g., the weather conditions, available time) as well as particular aspects of the 
trip itself (e.g., the goal of the trip, the distance to the destination). In fact, in 
transport research these characteristics are considered as situational constraints, 
referring to short-term aspects affecting the likelihood of the choice for a 
particular travel mode option (Ben-Akiva, 1992; Levin & Louviere, 1981). In 
actual choice situations such basic features have to be appreciated before any 
consideration of options can be made at all, and therefore they constitute an 
integral part of the decision making process. In the previous two studies the 
characteristics of the journey were given in the instructions prior to the infor-
mation search task. In doing so, we were not able to trace whether habit 
strength affected the extent to which such information was considered in the 
choice process. In the present study we therefore examined the role of habit in 
subjects' perceptions of the nature of the choice problem itself, rather than their 
interest in attributes of choice alternatives. 
5.2 Study 5 
A new information search task was developed. Subjects acquired information 
that disclosed the nature of a trip, rather than information about attributes of 
options, before they made a travel mode choice. Furthermore, rather than 
making a single choice, subjects were presented with 27 choice trials. The 
rationale behind using repeated choices is the assumption that habit may be 
more clearly revealed in tasks that provide the possibility of performing them 
in a routinized mode. 
In addition to effects of general habit strength, which are supposed to be 
relatively chronic, this study investigated effects of task-specific demands that 
motivate individuals to engage in a relatively more elaborate decision making 
process. Whereas in the previous studies accountability demands were used as 
an operationalization, in the present study we attempted to enhance subjects' 
attention to the choice process more directly by asking subjects to think about 
the importance of the trip attributes during the 27 choice trials. Attention is 
thus viewed as the critical stage in predecisional information acquisition and 
choice, which is supposed to be influenced by the level of involvement (see e.g., 
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Andrews, Durvasula, & Akhter, 1990; Gardner, Mitchell, & Russo, 1978; 
Laczniak, Muehling, & Grossbart, 1989; Mitchell, 1981). Again we expected that 
habit strength and task-specific demands would be related to the degree of 
information acquired before a travel mode is selected: Habit was expected to 
decrease the amount of information acquisition, and focusing the subjects' 
attention on the choice process was expected to increase the amount of informa-
tion acquisition. 
Contrary to the previous two studies, in this study a sample of adults was 
used, and car use was focused on as the target behavior. 
5.2.1 Method 
Procedure and measurement of habit strength 
Subjects worked on PCs in separate cubicles. They were first familiarized with 
the computer and were then presented with the 15-item habit measure 
described in Study 2 and 4. In the present experiment the number of times the 
car was mentioned across the 15 items was used as a measure of car choice habit. 
The mean score across the sample was 8.28, sd=3.50. The sample was split as 
close as possible to the median of the distribution as to distinguish between 
subjects with relatively strong versus relatively weak car choice habit. The habit 
measurement was followed by a filler task in order to remove responses from 
the subjects' working memory. In addition to the Response Frequency habit 
measure, self-reported frequency of past behavior concerning car use, and self-
reported car use habit were measured as in Study 4. 
The information acquisition task 
The information search task consisted of 27 trials. Subjects were told that each 
trial comprised an imaginary trip concerning the goal of picking up some 
goods in a shop somewhere for which they could choose between 4 travel 
modes, i.e., walking, bus, bicycle, and car. They could learn more about the trip 
by inspecting information about 5 aspects from an information display board, 
i.e., weather conditions, weight of luggage, travel distance to the shop, time of 
departure, and available time. The vertical ordering in which the aspects were 
displayed on the screen was varied, i.e., there were 5 different orders across 
which each aspect appeared in the first, second, third, fourth, and last position, 
respectively. Figure 5.1 shows an example of the information display board. 
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Figure 5.1: Example of the information display board in which information can 
be collected about the circumstances of the travel situation 
Subjects were randomly assigned to the 5 different order conditions. 
Information about an aspect appeared on the screen by 'clicking' the mouse at 
the respective box, and disappeared when another aspect was selected. Subjects 
were free to inspect and reinspect the available information. They were 
instructed to proceed to the next screen to indicate their travel mode choice, as 
soon as they felt that they were sufficiently informed about the nature of the 
trip in order to make a choice. They then made the choice and proceeded to the 
next trial. 
For each aspect the information that could be displayed on request com-
prised one of three values. For instance, weather conditions always referred to 
precipitation (i.e., "no rain", "a little drizzle", or "heavy rain"). The combinations 
of values of the 5 aspects in each trial were chosen such that, when the three 
possible values for each aspect are coded as 1,2, and 3, respectively, aspects are 
completely uncorrelated across the 27 trials. This was done in order to ensure 
that subjects' information search behavior was not affected by interdependency 
of aspect values. Complete independency was accomplished by using a 
fractional replication design (Cochran & Cox, 1957). Finally, for each subject the 
order of presentation of the 27 trials was randomly determined by the 
computer. 
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Manipulation of attention to the decision making process 
In order to examine the effect of focusing subjects' attention on the decision 
making process, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. 
One-third of the subjects (the "relevant attention" condition) were asked at the 
end of each trial to indicate how important they judged one particular aspect 
(e.g., weather conditions) to be for the choice that they just had made. In order 
to keep the working load within acceptable limits across the 27 trials, an 
importance rating of only one aspect was requested for each trial, and this 
aspect was randomly generated by the computer. The other subjects served as 
controls in two conditions. For one-third of the subjects (the "irrelevant 
attention" condition) the same procedure was implemented, but ratings of 
importance of aspects of the travel mode decisions were substituted by ratings 
of how easy or difficult subjects evaluated working on the computer to be. At 
the end of each trial 1 of 5 aspects of the computer (e.g., handling the mouse) 
was randomly presented, and subjects were asked to indicate how favorable or 
unfavorable they judged that aspect. Finally, one-third of the subjects were not 
exposed to either of these attention treatments (the "no attention" condition). 
Subjects and design 
Subjects were 135 adults (67 females and 68 males) from the city of Nijmegen. 
They were recruited by distributing flyers at several points in town. Ages 
ranged from 18 to 78 years (m=37.5, sd=13.7). All subjects had a driver's licence, 
and had a car at their disposal. They were paid Dfl. 25.00 for their participation. 
The design of the experiment was a 2 (Habit Strength: strong versus weak) χ 3 
(Attention: relevant, irrelevant, no) χ 27 (Trials: 1-27) factorial design with 
repeated measures on the last factor. 
5.2.2 Results 
Manipulation checks 
Subjects indicated on an 11-point scale, ranging from "little" (1) to "much" (11) 
the extent to which they had been actively thinking about their choice of travel 
mode in each trial. Subjects in the relevant attention condition thought more 
about their choices (m=4.51), compared to the pooled conditions of irrelevant 
attention (m=3.47) and no attention (m=3.56), t(133)=2.10, p<.04. The irrelevant 
attention and no attention conditions did not differ significantly, r(88)=0.16. 
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Interestingly, weak habit subjects indicated that they thought more about their 
choices (m=4.73) than did strong habit subjects (m=3.13), t(133)=3.56, p<.001. 
There was no significant habit strength χ attention interaction, F(2,129)=0.99. 
Finally, on the same 11-point scale subjects in the irrelevant attention condition 
indicated that they had paid more attention to working with the computer 
(m=4.67) compared to the pooled conditions of relevant attention (m=3.13) and 
no attention (m=2.93), f(133)=2.96, p<.004. 
Information acquisition 
The average number of information items that were inspected per trial was 3.43 
(sd=1.06). Travel distance was most frequently inspected (92% of the total 
number of inspections), followed by luggage weight (81%), weather conditions 
(71%), available time (61%), and time of departure (36%). Only 2.8% of the in­
formation was reinspected. All analyses were performed on the number of 
inspected items, thereby excluding reinspections, although including the 
reinspections in the analyses did not affect the results. 
The number of inspected information items was subjected to a ANOVA with 
repeated measures. A significant Habit Strength main effect indicated that 
across the 27 trials strong habit subjects acquired less information about the 
characteristics of the choice problems (m=3.25) than did weak habit subjects 
(m=3.66), F(l,129)=4.76, p<.04. Simple t-tests revealed that the effects of habit 
were manifested predominantly in the amount of information collected on the 
weather conditions, f(133)=2.21, p<.03 (mean scores for weak and strong habit 
group respectively 0.78 versus 0.65), and available time, r(133)=2.48, p<.02 
(mean scores for weak and strong habit group respectively 0.70 versus 0.54). 
Thus it appears that strong habit subjects were mainly interested in information 
about travel distance and weight of luggage. There were no significant 
between-subjects effects of Attention, F(2,129)=1.20, and the Habit Strength χ 
Attention interaction was also non-significant, F(2,129)=0.65. This result thus 
extends the findings in Study 3 and 4 that habit strength is negatively related to 
depth of predecisional information search. 
As for the within-subjects effects, there was a significant downward linear 
trend in number of inspections across the 27 trials, F(l,129)=4.92, p<.03. This ef­
fect is qualified, however, by a Habit Strength χ Attention interaction for the 
62 
Habit and the use of information about the journey 
linear trend, F(2,129)=3.64, p<.03. In Figure 5.2 the mean number of inspections 
in each trial is graphically presented1. 
CONTROL CONDITIONS 
ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι ι—г 
9 10 11 12 13 14 IS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
TRIALS 
ENHANCED ATTENTION CONDITION 
τ—ι—ι—ι—ι—η—ι—ι—ι—ι—ι—ι—ι—ι—ι—ι—ι—ι—ι—ι—ι—ι—г 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1112 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2122 23 24 25 26 27 
• weak habit subjects 
TRIALS 
ι strong habit subjects 
Figure 5.2: Mean number of inspected information items across the 27 trials 
for the combined control conditions (top panel), and the relevant 
attention condition (bottom panel) 
I It is important to note that the trials in the graphs represent a time sequence. Because the 27 trials were 
randomly presented to subjects, a particular inai number in the Figure thus represents different trips for 
different subjects. 
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A contrast between the two control conditions yielded no significant interaction 
with Habit Strength for the linear trend, F(l,129)=0.84. In the following 
analyses we therefore contrast the relevant attention condition with the two 
control conditions pooled. In the Figure the two control conditions are aver­
aged. 
A contrast between the relevant attention condition versus the control 
conditions revealed a significant Habit Strength χ Attention interaction with 
respect to the linear trend, F(l,129)=6.41, p<.02. Within the control conditions 
the effect of Habit Strength was marginally significant for the linear trend, 
F(l,131)=3.61, p<.06. Whereas strong habit subjects consistently inspected 
relatively little information across all trials, F(l,131)=0.02, ns, weak habit 
subjects showed a decay in their relatively high level of search, F(l,131)=5.45, 
p<.03. Within the relevant attention condition the Habit Strength effect for the 
linear trend is also marginally significant, F(l,129)=3.12, p<.08. In this 
condition, however, the weak habit group maintained a high level of 
information acquisition items across all trials (see Figure 5.2, bottom panel), 
F(l,129)=0.04, ns, whereas the strong habit group started off at a level 
comparable to the weak habit group, but thereafter showed a significant decay 
across the 27 trials, F(l,129)=5.36, p<.03. 
Travel mode choices 
On average across the 27 trials subjects made 3.62 choices for walking, 0.66 
choices for the bus, 9.26 choices for the bicycle, and 13.47 choices for the car. 
Frequency of car choices was subjected to ANOVA. Strong habit subjects chose 
the car more frequently (m=15.56) than did weak habit subjects (m=10.85), 
F(l,129)=29.38, p<.001. There was no significant effect of attention F(2,129)=0.21, 
and the interaction was also non-significant, F(2,129)=1.30. As was the case in 
the previous two studies, this illustrates the effect of habit on choice outcome. 
Alternative measures of habit 
In Table 5.1 the correlations between the Response Frequency measure of habit, 
self-reported frequency of past behavior, self-reported habit, and depth of 
information search are presented. The two self-report measures correlated 
moderately. Correlations between the Response Frequency measure and the 
self-reports were also moderate. Both the Response Frequency measure and the 
self-reports were significantly related to depth of information search, though 
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the correlation between self-reported habit and depth of search is only 
marginally significant (p<.10). 
Table 5.1: Pearson correlations between the Response Frequency measure of 
car choice habit, self-reported frequency of past car choice, self-
reported car choice habit, and depth of predecisional information 
search. 
1 2 3 4 
1. Response Frequency measure - .58** .52** -.18* 
2. Self-reported past behavior - .55** -.25** 
3. Self-reported habit - -.16 
4. Depth of information search 
* = ρ < .05; ** = ρ < .01 
5.2.3 Discussion 
The results of the present study offer support for the notion that habit reduces 
the acquisition of information about aspects of the travel situation2. Subjects 
who had a strong car choice habit acquired less information about these aspects 
than weak habit subjects. These results suggest that when strong travel mode 
choice habits have been formed, people may pay less attention to the 
circumstances under which the trip has to be made before they choose a mode. 
Furthermore, this study investigated the effects of task-specific demands on 
the acquisition of information concerning attributes of this earlier stage in the 
decision making process. Focusing subjects' attention on the importance of the 
information was effective for both weak and strong habit subjects, but in 
different ways. In the control conditions, weak habit subjects — showing overall 
deeper search than did strong habit subjects - slightly diminished their 
information search over time. In the relevant attention condition, weak habit 
2 As in previous studies, we explored whether habit produces significant effects when controlling for the 
amount of variance accounted for by (be attitude toward car use when going somewhere [the attitude was 
gauged before (be experimental task, by 4 bipolar 11-point semantic differential items, i.e., bad (1) - good 
(11), unattractive (1) - attractive (11), unpleasant (1) - pleasant (11), and not sensible (1) - sensible (11), 
coefficient alpha = 0.65]. The pattern of significant effects was the same when the residual scores of the 
habit measure were used in the analyses. 
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subjects started off at a high level of search depth, which they maintained 
throughout the 27 trials. In the latter condition, strong habit subjects started off 
at the same high level of search, but, in spite of the attention manipulation, 
their level of search declined over time. Thus, it seems possible to affect strong 
habit individuals' level of processing. However, this effect was only temporary, 
as the chronic tendency to engage in minimal processing ultimately seemed to 
prevail. 
Although the present results demonstrate that habit attenuates information 
search preceding choices of mode of transport, they do not provide conclusive 
evidence with respect to the question whether habit strength exerts impact on 
the amount of information actually processed or used in making the decision. 
That is, an experimental setting involving the acquisition of information may 
reveal subjects' need for information, yet, it does not necessarily imply that 
their choices are actually based on that information (cf. Billings & Marcus, 1983; 
Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979). Therefore, an experiment was 
conducted aimed to test the hypothesis that habit strength is negatively related 
to the amount of information that is used in evaluating travel mode options. 
5.3 Study 6 3 
One of the ways to investigate decision makers' strategies of weighting and 
combining information is to present them with stimuli that systematically vary 
on a number of attributes, let them to evaluate the options, and infer decision 
strategies by means of multiple regression analyses based on within-subjects 
information - evaluation covariations. This paradigm is known as policy 
capturing (Brehmer & Joyce, 1988). The values of the attributes that are 
systematically varied yield a set of attribute combinations, which are referred to 
as profiles. In our case, the evaluation of travel modes consisted of attributes 
about the circumstances under which a journey is made, i.e., travel distance, 
departure time, weight of luggage, and weather conditions. One travel 
situation might be described, for example, as a distance over 2.5 kilometers, 
departure time at 9:00 a.m., weight of luggage of 4 kilograms, and no rain. 
Given a sufficient number of different travel situations to be judged, a linear 
regression analysis can be performed for each individual to describe the 
3 Based on Aarts, Verplanken, & Van Knippenberg (1995). 
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relation between the informational input (attributes) and the judgments. These 
regression analyses reveal for example which (and therefore also how many) 
attributes are used for the evaluations of options (i.e., significance of their beta 
weights), or how consistently the information is processed (i.e., the proportion 
of variance in a subject's judgments accounted for by a linear combination of 
the attributes). A larger number of significant beta weights and a larger 
proportion of explained variance are indicative of relatively effortful 
information processing strategies (e.g., Hagafors & Brehmer, 1983; Weldon & 
Gargano, 1988). The researcher thus attempts to draw inferences regarding the 
strategy the subject adopted in evaluating the presented stimulus options. The 
policy capturing paradigm has been applied to a variety of judgment tasks in 
many application fields (see for an overview Brehmer & Joyce, 1988). 
If the attributes on which the profiles are based are uncorrelated, their beta 
weights represent their relative importance for each subject. A beta weight thus 
reflects the extent to which a judge has used that attribute in making the 
judgments. Furthermore, the strategies that judges use to weight and combine 
attribute information may vary in complexity. For instance, judgment rules that 
involve trading off between all available attributes are relatively complex. An 
example of such a rule is represented by the weighted additive rule. This rule 
comprises the evaluation an option according to a weighted sum of all relevant 
attributes. Because this rule requires consideration of decision weights for each 
attribute and a relatively complex trade-off between weighted attribute values, 
it is a cognitively demanding strategy. Alternatively, individuals may adopt 
less complex strategies, for example the construction-by-aspects rule (McGuire, 
1985). When following this rule, judges start by directing attention toward one 
salient attribute (probably the most important one), and if this attribute is 
sufficient to arrive at a judgment, they may do so on the basis of this single 
attribute, no matter what other attributes look like. The weighted additive rule 
requires that subjects direct their attention more equally across attributes, 
whereas the latter rule implies selective attention to attributes. 
In line with the findings of Study 5, we investigated the effects of habit 
strength and situation-specific motivation on the elaborateness of information 
processing. As was done in Studies 3 and 4, situation-specific motivation was 
manipulated by means of perceived accountability. Subjects in the 
accountability condition were told that they had to explain their judgments at 
the end of the experimental session. This study focused on the evaluation of 
bicycle use for short distance trips. We expected that both bicycle choice habit 
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and accountability would be related to the depth of the process of information 
use, i.e., habit strength was expected to lead to the use of less complex 
evaluation rules, while accountability was expected to lead to more complex 
rules. 
5.3.1 Method 
Measurement of bicycle choice habit strength 
Subjects were presented with 9 globally described trips, and were required to 
indicate for each trip as quickly as possible the first mode of transportation that 
came to mind as the one they would use (see Study 3). The trips were randomly 
presented. The frequency of mentioning the bicycle served as a measure of 
habit strength for choosing bicycle. The measure thus varies from 0 to 9. The 
mean score across the sample was 5.06, sd=1.44. On the basis of a median split 
subjects were categorized as weak or strong concerning bicycle choice habit. 
Procedure and Task 
The experiment was run at computers. Subjects worked in separate cubicles. 
First, habit strength of bicycle use was measured, which was followed by a 
filler task to remove the travel mode choice habit responses from subjects' 
working memory. Subsequently, subjects received a description of the travel 
mode judgment task in which they learned to respond to a series of travel 
situations concerning the goal of picking up some goods somewhere. After 
instructions for the task, the experimental manipulations of accountability were 
implemented. Half of the subjects were told that they had to explain their 
judgments at the end of the experimental session to the researchers conducting 
the study. Subjects were then presented with the travel mode judgment task. 
For each travel situation subjects read the description of a travel situation and 
indicated their judgment of the favorability of using the bicycle in that 
particular situation. After the judgment task they responded to a manipulation 
check and were debriefed. 
Stimulus material 
The stimuli consisted of 16 descriptions of travel situations. Each situation was 
described with four attributes, each of which could have two values, i.e., 
weather conditions (rain, no rain), weight of luggage (4 kilograms, 20 
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kilograms), departure time (9:00 a.m., 2:00 p.m.) and distance to the destination 
(2.5 kilometers, 5 kilometers). The values were combined across the attributes 
according to a fully balanced design, resulting in the construction of sixteen 
travel situations. In this design the attributes are uncorrelated. Multiple linear 
regression analyses will therefore yield independent estimates of attribute use. 
The order of presentation of attributes was varied. For half of the subjects the 
order in which the attributes were presented was: weather, weight, departure 
time, and distance, whereas the order for other subjects was: departure time, 
distance, weather, and weight. The 16 travel situation descriptions were 
randomly presented. 
Dependent measures of information use 
Subjects indicated their favorability of using the bicycle in each travel situation 
on a 10-point scale ranging from "unfavorable" (1) to "favorable" (10). 
Two characteristics are assumed to reflect the degree of cognitive effort in 
information processing: the number of attributes used and the consistency 
concerning processing information of attributes. Indices of both types of 
characteristics were obtained by two steps. First we performed a linear multiple 
regression analysis across the 16 judgments for each subject. In these analyses 
subjects' judgments of favorability of bicycle use were regressed on the 
attribute values (coded 1 or 2), as is the usual procedure in this paradigm. 
Because the design yields uncorrelated attributes, beta weights represent the 
independent contribution of each attribute in subjects' judgments across the 16 
stimulus trips. Moreover, the significance of a beta weight indicates whether 
the attribute was actually used. Therefore, a measure of the number of attributes 
used is represented by the number of significant beta weights, which may thus 
vary between 0 and 4. A high number of significant beta weights implies a 
relatively large amount of information use. 
The proportion of variance in each subject's judgments accounted for by the 
four attributes (R2) may serve as a measure of consistency of information use. 
When R2 is large, there is little variance in the judgments that cannot be 
explained by a linear combination of the attributes. Conversely, using the 
information of attributes less consistently yields a lower R2. 
As an indicator of complexity of information processing we calculated for 
each subject the standard deviation of the relative beta weights, which can be 
interpreted as the extent to which subjects allocate equal importance to the 
attributes. Procedurally, first the relative beta weights were computed as the 
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ratio of the absolute beta weight for each attribute to the sum of absolute beta 
weights across all four attributes. Since the sum of the relative beta weights is 
one, each beta weight reflects the relative importance allocated to the respective 
attributes. The standard deviation of the relative beta weights was used as an 
index of information processing complexity. When subjects weight the 
attributes as equally important the standard deviation is 0, and the relative beta 
weights are 0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25. When subjects weight the attributes differently 
in importance, the standard deviation is high. In the extreme case the standard 
deviation is 0.5, and the relative beta weights are, for example, 1, 0, 0, 0 (one 
attribute is given all weight). A low value of the standard deviation therefore 
implies a relatively complex information processing strategy. 
Subjects and design 
Eighty-two undergraduate students received Dfl. 7.50 for participating in the 
experiment. Because their task was to evaluate the usefulness of the bicycle, 
only subjects who owned a bicycle were recruited. None of them had a car at 
their disposal. The design of the experiment is a 2 (Habit Strength: strong 
versus weak) χ 2 (Accountability: accountable versus not accountable) between-
subjects factorial design. All ANOVAs were conducted according to this 
design. Subjects were randomly assigned to the accountability conditions. 
5.3.2 Results and discussion 
Manipulation check 
As a check on the accountability manipulation, subjects were asked to respond 
to the question: "To what extent did you feel a need to make judgments that 
you could explain?" Responses were given at an 11-point scale ranging from 
"not at all" (1) to "very strongly" (11). Responses to the manipulation check 
suggested that accountable subjects felt a stronger need to explain their 
judgments (m=6.11) than unaccountable subjects (m=4.55), t(78)=2.82, p<.01. 
The use of information 
On average 2.0 beta weights were significant (sd=0.72), suggesting that 50% of 
the information was used for the judgments on bicycle use. According to the 
average number of significant beta weights of the four attributes 92% of the 
subjects used information about the weather conditions, 68% about the weight 
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of the luggage, and 38% about the distance. Information about departure time 
was hardly considered (2%). In an analysis of variance on the number of 
significant beta weights, the main effects of Habit and Accountability were 
significant. Weak habit subjects used more attributes than strong habit subjects, 
F(l,78)=5.64, p<.03 (mean scores respectively 2.18 and 1.78). Accountable 
subjects used more attributes than subjects who were not held accountable, 
F(l,78)=5.58, p<.03 (mean scores respectively 2.20 and 1.81). However, the 
effects of habit and accountability on the number of attributes used during the 
judgment task were independent, as was indicated by a non-significant 
interaction, F(l,78)=1.35, p>.20. 
For accountable subjects R2 was higher than for not-accountable subjects, 
F(l,78)=3.68, p<.06 (mean scores respectively 0.77 and 0.71). In the policy 
capturing paradigm, a larger R2 is interpreted as indicating more consistent 
information processing4. These results thus suggest that accountable subjects 
were more consistent information processors. There was no significant effect of 
Habit, F(l,78)=0.24, and no significant interaction, F(l,78)=0.09 (overall M=0.74; 
srf=0.13). 
Concerning the standard deviation of the relative beta weights, the results of 
the analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect for Habit. The 
standard deviation was lower for weak habit subjects than for strong habit 
subjects, F(l,78)=6.52, p<.02 (mean scores respectively 0.21 versus 0.25). This 
suggests that weak habit subjects divided their allocation of importance more 
equally across attributes compared to strong habit subjects, who were more 
selective in their information use. No significant main effect for Accountability, 
F(l,78)=0.07, and no significant interaction, F(l,78)=1.97, p>.15, was found on 
the standard deviation (overall M=0.23; sd=0.07). 
To summarize the results, strong habit subjects tended to use fewer 
attributes during judgments and divided their attention less equally across 
attributes compared to weak habit subjects5. Furthermore, accountability also 
4
 It may be argued that a low R2 does not necessarily imply thai judges are inconsistent, but that they 
employ a strategy which cannot be captured by a linear additive model (Stewart, 1988). For instance, the 
effect of one attribute on an individual's judgment may depend on the specific level of a second attribute. 
Such strategy is described as noncompensatory, and is usually measured by testing whether the increment 
in R2 is significant when the interactions among attributes are added to the regression model. In order to 
test whether accountability is related to such a significant increment in R2, for each subject all first-order 
interactions among attributes were added to the original predictors (i.e. main effects) in the regression 
analysis. However, simple t-test revealed no significant increment in Д2 due to accountability. 
5
 As was the case in previous studies, when the attitude toward bicycle use is partialled out of the habit 
measure [the attitude component was assessed before the experimental task, by a bipolar 11-point 
semantic differential item, i.e., unattractive (1) - attractive (11)] the analysis produced the same pattern of 
significant effects. 
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enhanced the number of attributes used as well as consistency in processing 
attribute information. 
5.4 General discussion 
In the present two experiments we focused on subjects' perceptions of the 
nature of the choice problem, i.e., perceptions of characteristics of the journey. 
When travel mode choices become habitual, information about such 
characteristics may already be decisive for the travel mode to be chosen. It was 
found that habit was negatively related to the amount of information about 
characteristics of the trip that was used before a travel mode decision was 
made. These effects were established in the information search experiment as 
well as in the policy capturing experiment. Moreover, the results of Study 6 
suggest that habit strength is also negatively related to the complexity of 
decision strategy: strong habit individuals were more selective in using 
information about the available attributes than weak habit individuals. This 
suggests that strong habit subjects tended to use heuristic and low effort 
strategies to process travel information before making a travel mode decision, 
whereas weak habit persons seemed to apply more complex and cognitively 
demanding strategies. This corroborates the findings of the previous 
information search studies, in which we focused on information acquisition 
concerning attributes of options. 
In addition to the role of habit strength, effects of manipulated situation-
specific demands on the decisional process were investigated. The results 
suggest that one can affect the elaborateness of decisional processes that 
underly behavioral choices, either by directly enhancing individuals' attention 
to trip-related cues during the choice process, or by holding individuals 
responsible for their judgments; both lead to more effortful modes of 
processing. 
However, although both habit strength and situational demands were re-
lated to the depth of processing, their effects were independent. This suggests 
that one may be able to enhance individuals' motivation to engage in more 
effortful information processing, but this does not necessarily affect the chronic 
effect that habit strength has on the decision making process. In Study 6 
situation-specific motivation was again manipulated by perceived 
accountability. The results of this study showed that the accountability 
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manipulation increased the number of attributes used by subjects as well as 
their consistency in using the information, while the latter effect was not 
obtained for habit strength. It may be that accountable students anticipated that 
they had to inform the experimenter about their evaluation strategy, e.g., which 
attributes were considered and how those attributes influenced their 
judgments. Hagafors and Brehmer (1983) argued that persons usually lack 
insight into such judgment processes (see also Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
However, when asked to describe how they arrive at their judgments, judges 
may switch to more analytical strategies, i.e., a mode which is consistent and 
retrievable, irrespective of the strength of habits to come to such conclusions 
(cf. Tetlock, 1985). Hagafors and Brehmer (1983) showed that having to justify 
one's judgment led to higher consistency in the use of information, which 
seems to have been the case in the present study as well. Whereas strong and 
weak habit subjects may have differed in the complexity of processing 
strategies, as has been argued before, the accountability manipulation may 
have motivated subjects to maintain consistency in their judgments. 
It should be noted that there is a discrepancy between the two types of 
research methods employed in Study 5 and 6. First, the two tasks differ in 
response mode, namely choice versus judgment. Although normative models 
treat choice and judgment as equivalent in that evaluations precede actual 
choices, it has been argued that the psychological processes underlying choice 
and judgment may not be equal (e.g., Abelson & Levi, 1985; Billings & Scherer, 
1988; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). One point that may be particularly relevant for 
the present purpose is that judgment usually elicits a more deliberate mode of 
processing than choice, since judgment does not necessarily encourage subjects 
to use simplifying, heuristic strategies (e.g., elimination of aspects rule) as may 
be often the case in a choice context. Therefore, judging the performance of a 
given behavior may be less habitual than choosing between different courses of 
action. 
A second distinction between the two methods used here concerns the 
inferences about the decision making process, i.e., as being derived from 
information search behavior versus statistical relations between input (attribute 
values) and output (judgments). Although both methods focus on the process 
of information utilization underlying choices, Billings and Marcus (1983) 
argued that, because indices of decision making processes from these two 
paradigms lacked convergence, they may represent different parts of the 
decision process, i.e., information acquisition versus combination. 
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However, although we used different paradigms, habit appeared to affect 
the depth of information processing in both tasks. The findings of the two 
methods can therefore be considered complementary rather than contradictory, 
suggesting that habit affects various parts or aspects of the travel mode 
decision process. 
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Chapter six 
Predicting actual travel mode choices 
from intention and habit strength (Study 7Y 
6.1 Introduction 
The studies in the preceding two chapters focused on predecisional information 
processing. One drawback of the paradigms used in those experiments is that 
the processes and choices are observed in an artificial context. In addition, we 
used a procedure to measure habit that has not been used before by other 
researchers. The possibility that the observed relation between habit, choice 
and information processing is artificial cannot completely be ruled out, 
especially in view of the fact that traditional measures of habit in Study 4 did 
not show significant relations with information acquisition behavior. The 
ecological validity of the previous findings would therefore be enhanced if 
parallel findings were obtained in a naturalistic setting. Therefore, a field study 
was conducted that focused on the role of habit in real-life travel mode choices. 
The objective of the next study was to examine whether car choice habit 
predicts actual car choices over an above intentions. In addition, as suggested 
by Triandis (1977; 1980) we tested the hypothesis that car use habit and car 
choice intention interact in the prediction of car choice behavior, i.e., intentions 
are related to behavior only when there is no strong habit. 
It is important to note that the present study differs in some important 
aspects from other studies that have investigated the role habit plays in the 
intention-behavior relation. First, instead of measuring the constructs at one 
point in time (see for example Study 1), we conducted a longitudinal study in 
which attitude, subjective norm, behavioral intention, and habit were first 
measured, and were related to actual car choices which were recorded later. 
Furthermore, whereas in most other studies behavior was measured by global 
self-reports (e.g., subjects report their behavior on a unipolar scale, ranging 
from "never" to "always"), in this study travel mode choices were recorded by 
means of diaries over a 7-day period. Finally, habit was measured by the 
1
 Based on Aarts, Moonen, Verplanken, & Van Knippenberg (1995). 
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Response Frequency instrument, as well as by self-reported frequency of car 
use (e.g., Triandis, 1980), and self-reported car choice habit (e.g., Wittenbraker 
et al., 1983). It was expected that all measures of habit would predict later 
behavior over and above behavioral intentions, as is usually found. Moreover, 
it was expected that intentions predict behavior only when habit is weak. 
In addition to the role of habit, effects of situation-specific motivation to 
think about the travel mode choice were investigated by manipulating atten-
tion to the perceived importance of aspects of travel situations (e.g., weather 
conditions), which was implemented during the 7-day period when travel 
mode choices were recorded. It was expected that when subjects' attention was 
focused on the importance of aspects of travel situations, choices would be 
guided more by reasoning (i.e., previously recorded behavioral intentions) 
compared to a no-attention control group. Because in the previous 
predecisional information processing experiments situation-specific factors 
consistently yielded effects independently of habit, or interacted only tempo-
rarily with habit, suggesting that processes induced by habit and manipulated 
attention enhancement are relatively autonomous, it was expected that the 
effect of the attention manipulation would be independent of habit. 
6.2 Method 
Subjects and procedure 
The experiment was conducted in a village called Wijchen, which has regular 
train and bus services to nearby towns, as well as an easily accessible highway. 
The target behavior was the choice of car rather than alternative travel mode 
options (i.e., train, bus, bicycle) for job-unrelated trips outside the village. 
Subjects were 200 inhabitants of the village who had a driver's licence, and who 
had a car at their disposal. They were recruited by contacting random 
selections from the telephone directory. In order to match subjects with respect 
to accessibility of train and bus services, the selection procedure was restricted 
to areas equal in distance from the train and bus station. There were 96 males 
and 104 females. Ages ranged from 20 to 70 years (m=43.1 years). Subjects 
received a lottery ticket in return for their cooperation. 
The study consisted of two parts. First, attitude, subjective norm, behavioral 
intention, and habit strength concerning traveling by car for job-unrelated trips 
outside the village were measured as part of a larger survey. Following the 
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survey, subjects kept a 7-day diary, in which they recorded travel mode choice 
behavior every day. In addition to the 200 subjects who were interviewed 
before the diary registration, a sample of 25 people (12 males and 13 females) 
were not interviewed, but only kept a diary. This group was included in order 
to detect any effects of the survey on choice behavior. 
The survey 
The survey comprised a face-to-face structured interview, which was 
conducted by trained interviewers. The study was presented as concerned with 
patterns of mobility. First, car use habit was measured by the 15-item response 
frequency measurement instrument as used in Studies 2, 4 and 5. In addition, 
later in the interview, self-reported frequency of past behavior concerning car 
use, and self-reported car use habit were measured as alternative measures of 
habit. Subjects were asked to indicate how frequently they had used their car 
during the last 4 weeks when going to destinations outside the village. The item 
was accompanied by a 4-point response scale which ranged from "never" (1) to 
"always" (4). Self-reported habit was measured by asking subjects to report on 
how often they had taken the car by force of habit in the last 4 weeks when 
going to destinations outside the village. Responses were given on a 7-point 
scale, which ranged from "never" (1) to "always" (7). Attitude toward choosing 
to travel by car to destinations outside the village was measured by five bipolar 
7-point semantic differential items, i.e., bad (1) - good (7), unattractive (1) -
attractive (7), unpleasant (1) - pleasant (7), not sensible (1) - sensible (7), and 
negative (1) - positive (7), coefficient alpha=0.84. Subjective norm concerning car 
use was operationalized as the extent to which one thinks that people who are 
personally important think that one should travel by car to destinations outside 
the village. Subjects responded on a 7-point scale, varying from not at all (1) to 
absolutely (7). To measure intention, subjects were asked to what extent they 
intended to travel by car to destinations outside the village. Responses were 
given on a 7-point scale ranging from "certainly not" (1) to "absolutely certain" 
(7). In order to avoid unwanted focus on car use, the same questions were 
asked concerning the use of the train2 . In addition, a 20-item Dutch version of 
the impression management subscale of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable 
2
 In line with the theory of planned behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 1988,1991), a measure of perceived behavioral 
control was included. However, because the sample only comprised individuals who had a driver's 
license and a car available, the target behavior was under optimal control for all subjects. Toe distribution 
of the 7-point measure of perceived behavioral control was very skewed indeed (m=6.37, sd=\ .10, skew-
ness=-2.20). The analyses were therefore confined to the theory of reasoned action and habit strength. 
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Responding (Paulhus, 1991) was included to control for a socially desirable re-
sponse tendency in the measure of behavior (see below), coefficient alpha=0.72. 
Car choice behavior 
At the end of the interview subjects were requested to maintain a diary during 
a 7-day period, starting the day after the interview. As was the case in the 
interview, subjects were led to believe that the study investigated patterns of 
mobility. Care was taken that the diary did not focus on a single behavior (i.e., 
our target behavior of car use), but it inquired about all trips that subjects made 
within or outside the village. The diary was also short and easy to fill out. 
These aspects were carefully considered so as to provide optimally reliable 
reports of behavior (Sudman & Ferber, 1979). Subjects were provided with a 
booklet, containing one form for each of the 7 days. At the end of each day 
subjects were requested to indicate for every occasion they had left their house 
that day: (1) the time of the day (i.e., morning, afternoon, evening), (2) destina-
tion, and (3) mode of travel. After 3 days subjects were phoned in order to an-
swer any questions they had, and to encourage them to continue to maintain 
the diary. 
Each instance in the diary was coded as a movement starting from home to a 
destination either inside or outside the village, which either did or did not 
concern the person's job. In order to check whether this categorization could 
reliably be inferred from the diaries, 45 diaries were coded by two independent 
judges. These judgments were very reliable, Cohen's kappa=0.95. Across the 7 
days' entries, the number of times that subjects made a trip by car as a driver to 
a destination outside the village, not in connection with his/her job, was 
divided by the total number of job-unrelated trips that were made outside the 
village. This proportion served as a measure of car use behavior. One subject 
did not maintain the diary. Sixteen subjects, of whom two belonged to the 
diary-only sample, did not make any job-unrelated outside-village trip during 
the 7 days following the interview. These 17 subjects were removed from the 
analyses, leaving 185 usable subjects in the survey + diary sample, and 23 in the 
diary-only sample. 
Manipulation of attention to the choice process 
Subjects' attention to the choice process was manipulated during the 7 days of 
diary registration. Half the subjects received a diary in which extra information 
was requested for each trip, i.e., the distance of the destination (< 3 kilometers, 
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< 10 kilometers, > 10 kilometers), amount of luggage (none, little, much), and 
weather conditions (fair, moderate, bad). These aspects were the ones that had 
been most frequently attended to in Study 5. In addition, at the end of each 
day's page subjects were asked to take notice of these three aspects if they were 
to make a trip next day. 
6.3 Results 
Manipulation check 
At the end of the 7-day period, when the diaries were collected by the inter-
viewers, an attempt was made to have subjects respond to some ancillary 
questions, which included a check on the manipulation of attention to the 
choice process. One hundred and twenty subjects could be personally con-
tacted. Subjects in the control condition indicated on a 7-point disagree (1) -
agree (7) scale that during the 7-day period they had chosen travel modes 
without much thought to a greater extent than did subjects in the experimental 
condition, m=3.63 and m=2.97 respectively, t(U8)=1.88, p<.04, one-tailed. 
The prediction of behavioral intentions 
In Table 6.1 means, standard deviations, and correlations are presented for 
attitude, subjective norm, behavioral intention, habit strength, and behavior 
with respect to choosing the car for destinations outside the village. 
Table 6.1: Means, standard deviations, and pearson correlations between 
attitude, subjective norm, intention, habit strength, and behavior. 
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Attitude (1-7) 5.29 1.06 - 39" .48" .22* .11 
2. Subj. norm (1-7) 4.97 1.85 - .35" .11 .03 
3. Intention (1-7) 5.72 1.45 - .36" .20* 
4. Habit strength (0-15) 9.78 2.67 - .28" 
5. Behavior (0.00-1.00) 0.76 0.35 
* = p<.01;" = p<.001 
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In line with the theory of reasoned action, regressing the intention on attitude 
and subjective norm yielded a multiple R of .516. Including habit strength as a 
predictor raised R to .577, F-change=18.14, p<.001. Beta weights of attitude, 
subjective norm, and habit were .360, p<.001, .174, p<.01, and .267, p<.001, re-
spectively, which indicates that all three variables share unique variance with 
intention. 
The prediction of behavior 
The number of outside-village job-unrelated trips ranged from 1 to 9 across the 
7 days (M=3.25, SD=1.88). As Table 6.1 shows, on average for 76 % of these 
trips the car was chosen as mode of transportation. There were no indications 
of measurement bias due to the survey: the number of outside-village job-
unrelated trips did not differ significantly between the sample of 23 subjects 
who were not interviewed before the diary registration (m=3.43), and the main 
sample, m=3.25, f(206)=0.44, ns, nor were differences in proportion of car 
choices significant, the respective Ms being 0.73 and 0.76, i(206)=0.44, ns. The 
manipulation of attention to the choice process did not result in different 
numbers of outside-village job-unrelated trips, m-control group=3.42, m-atten-
tion group=3.09, f(183)=1.21, ns, or in differences in the proportion of car-
choices, m-control group=0.77, m-attention group=0.75, f(183)=0.44, ns. There 
was no significant correlation between number of car-choices and the measure 
of socially desirable response tendency, r=-.090, ns, suggesting that there was 
no social desirability response bias in the registration of car choices. 
Before investigating the effects of habit strength on behavior and the 
intention-behavior link, the measure of habit was controlled for the amount of 
variance accounted for by the attitude toward car use (see also previous 
studies). The attitude was therefore first partialled out of the car choice habit3. 
In a moderated hierarchical multiple regression analysis the measure of 
behavior was regressed on behavioral intention, the residual scores of habit 
strength, and attention to the choice process (step 1), all second-order in-
teraction terms (step 2), and the third-order interaction term (step 3). In order to 
reduce multicollinearity bias, the independent variables were standardized 
before crossproducts were computed (Dunlap & Kemery, 1987). Regressing 
behavior on intention, habit, and attention yielded a multiple R of .299. 
Including the second-order interactions raised R to .379, F-change=3.75, p<.02. 
J
 All analysis reported below are performed with the residual scores of the babit measure, unless 
otherwise is mentioned. 
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The third-order interaction did not contribute significantly to the prediction, F-
change=.73. The resulting beta weights are presented in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: The prediction of car-choice behavior across seven days by 
intention, habit strength, attention to the choice process, and their 
interactions. 
Predictor Beta weight 
Intention (I) .031 
Habit strength (H) .255w 
Attention (A) -.078 
I x H -.214" 
IxA .202* 
HxA -.141 
I x H x A .067 
* = p< .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p <.001 
Habit strength was the strongest predictor of later behavior. Although intention 
significantly predicted later behavior (see Table 6.1), intention did not share 
unique variance with behavior when habit was included in the regression 
equation. Furthermore, the intention χ habit interaction was significant. When 
the sample was split at the median of the habit measure, the intention -
behavior correlation was significant for weak habit subjects, r=.292, p<.02, but 
practically zero for strong habit subjects r=.023, «s.4 This pattern of correlations 
suggests that the intention - behavior relation was conditional on habit 
strength, which confirms the trade-off between intention and habit in the 
prediction of behavior suggested by the Triandis model. 
Although the manipulation of attention did not affect frequency of behavior 
directly, the significant Intention χ Attention interaction suggests an effect of 
the manipulation on the intention - behavior relation. In the control condition 
4
 It seems possible, however, that variance differences on intention and/or behavior between weak and 
strong habit subjects produced the pattern of correlations observed (i.e. restriction of range effect for 
strong habit subjects). To explore this alternative explanation we calculated the respective variance of 
intention and behavior within the weak and the strong habit group. Although the variances on both 
measures were higher for weak habit subjects than for strong habit subjects, the differences between 
groups were not statistically significant (variance of intention for weak and strong habit group 2.378 
versus 1.688, respectively, and for behavior .137 versus .108, respectively). 
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the intention - behavior correlation was nonsignificant, r=.118, ns, whereas this 
correlation was higher and significant in the attention condition, r=.262, p<.02. 
It thus appears that both habit strength and manipulated attention 
enhancement can affect the strength of the intention - behavior relation. These 
effects are independent of each other, however, as was shown by the non­
significant intention χ habit χ attention interaction. 
Alternative measures of habit 
In order to validate the Response Frequency measure of habit once more, we 
compared its effects on actual car choices and the intention-behavior link with 
self-reported frequency of past behavior and self-reported habit. Table 6.3 
contains correlations between the Response Frequency measure of habit, self-
reported past behavior, self-reported habit, intention, and later behavior. 
Table 6.3: Pearson correlations between the Response Frequency measure of 
car-choice habit, self-reported frequency of past car-choices, self-
reported car-choice habit, and later behavior. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. Response Frequency measure - .25" .37** .26** .27** 
2. Self-reported past behavior - .38** .26** .27** 
3. Self-reported habit - .46** .08 
4. Behavioral intention - .20* 
5. Behavior 
= ρ < .01; = ρ < .001 
Significant correlations between the Response Frequency measure and the self-
reports were obtained, although the sizes of the correlations were smaller than 
those in Study 2, 4 and 5. All measures of habit correlated significantly with 
intention. Furthermore, both the Response Frequency measure and self-
reported frequency of past behavior predicted later behavior significantly, 
whereas self-reported habit was unrelated to behavior. When behavior was 
regressed on self-reported frequency of past behavior, intention, and their 
interaction, the results were similar to what was found when the Response 
Frequency measure was used, i.e., a significant beta weight of .295, p<.001, for 
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habit, and a nonsignificant weight of .094, ns., for intention. However, contrary 
to the analysis using the Response Frequency measure, the intention χ habit 
interaction term was not significant, beta=.005, ns. These results indicate that 
the Response Frequency measure interacted with the intention in the prediction 
of behavior, whereas these results, which were predicted on the basis of the 
Triandis model, were not found when the self-report measures were used. 
6.4 Discussion 
The results of this study show that actual car choices during 7 days after the 
survey were predicted by car choice habit strength. Although intention 
significantly correlated with later behavior, this effect disappeared when habit 
was included in the prediction. This suggests that intentions are not sufficient 
to predict travel mode choice behavior. Furthermore, car choice intention was 
determined by both attitude and subjective norm toward choosing the car as 
mode of transport, as is postulated by the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975). However, consistent with other studies of repeated behavior (e.g., 
Bagozzi, 1981; Fredricks & Dossett, 1983), habit appeared to be a unique 
predictor of intentions to perform the habitual behavior, i.e., car choice habit 
explained 7% of variance in addition. 
Furthermore, as was expected on the basis of the Triandis (1977, 1980) 
attitude-behavior model, habit attenuated the strength of the relationship 
between intention and behavior. Intentions were only significantly predictive 
of actual car choice behavior when the habit to use the car was weak; persons 
who have developed a strong habit did not act upon their intentions. These 
results suggest that when behavior is habit-driven, people do not trade off 
available options, or form explicit intentions to choose the most suitable mode 
in the present circumstances, but routinely choose the option that they usually 
use. 
Theoretically, the relation between attitudes and choice intentions suggests a 
decision making process in which attitudes toward possible options are 
successively formed, retrieved from memory, and compared in order to make a 
final decision (see also Sheppard et al., 1988). For instance, in deciding to use 
either the car or the train for a trip outside the village, travelers may start with 
weighting and combining the consequences (pros and cons) associated with 
each option into attitudes toward these two options. If the person has 
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previously elaborated on these actions and their benefits and costs, the 
consequences may already have been integrated into attitudes. In this case the 
person may simply retrieve his or her attitudes toward car and train from 
memory. Then, the decision maker may compare the two attitudes with each 
other. The decision to use one option over the other in that particular situation 
is supposed to reflect one's most favorable attitude, i.e., the option with the 
highest subjective utility. Consistent with findings of the previous information 
processing studies it may be argued that such a process is less likely to occur 
when habit is strong, since decisions to use a particular mode were directly 
guided by habit, and thus were preceded by a less elaborate decision making 
process. In other words, it may be expected that attitudes (i.e., toward traveling 
by car and by train) are less predictive of choice intentions (i.e., deciding to use 
the car over the train) for strong habit persons than for weak habit persons. To 
explore these expectations we calculated the magnitude of the difference 
between the attitude toward car and attitude toward train use for a trip outside 
the village, and correlated this index with the magnitude of the difference 
between the intention toward car and intention train use for a trip outside the 
village for both the weak car habit and strong car habit group5. As expected, 
habit strength appeared to moderate the relation between attitudes and 
intentions6. The correlation was stronger among the weak habit subgroup 
(r=.65, n=97, p<.001, shared variance is 42%) compared to strong habit persons 
(r=.44, n=88, JK.OOI, shared variance is 19%). Moreover, the difference between 
the correlations was significant, z=2.02, p<.05, suggesting that weak habit 
persons' choice intentions are more strongly guided by reviewing and 
comparing one's attitudes toward possible options, while strong habit persons' 
intentions are more likely to be determined by habit strength. 
Taken as a whole, the results of the present study suggest that when 
behavior is repetitive, the habit component is incorporated in choice intentions 
as well as in behavior itself. First, when habit is strong, people tend to form 
decisions to perform that behavior in a more simple and probably less effortful 
fashion than when there is no or only a weak habit. When asked to indicate 
their choice intentions, weak habit subjects' responses may reflect a more 
5
 Measures of attitude and intention toward train use were similar to those used for measuring attitude 
and intention toward car use (attitude toward train use coefficient alpha=0.89). 
6
 Regressing the difference of intentions on the measures of altitude difference and habit strength yielded 
a multiple R of .64. Including the interaction between both variables as a predictor raised R to .67, F-
change=13.68, p<.001. Beta weights of altitude difference, habit and the interaction term were .50, 
p<,001, .32, p<.001, and -.20, /x.001, respectively. 
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genuine, or more serious, choice intention which is relatively more based on a 
trade-off between available alternatives compared to strong habit subjects' 
responses. Furthermore, the interaction between habit and intention in the 
prediction of later behavior suggests that when a strong habit has been 
developed, the behavior is immediately triggered upon the instigation of the 
goal to travel, without the need to engage in deliberate decision making, i.e., 
the behavior is guided by the automaticity of stimulus - response associations. 
Another variable that was investigated in this study was the motivation to 
consider travel mode options at the moment a decision has to be made. 
Manipulated attention to the choice process did not affect frequency of car use 
directly. However, it was found that enhancement of attention increases the 
intention-behavior relation. In other words, instigating individuals to think 
about aspects of the travel situation leads to choices which are more based on 
rational considerations (i.e., previously recorded behavioral intentions) 
compared to a no-attention control group. 
Although both habit strength and manipulated attention to the choice 
process were related to the strength of the intention - behavior link, their effects 
were independent. It is important to note that enhancement of attention was 
manipulated during the measurement of behavior, i.e., after the measurement 
of habit and intention. The effects of manipulated attention on the intention -
behavior relation must therefore have a different history than the comparable 
effects of habit strength. Whereas strong and weak habit subjects may have 
differed in the extent to which the behavior was automatically instigated by the 
goal to travel (and thus differed in the extent to which they act upon their 
previously expressed intentions), as has been argued before, the attention 
manipulation may have made intentions more accessible, which thus were 
enacted to a greater extent than in the control condition (cf. Fazio, 1989). 
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Chapter seven 
General conclusions and discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the psychological antecedents of 
travel mode choice behavior. In particular, in the current research an attempt is 
made to study the decisional processes that occur between the moment 
individuals are faced with a particular stimulus trip and the moment they 
eventually decide which mode of transport to use in order to make that trip. 
In the preceding five chapters 7 studies were presented in which travel mode 
choice behavior was investigated on the basis of three areas of theory and 
research, namely attitude theory, behavioral decision making theory, and 
theories about habitual and automatic behavior. The central proposition of 
these studies was that repetitively performed behaviors are mainly affected by 
habits, rather than being guided by an elaborate decision making process, that 
is a decision based on attitudes. In addition, it was hypothesized that choices 
are more likely to be preceded by effortful decision making when a person 
appreciates the importance of the decision or is otherwise motivated to 
consider alternatives. 
This final chapter aims to summarize and discuss the major findings of these 
studies, and to formulate the main conclusions that can be inferred from these 
findings. Finally, I will comment on the alternative approach we have taken to 
the measurement of habit. 
7.2 Attitudes, habit and the prediction of travel mode choice behavior 
In Study 1 a survey was conducted in order to test a model of car choice 
behavior. The results showed that attitude toward car and attitude toward train 
as choice of travel mode for a particular journey were both significantly related 
to self-reported car use for that journey. In addition, it was found that car 
choice habit predicted self-reported car use over and above both attitude 
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components. Thus, mode choice seems to be affected by habit like other highly 
repetitive behaviors, for which the predictive role of habit has been 
demonstrated (e.g., Bentler & Speckart, 1979, 1981; Landis et al., 1978; Mittal, 
1988; Wittenbraker et al., 1983). In addition, as expected on the basis of the 
Triandis' attitude - behavior model (1977; 1980) we found a trade-off between 
the weights of car attitude and car habit in the prediction of car choice (i.e., a 
unique contribution of their interaction). A relatively high correlation between 
attitude and behavior was found for individuals who have a weak car choice 
habit, whereas a low correlation was found for those with a strong habit. In 
short, the results of Study 1 seem to indicate that when the habit of choosing a 
particular mode increases in strength, travel mode choice behavior tends to be 
less affected by attitudes toward travel modes (cf. Ronis et al., 1989). 
Obviously, habits only develop when individuals are physically able to 
perform the behavior (e.g., Triandis, 1980). For instance, to acquire the habit of 
choosing the car, a car should be available, and, of course, one should own a 
driving licence (cf. Banister, 1978). Consistent with this reasoning, the results of 
Study 1 showed that car availability (the number of cars available divided by 
the number of driving licences in a household) is related to car choice habit 
strength. 
As was argued in the introductory chapter, making the same decision 
repeatedly contributes to the strength of habit. Simultaneously the mere 
repetition of choice decreases the need to elaborate on the decision making 
process in subsequent situations, that is, it reduces the decision maker's 
decisional involvement. Indeed, results of Study 1 showed that habit strength 
was moderately negatively related to decisional involvement. 
Study 1 has some important weaknesses. First, the behavior to be predicted 
was assessed by self-reports of past behavior, which may yield inaccurate 
responses. Second, we employed a cross-sectional design, in which attitudes, 
habit and behavior were measured at one point in time. The correlational data 
do not allow us to draw conclusions as to the causal relationships between the 
constructs measured. Furthermore, only a part of the model proposed in the 
introductory chapter (see p. 8) was tested, i.e., subjective norms and behavioral 
intentions were not included in the study. Therefore, a longitudinal study was 
conducted in which attitude, subjective norm, behavioral intention, and habit 
toward choosing to travel by car were first measured, and subsequently related 
to actual car choices (see Study 7). Actual travel mode choices were assessed by 
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a more solid measurement procedure, that is, they were recorded by means of 
diaries over a 7-day period. 
Results of this study showed that habit added to the prediction of intentions 
— considered as the most proximal cause of behavior — over and above 
attitudes and subjective norms. Strong habit subjects more strongly intended to 
perform the habitual behavior than weak habit subjects, demonstrating the 
direct impact of habit on intentions. Similar findings have been reported in 
other studies on repeated behavior (e.g., Bentler & Speckart, 1979, Baggozi, 
1981; Fredricks & Dosset, 1983). Furthermore, in line with findings of Study 1 it 
was found that actual behavior was predicted by habit strength. Intention was 
also significantly related to actual behavior, but did not add to the prediction of 
behavior when habit was included in the regression equation. Our first 
conclusion is therefore: 
Conclusion 1: 
Habit strength is an important variable in the prediction of travel 
mode choice behavior. First, habit strength predicts intentions over 
and above attitudes and subjective norms. Second, habit strength 
predicts actual behavior in addition to intentions. 
Another interesting result that was obtained in Study 7 was that habit 
strength moderates the relationship between attitudes and intentions. That is, 
intentions appeared to be significantly less strongly related to attitudes as habit 
increased in strength, suggesting that strong habit subjects' choice intentions 
are less based on attitudes. Deliberate planning, in the sense of checking up on 
attitudes towards available options, seems less necessary when people have 
formed habitual patterns of behavior. Conversely, deliberate planning may be 
useful for inexperienced or weak habit individuals (cf. Schifter & Ajzen, 1985). 
More importantly, habit and intention interacted in the prediction of 
behavior, i.e., intentions were less predictive of behavior as the habit in that 
behavioral domain increased in strength (Triandis, 1977; 1980). In other words, 
when behavior is habitual or automatically performed, deliberate intentions — 
which are supposed to be based on reasoned considerations of performing the 
behavior ~ cease to affect future behavior. These results corroborate the 
findings in Study 1 and other research on repeated behaviors (Mittal, 1988; 
Montano & Taplin, 1991). Therefore we may conclude that: 
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Conclusion 2: 
Habit strength moderates the relationship between intention and 
subsequent behavior. The intention - behavior link becomes weaker 
as habit increases in strength. In other words, when strong habits 
have been developed, the behavior in question is less likely to be 
guided by attitudes and intentions. 
7.3 Habit and the process of travel mode decision making 
The relations between intention, habit strength and later behavior, as discussed 
above, suggest that the decision process underlying choices between behavioral 
alternatives is less elaborate and less complex as habit increases in strength. 
More specifically, it may be predicted that when habit is strong, information 
relevant for the decision to perform the behavior is more superficially 
processed and less effortful decision rules are used. In order to study the 
relationship between habit and the process of decision making more closely, 
four laboratory experiments were conducted (all reported in Chapters 4 and 5). 
A distinction was made between two different stages in the decision process, 
namely (1) predecisional information acquisition concerning attributes of 
available mode options, and (2) the examination of characteristics of the trip or 
the circumstances under which the trip is made. The main results will be 
discussed separately in the next two sections. 
Habit and information acquisition about attributes of choice options 
In Study 3 and 4 (see Chapter 3) the process of making a travel mode decision 
was investigated by means of the information display board paradigm (e.g., 
Jacoby et al., 1987; Ford et al., 1989). The typical choice problem in this 
information search paradigm comprises an informational environment in 
which a set of options (e.g., car, bicycle, bus) are described by values on a set of 
attributes (e.g., costs, travel time, convenience). In both studies we focused on 
choices of bicycle for short distances. 
The main results of Study 3 were that bicycle choice habit strength was 
negatively related to the amount of predecisional information acquired about 
attributes of mode options. In addition, habit strength influenced the choices 
subjects made: Strong habit subjects chose the bicycle versus an alternative 
option more frequently than did weak habit subjects. However, although these 
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findings are consistent with the hypothesis that habit strength attenuates the 
elaborateness of the decision making process, the reduced search may have 
been due to a possible covariation of habit with the level of knowledge and 
experience concerning the domain of interest. For strong habit subjects there 
may have been relatively little need for external information, and relevant 
information may have been processed efficiently (see for example Bettman & 
Park, 1980; Brucks, 1985; Johnson & Russo, 1984; Punj & Staelin, 1983). For 
instance, when decisions are based on high levels of expertise, information 
search may not occur externally at all, but may be restricted to a search for 
internally available information, i.e., scanning memory for relevant information 
(cf. stimulus-based versus memory-based decisions, Lynch & Srull, 1982). This 
might constitute an alternative explanation for the results of Study 3, in which 
strong habit subjects acquired less information concerning a well-known trip 
than did weak habit subjects. Indeed, an additional result that emerged from 
the analyses was that habit was positively related to subjective certainty about 
not-inspected information, suggesting that strong habit subjects were more 
familiar with the decision. Because of this possible confound of habit with 
relatively high levels of knowledge and experience concerning the decision 
problem, habit strength may not have been the critical variable that produced 
the pattern of results. We therefore conducted a second experiment, this time 
using a relatively unfamiliar journey (Study 4). 
As expected, the effects of habit replicated the results obtained in the 
previous study. It was again found that habit strength reduced the need to 
consider information about attributes of options. Contrary to the findings of 
Study 3, however, a non-significant relation was observed between habit 
strength and subjective certainty about not-inspected information, suggesting 
that, this time, strong habit subjects did not differ from weak habit subjects 
concerning the familiarity with the decision. Therefore, the alternative 
explanation suggested above may be rejected. As a third conclusion from our 
research we may posit that: 
Conclusion 3: 
Habit strength reduces the depth of information search concerning 
attributes of available options: Persons with strong habits acquire 
less information about pros and cons of possible options before they 
make decisions about which course of action to take than persons 
with no or weak habits. 
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The results from Study 4 further showed that habit affects the variability of 
information searched across options. When habit is strong higher levels of 
variability were obtained than when habit is weak. More specifically, subjects 
with strong habit gathered predominantly information about cycling, whereas 
weak habit subjects divided their attention more evenly across the alternatives. 
Apparently, habit narrows the focus on the habitually chosen option. Probably 
habit limits the decision maker's consideration set. In the traditional 
information display board paradigm, variability of information search across 
options is considered to be an important indication of the decision strategies 
adopted by decision makers: An evenly distributed information search pattern 
(low variability) is associated with compensatory strategies, whereas a selective 
information search pattern (high variability) reflects noncompensatory 
strategies (e.g., Bettman et al., 1991; Payne, 1976). Thus, the present results 
suggest that when habit is strong, transport mode decisions may be guided by 
simple, heuristic, noncompensatory rules - alternatives are rejected relatively 
early in the decision process - and, conversely, when habit is weak decision 
makers adopt more cognitively demanding compensatory decision rules (cf. 
Banister, 1978; Gärling, 1994; Polak & Jones, 1993). In other words, habitual 
travel mode choices tend to follow cognitive shortcuts. Eventually they may no 
longer require the consideration of pros and cons of various alternatives. This 
line of argument concurs with theories of consumer choice behavior 
postulating that decision making may vary from a complex, extensive process 
to a more simple, effortless, habitual process (e.g., Bettman, 1979; Engel et al., 
1993; Hansen, 1972). Our fourth conclusion is that: 
Conclusion 4: 
Habit strength affects the strategies individuals employ to make 
decisions: When habit increases in strength, decision makers may 
simplify the decision process by switching to a more heuristic mode 
of predecisional information search concerning attributes of options. 
Finally, consistent with results of Study 3 it was found that habit is directly 
related to choice; strong habit subjects more frequently chose to perform the 
habitual behavior instead of an alternative course of action than weak habit 
subjects. This suggests that when the same behavior is repeatedly executed, the 
decision (or intention as it is called by most attitude theorist) to perform that 
behavior is guided by habit, and simultaneously less accompanied by 
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consideration of advantages and disadvantages of options. This result seems to 
be consistent with results from Study 7, in which habit was found to be related 
to the intention to perform the habitual behavior, and moreover, intentions 
were less affected by attitudes toward options as habit increased in strength. 
In a more general sense the results imply that, in addition to the execution of 
actions, the very decision to execute these actions is affected by habit strength. 
Presumably, when individuals are asked to express their intentions or have to 
decide which course of action to take in a particular situation, they probably 
will remember what they usually do in that situation. This information about 
past experiences may then be used when making the decision to perform the 
behavior (e.g., "I choose the car as mode of transport, because that is what I 
always do"). The effects of habit on intentions or decisions to behave may thus be 
due to the fact that people become aware of those instances in which they 
executed that behavior in the past. On the other hand, the direct influence of 
habit on later behavior may represent the automaticity of stimulus - response 
associations. That is, the goal-directed behavior is associated with and 
immediately triggered by the specific situational cues that normally precede 
that behavior, without mediation of much active attention or conscious thought 
(see Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Bargh & Barndollar, in press). 
Habit and the acquisition and utilization of trip-related information 
Individual travel mode choices are supposed to be primarily based on 
information about attributes of mode options. As argued before, when 
individuals are highly familiar with the stimulus journey, this information is 
likely to be retrieved from memory, limiting the necessity for external 
predecisional information search. Therefore, complementary to the studies of 
information search concerning attributes of options, we investigated the earlier 
stage of the decision making process, namely subjects' appreciation of the 
characteristics of the trip, such as travel distance and weather conditions. It was 
hypothesized that, as the habit of choosing a particular mode increases, the 
amount of information processed concerning such basic features of the journey 
would be reduced. Study 5 and 6 were carried out to test this hypothesis. 
In Study 5, an information search paradigm was used again, only this time 
the subjects' task was to make travel mode decisions on the basis of information 
about the circumstances of the journey. Subjects were given the opportunity to 
search for trip-related information before deciding which mode of transport to 
use. The choice of car was focused on as target. Furthermore, rather than asking 
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subjects to make a single choice, as was done in the previous two studies, they 
were presented with a large number of choice trials. The results of this study 
showed that car use habit was strongly related to the number of car choices, 
which corroborates the findings of the previous two information search studies. 
Furthermore, it was found that the nature and amount of journey-related 
information consulted by subjects to make travel mode decisions was affected 
by habit. That is, strong habit subjects searched for less information concerning 
characteristics of the trip than weak habit subjects. As a matter of fact, they 
appeared to be predominantly interested in information about the travel 
distance and the weight of luggage. Presumably, information about these 
features may have relatively high diagnostic value when choosing between 
different types of mode options. These results suggest that habitual choices are 
based on a small subset of trip-related cues necessary to make these choices. 
Whereas Study 5 focused on the amount of travel information gathered 
before a transport mode decision was made, in Study 6 we examined explicitly 
the number of trip-related cues utilized in order to make judgments about the 
usefulness of travel modes. The subjects' task was to evaluate the favorability of 
using the bicycle for the trips presented. The characteristics of the stimulus 
trips were systematically varied. Then, multiple regression analyses based on 
within-subjects covariations between the evaluation of bicycle use and the trip 
cues were used to assess the contributions of the latter to predictions of bicycle 
evaluation. The number of significant predictors constituted the dependent 
variable in subsequent analysis of variance. The results of Study 6 showed that 
there were fewer significant predictors for subjects with a relatively strong 
habit than for weak habit subjects. These results indicate that when subjects 
make judgments about the usefulness of a travel mode for a specific travel goal, 
strong habit persons use fewer trip-related cues than weak habit persons. 
Accordingly, on the basis of Studies 5 and 6 we may conclude that: 
Conclusion 5: 
Habit affects the number of trip-related cues individuals take into 
account in making judgments and decisions concerning travel 
modes: Strong habit persons acquire and utilize less trip-related 
information than weak habit persons. 
In addition, the results of Study 6 showed that habit strength is negatively 
related to the complexity with which individuals processed the pieces of 
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information: Strong habit individuals were more variable in using the available 
trip-related cues (that is, there was greater variation in the beta-weights) than 
weak habit individuals. In other words, when judging the usefulness of travel 
modes for a specific travel goal, subjects with strong habits are rather selective 
or one-sided in allocating their attention toward relevant trip-related cues, 
while weak habit subjects distribute their attention more evenly over these 
cues. These findings support the conclusion that habit strength affects the 
complexity of strategies individuals employ in making judgments and 
decisions on the basis of trip-related information: 
Conclusion 6: 
Persons who have developed a strong habit to use a particular travel 
mode tend to adopt simplified and heuristic strategies to utilize trip-
related information before making judgments and decisions about 
using that mode, whereas weak habit persons tend to apply 
relatively complex strategies. 
It is worthwhile to emphasize that our research program comprised different 
types of research paradigms pertinent to different stages and aspects of the 
choice process. First, travel mode decision making was investigated in 
naturalistic, correlational field studies as well as experimental laboratory 
studies. Second, a distinction was made between subjects' appreciation of 
characteristics of the trip and their interest in information about attributes of 
available mode options. Third, attention was directed to both the process of 
judgment and choice. Fourth, we investigated the process of information 
acquisition and utilization. It should be noted that conclusions across studies 
and different types of research paradigms converge. This convergence of 
findings across multiple paradigms may be argued to enhance the validity and 
generalizability of our conclusions (Srull, 1984). 
7.4 Situational motivation and the process of decision making 
So far, the results indicate that habitual, routinized actions such as travel mode 
decisions, are accompanied by less need to expend mental effort in deciding 
which course of action to take. In other words, the person's involvement to 
engage in the decision making process decreases as he or she makes the same 
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decision over and again. However, as the decision becomes more significant, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the person's involvement with that particular 
decision increases, and that he or she will ponder more extensively about it 
(Ronis et al., 1989). Therefore, in the experiments we carried out (see Chapter 4 
to 6) we investigated whether there are situation-specific motivational 
conditions that lead people to switch to a more elaborate mode of decision 
making, in spite of strong habit. This was accomplished by introducing two 
task-specific demands: by making someone feel that he/she needs to be able to 
explain the choice (perceived accountability for decisions one makes), or by 
directly focusing individuals' attention on relevant aspects of the decision 
problem during the choice process. 
First, results of Study 3 and 4 showed that perceived accountability increases 
the amount of information about attributes of options acquired before subjects 
make travel mode choices. In addition, in Study 6 it was found that 
accountability is related to the number of trip-related cues subjects utilize to 
arrive at judgments about using travel modes for a specific journey: Subjects 
who were held accountable used more cues than subjects who were not held 
accountable, as indicated by the number of significant predictors when 
regressing the judgments on the cues. This finding is consistent with studies 
demonstrating that people expend more cognitive effort on judgments and 
decisions for which they feel personally accountable (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; 
McAllister et al., 1979; Tetlock, 1983; Weldon & Gargano, 1988). 
Furthermore, with respect to the enhanced attention manipulation the results 
of Study 5 showed that focusing subjects' attention on the importance of trip-
related cues was effective for strong habit subjects, but only on a temporary 
basis. That is, strong habit subjects started off at the same high level of search 
for trip-related cues as weak habit subjects, but, in spite of the attention 
manipulation, their level of search declined over time, approaching the level of 
search of strong habit subjects in the control conditions. In sum, the findings in 
our laboratory experiments indicate that: 
Conclusion 7: 
Situation-specific motivation enhances the depth of travel mode 
choice processes. This effect pertains to both the acquisition and 
utilization of information and occurs in two different stages in the 
decision process: the perception of the characteristics of the journey, 
and the acquisition of information about attributes of mode options. 
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Finally, the results of Study 7 showed that under conditions of enhanced 
attention to important trip-related cues during the choice process, previously 
formed intentions were more strongly correlated with later behavior than in the 
control condition. These results suggest that the enhanced attention to trip-
related cues may have made subjects' intentions more accessible at the moment 
actual mode choices were made, which were subsequently enacted to a greater 
extent than in the control condition. We conclude therefore that: 
Conclusion 8: 
Situation-specific motivation affects the strength of the intention-
behavior link. Directing the individuals' attention to important 
aspects of the trip when travel mode choices are made leads to 
enhanced intention-behavior consistency. 
Although both habit strength and manipulated situation-specific motivation 
were related to the depth of information processing and the strength of the 
intention - behavior link, their effects seem to be independent. Moreover, 
whereas in all studies habit strength consistently affected the choices subjects 
made, none of the studies yielded significant effects of situation-specific 
motivation on choices. These results suggest that habit and the two types of 
situation-specific demands influence the decisional process in different ways. 
Habit may inherently reduce the need to deliberate, because the decision and 
outcomes are likely to be the same with or without much thought. In other 
words, when habit is strong, the personal relevance to engage in the decision 
making process to attain desirable outcomes seems less salient, since decisions 
that accomplish these outcomes can be made immediately. 
In contrast, the situational demands used in the present research may have 
encouraged individuals only to scrutinize information for its relevance to 
explain or to provide a rationale for their decision, but not to make another 
decision than one usually makes. More specifically, the accountability 
manipulations may have elicited the processing goal to gain information in 
order to appear logical or more thoughtful, rather than to raise a genuine 
interest in a thorough analysis of all the information necessary to choose an 
optimal course of action. In a similar vein, Johnson and Eagly's (1989) meta-
analysis on the effects of involvement on persuasion showed that 
manipulations like accountability and justification, which they refer to as 
impression-relevant involvement because such manipulations arouse 
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impression management concerns, may evoke a more elaborate mode of 
processing, but do not necessarily lead to attitude change. 
Furthermore, asking subjects to consider the importance of aspects of the 
travel situation during the choice process, as was done in Study 5 and 7, may 
have increased subjects' awareness that information is relevant and useful in 
order to make a decision and to attain desirable outcomes. In other words, 
under such conditions subjects may become more amenable to information and 
reasons for making a decision. Accordingly, focusing attention on the 
importance of aspects of the decision problem may enhance subjects' 
motivation to consider these aspects in the choice process. As the present data 
suggest, focusing attention may incite behaviors that are relatively more guided 
by the reasons that originally have been considered when deciding to perform 
the behavior. Moreover, there is some evidence that this focused attention 
elicits more active information processing in people who have developed 
strong habits. However, over a series of repeated choices (27 times), we 
discovered that this effect declines over time, eventually resulting in strong 
habit subjects' usual level of minimal processing. 
To summarize, the present studies suggest that habit strength and 
situationally determined motivation independently affect the decision making 
process, probably due to the fact that those factors are related to different types 
of involvement and processing goals. However, because the present research 
investigated only two types of situational motivation, it remains to be seen 
whether other types of situation-specific motivational conditions may override 
the effects of habit on decision making, or whether habitual mode choices can 
only be broken by more severe measures, such as physical obstacles (e.g., 
prohibit car drivers from having access to certain routes) or high monetary 
incentives (e.g., extreme increase in gasoline prices). This is an important 
question which needs to be investigated in future research. For the moment the 
results of our experiments suggest that: 
Conclusion 9: 
One can enhance individuals' motivation to engage in more effortful 
decision making by situational demands, but this does not affect the 
chronic effect that habit strength has on decision making and choice. 
To the extent that it is possible to evoke a deeper mode of 
information processing in strong habit subjects, it rapidly wears off 
over time. 
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7.5 The measurement of habit 
Instead of the traditional self-report measures of past behavior or habit, we 
followed an alternative approach to the measurement of habit strength, based 
on the idea that people have mental representations of relevant choices and 
behaviors in the past. The measure was referred to as the Response Frequency 
measure of habit. Because this measure plays an central role in this research it 
seems appropriate to comment on the validity and reliability of this measure. 
While Study 3 was designed explicitly to investigate these properties of the 
Response Frequency measure, in other studies the habit measure was also 
compared with other habit indicators. 
First, support for convergent validity was provided by the finding that, in 
general, the Response Frequency measure correlated satisfactorily with the 
traditional self-reports, in particular with self-reported frequency of past 
behavior. Moreover, in Study 7 it was found that the Response Frequency 
measure predicted later behavior as strongly as did self-reported frequency of 
past behavior. Self-reported habit was not significantly related to later 
behavior. Second, results of Study 3 revealed the predictive validity of the 
Response Frequency measure: The measure fairly accurately predicted mode 
choice behavior for traveling to and from work over very short distances — an 
external behavioral criterion which is theoretically supposed to be substantially 
influenced by habit strength. Third, results of Study 4 and 5 showed that, in 
general, the Response Frequency measure and self-reported past behavior were 
both related to depth of information acquisition, while this effect was less 
reliable when the measure of self-reported habit was used. Lastly, with respect 
to the issue of reliability, results of Study 3 showed that the test-retest 
correlation of the Response Frequency measure was sizable (r=0.92, p<.001, 
shared variance 85%), while the measure of self-reported frequency of past 
behavior and self-reported habit yielded less consistent responses over a period 
of 4 months (r=0.62, p<.01, shared variance 38%, and r=.64, p<.01, shared 
variance 41%, respectively). Considering the chronic and stable nature of many 
habits, these results indicate that the Response Frequency measure is a reliable 
instrument to assess habit strength, while the self-reports are probably not. 
So far, the results suggest that the Response Frequency measure of habit 
generally converges more strongly with self-reported frequency of past 
behavior than with self-reported habit. As was argued in Chapter 3, this 
stronger convergence may be due to the fact that responses elicited by both 
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measures may be derived from the same repository of cognitively represented 
experiences related to travel behavior, i.e., decisions made and actions executed 
in a wide range of travel situations in the past, stored and ready to be retrieved 
from memory upon instigation. However, an important distinction between the 
Response Frequency measure and self-reported past behavior can be made 
when investigating the interaction between intention (reflecting the reasoned 
nature of behavior) and habit (representing the automatic nature of behavior) 
in the prediction of later behavior (see Study 7). The Response Frequency 
measure interacted with the intention in the prediction of behavior, as was 
predicted on the basis of Triandis' (1977; 1980) attitude-behavior model, while 
this result was not found when the self-report measure of past behavior was 
used. Thus, compared to self-reported past behavior, the Response Frequency 
measure seems to be more indicative of the automatic, nonintentional nature of 
habitual choices and behaviors. 
Finally, it might be argued that the Response Frequency measure taps 
subjects' attitudes toward a given travel mode rather than their habit strength 
to use that mode. However, the habit measure should and can be distinguished 
from attitudes on both empirical and conceptual grounds. First, data of our 
studies suggest that the Response Frequency measure of habit can generally be 
differentiated from attitudes, since the habit measure is only modestly 
positively related to attitudes. As a matter of fact, responses elicited by the 
Response Frequency habit measure reflect (self-reported) frequency of past 
behavior to a much greater extent than attitudes (shared variance on average 
23% versus 10%, respectively, see Table 7.1). In addition, controlling for the 
variance accounted for by the attitude in the Response Frequency habit 
measure did not generally modify the hypothesized pattern of effects in our 
studies. These findings suggest that effects of the Response Frequency measure 
on the decisional process underlying choice are due to habitual, automated 
processes, rather than to reasoned processes. 
To conclude, the results suggest that the Response Frequency measure of 
habit is valid and reliable. Moreover, in comparison to self-report measures the 
Response Frequency measure may have some advantages. First, the measure is 
in some sense unobtrusive; the respondents' attention is not explicitly directed 
to the frequency with which they have performed a specific behavior in the 
past, which may make the measure less vulnerable to distortion due to social 
desirability. Second, the measure is general; it measures habit strength of a 
particular behavioral choice that respondents make across a large variety of 
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situations. This makes the measure attractive to use for many other socially 
relevant behaviors. Third, subjects are not requested to retrieve frequency of 
past behavior from memory, or to report on past psychological states or 
processes. 
Table 7.1: Summary across studies of relationships (Pearson correlations) 
between Response Frequency measure and (a) attitude and (b) self-
reported past behavior. 
attitude self-reported past behavior 
Study 1 
Study 2 
Study 3 
Study 4 
Study 5 
Study 6 
Study 7 
(п=199)я 
(n=30) 
(n=80) 
(n=42) 
(n=135) 
(n=82) 
(n=185) 
combined Ζ : 
combined effect size r : 
.32 
.32 
.48 
-
.33 
.31 
.22 
8.16 
0.31 (n=711) 
.54 
.66 
-
.42 
.58 
-
.31 
11.95 
0.48 (n=591) 
" Because the target behavior predicted in Study 1 comprises self-reports of past behavior, mis 
measure is included in the Table. 
It should be noted that the Response Frequency measure needs to be 
constructed and pilot-tested for each behavioral domain and population that is 
investigated. In this case, it is important that the measure contains a 
representative sample of situations of the behavioral domain of interest (in the 
present context travel goals). Excluding such situations from the measure may 
impair the validity and reliability of the instrument as an indication of general 
habit. Finally, because the Response Frequency measure generally converges 
with self-reported frequency of past behavior, for practical purposes self-
reports might be more convenient to obtain measures of habit. However, given 
the advantages discussed above, for some behavioral domains it may be 
recommendable to follow the Response Frequency measurement procedure to 
assess habit strength. 
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7.6 Concluding remarks 
In the current research we have drawn from a wide variety of psychological 
research to study the relationship between habit and the decisional processes 
that accompany travel mode choices. Our studies have demonstrated the 
pervasive impact of habit on choice processes. Habits guide decisions on 
courses of action and their subsequent execution directly. Furthermore, the 
original proposition about the automatic nature of habits may have been 
corroborated by three basic findings. First, as Triandis (1977; 1980) predicted, 
habit strength is inversely related to the level of intentionality of behavior; as 
habit increases in strength, attitudes and intentions, as reflections of reasoned 
considerations, guide subsequent behavior to a lesser extent. Second, habit 
strength is inversely related to the level of mental effort; strong habits are 
accompanied by lower levels of effort during decision making, i.e., in terms of 
depth and complexity of predecisional information processing. Third, habit 
covaries with frequency of past behavior; behavior which is repetitively 
exhibited in the past tends to become habitual. 
Although the present research may reveal the heuristic, non-reasoned nature 
of habitual choices, it does not necessarily imply that making decisions "by 
force of habit" would be detrimental or irrational. On the contrary, since many 
decisions — which often originated from much reasoning — are repeatedly 
enacted in the same environment, developing habits is rational and functional. 
After all, the consequences of making such decisions are known, and 
accordingly, they do not have to be considered each time these decisions have 
to be made again, unless the behavior is entirely novel or blocked by objective 
constraints. Moreover, habitual behaviors, executed on a daily routine basis, are 
often intended rather than unintended, that is, people pursue the habitual 
behavior in order to achieve desirable outcomes or end states. The only 
difference is that the goal-directed behaviors may no longer be guided by these 
conscious intentions, but instead, are automatically evoked by environmental 
cues. Indeed, in everyday life we often smoothly switch from one habitual or 
routinized action to the other, even sometimes without actually being aware of 
what caused these switches. So what is irrational about executing behaviors 
that produce the kinds of results we actually desire? And why should we 
engage in a deliberate decision making process when we achieve what we aim 
for without it? 
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In conclusion, habits reflect the regularities and frequency of satisfactory 
choices made in the past, which accomplish the kinds of outcomes we aspire in 
a rather mindless fashion, and usually do not diminish the adequacy of our 
actions. Obviously, many habitual behaviors can be observed beyond the 
context of travel mode decision making, for instance in the domain of work 
activities, health behavior, and consumer behavior. The role of habit in all these 
behavioral domains may be fruitfully explored in further research. 
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Summary 
Summary 
This thesis addresses the question how people make travel mode choices. 
Specifically, the present research aims to study the psychological antecedents of 
travel mode choice, and the decision processes underlying this type of choice. 
Because of the repetitive nature of many types of travel behaviors, it may be 
conjectured that travel mode choice is a matter of habit, rather than reasoned 
action (that is, a decision based on the consideration of pros and cons of 
options). In other words, it may be argued that mode choices are made in a 
routinized or automatic fashion, without the need to engage in an elaborate 
decision making process. 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the main theoretical issues. It starts with 
models that emphasize the rational aspect of travel mode choice and related 
behaviors by proposing that individuals consider the pros and cons of various 
options before they make a decision. This emphasis on rational choice also 
underlies Fishbein and Ajzen's 'reasoned action' approach to attitudes. The 
latter model suggests that attitudes guide behavior through the mediating role of 
behavioral intentions. Next, the relationship between repeated past behavior, 
habit and future behavior is discussed and incorporated in the attitude -
behavior model. However, it is argued that this model does not adequately 
address the decisional processes underlying repeated choice behavior. The 
chapter continues with reviewing the literature that describes various decision 
rules which people may employ to make decisions in a multiple choice context, 
and research that investigates these decision rules in terms of information 
acquisition behavior. Subsequently, the literature on habit is further reviewed and 
effects of habit on decisional processes are discussed. The major observation is 
that as habit increases in strength, future behavior is less guided by attitudes 
and intentions. It may therefore be argued that habitual behaviors are 
accompanied by a less elaborate and less complex decision making process 
than non-habitual behaviors. In the present research habit is considered as a 
person-related stable factor, which affects the decision making process on a 
recurrent basis. However, the depth of decision making may also be contingent 
upon situation-specific factors that motivate people to ponder more about the 
decision, and thus evoke an effortful choice process. In the present research 
such a temporary motivation is referred to as situational motivation. It is 
hypothesized that both habit and situational motivation affect the decision 
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making process: Habit decreases the depth and complexity of decision making, 
while situational motivation is expected to increase the depth and complexity 
of decision making. Several studies are carried out to test these hypotheses. 
First, chapter 2 presents a new method to measure habit strength and 
describes the results of a field study in which this new measure of habit was 
tested in a model of car use for a specific journey (Study 1). The new habit 
measure is based on the assumption that habitual choices and behaviors are 
mentally represented: When a strong habit has been developed with respect to 
a specific behavioral alternative, this alternative may constitute a dominant 
element in the mental representations concerning that behavioral domain. 
Unlike traditional measures of habit, in the present research the habit toward 
using a specific mode of transport is measured by presenting subjects with a 
number of globally described trips. Next, they are required to mention for each 
trip as quickly as possible the first mode of transportation that comes to mind 
as the one they would use. The frequency of mentioning a specific mode (e.g., 
car) serves as a measure of habit strength for using that mode. The prevalence 
of car use (i.e., car use habit) in mental representations concerning travel 
behavior is supposed to be reflected in a relatively large number of car choices 
across the presented trips. The results of the field study showed that car use 
was predicted by the attitude toward choosing car and the attitude toward 
choosing train on the one hand, and the new measure of car use habit on the 
other hand. In addition, habit appeared to moderate the effects of attitudes on 
behavior: The attitude-behavior relation becomes weaker as habit increases in 
strength. Finally, it was found that car use habit is related to car availability (the 
extent to which a person is able to make use of a car) and decisional 
involvement (the person's motivation to engage in the decision making 
process). 
Chapter 3 reports a study designed to establish the predictive, convergent, 
and discriminant validity and the reliability (test-retest correlation) of the new 
habit measure (Study 2). First, the results support the predictive validity of the 
habit measure: travel mode choices for commuting transport over short 
distances — an external behavioral criterion which is theoretically supposed to 
be substantially influenced by habit strength - was fairly accurately predicted 
by the new measure. Secondly, convergent validity of the habit measure was 
established by the finding that the measure correlates substantially with 
traditional measures of habit, and in particular with self-reported frequency of 
past behavior. Furthermore, the new measure met the criterion of discriminant 
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validity: the correlation between the habit measure and a measure of attitude 
was moderate but non-significant. Finally, a sizable test-retest correlation over 
a 4 months period suggests that the measure is a very reliable instrument. 
Chapter 4 describes two experiments which investigated the effects of habit 
and situational motivation on the decisional process that precedes the decision 
to use a travel mode in a familiar (Study 3) and a relatively unfamiliar (Study 4) 
journey. Habit (toward bicycle use) was measured with the new instrument 
and situational motivation was experimentally manipulated. The decision 
making process was traced by means of a computerized information search 
task, which gave subjects the opportunity to gather information about 
attributes (pros and cons) of choice options before a decision was made (e.g., 
travel time of the train, bicycle, and bus, convenience of the train, and so on). 
The main results of both studies were that habit (of bicycle use) is directly 
related to the decision to perform the habitual behavior, and is negatively 
related to the depth and complexity of the decisional process. These effects 
were independent of the effects of manipulated situational motivation on the 
depth of decision making. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of Study 5 and 6 in which we focused on an 
earlier stage in the decision process, namely the circumstances under which a 
trip is made. As in the previous two studies, effects on predecisional 
information processing of habit strength and situational motivation were 
tested. In the first experiment car owners were confronted with 27 travel 
situations without mentioning any details about the trip (Study 5). In each 
situation they could learn more about the trip by inspecting information about 
5 trip-related cues: travel distance, time of departure, the weight of luggage, 
weather conditions, and available time. As soon as they felt that they were 
sufficiently informed about the nature of the trip, they indicated their travel 
mode choice. Habit (toward car use) was measured and situational motivation 
manipulated by focusing a part of the subjects explicitly on the importance of 
the trip-related cues before a decision was made. First, the results showed that 
habit is directly related to choice: Strong habit subjects chose to perform the 
habitual behavior more frequently than an alternative course of action. The 
results further indicated that habit decreases the number of trip-related cues 
consulted before a decision was made. Enhanced attention to trip-related cues 
appeared to enhance the amount of information acquisition in strong habit 
subjects, but this effects declined over time. In the control conditions weak 
habit subjects searched overall more information than strong habit subjects. 
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Although an information search task may reveal the type and quantity of 
information subjects need to make a decision, it does not provide conclusive 
evidence with respect to the question whether the information is actually used 
to make that decision. Therefore, in a second experiment we used another 
research paradigm to investigate the effects of habit and situational motivation 
on the depth and complexity of information use (Study 6). In a so-called "policy 
capturing" paradigm, subjects performed a multiattribute travel mode judg-
ment task, in which they were confronted several times with 4 trip-related cues 
containing information about the circumstances under which trips were to be 
made and evaluated the usefulness of the bicycle in these trips. Measures of 
information use were obtained by performing multiple regression analyses for 
each subject with cue values as predictors and the evaluation of the travel mode 
(bicycle) as criterion. It was found that habit strength reduces the depth and 
complexity of information use in the evaluation of travel mode use. This effect 
appeared to be independent of effects of situational motivation (i.e., 
manipulated accountability for judgments). 
Chapter 6 reports a longitudinal field experiment in which attitude, 
subjective norm, behavioral intention, and habit were measured, and 
subsequently related to real-life travel mode choices which were recorded later 
(Study 7). The aim of this study was to test the findings of the previous studies 
in a naturalistic setting. Actual travel mode choices were recorded by means of 
diaries over a 7-day period. Before this period subjects filled out a 
questionnaire, which included measures of attitude, subjective norm, 
behavioral intention, and habit. The target behavior was car use for a trip 
outside the village. Effects of situational motivation were investigated by 
manipulating subjects' attention to the choice process during the 7-day period 
when travel mode choice behavior was recorded. First, results showed that 
habit predicts intention along with attitudes and subjective norm. More 
importantly, actual car choices were predicted by habit, but not by intentions. 
The intention was only significantly related to actual car choices when habit 
was weak, demonstrating the automatic nature of habitual travel mode choices. 
Enhanced attention to the choice process did not affect frequency of car use 
directly. However, it was found that enhancement of attention strengthens the 
intention-behavior relation. 
In chapter 7 the findings of the studies are summarized and discussed, and 
the main conclusions that can be inferred from these findings are formulated. 
Finally, the new approach to the measurement of habit is commented upon. It 
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is concluded that habit plays an important role in travel mode decision making. 
First, habit guides intentions and subsequent behavior directly. Second, when 
habit is strong, the behavior is less guided by attitudes and intentions. Third, 
habit reduces the elaborateness of the decision making process: Strong habits 
are accompanied by less information acquisition and utilization, and less 
complex or more heuristic decision rules. This effect occurs in different stages 
in the decision process: (1) The perception of advantages and disadvantages of 
available mode options; and (2) the appreciation of the characteristics of the 
journey. Furthermore, it is concluded that situational motivation, induced 
either by holding individuals accountable for their decisions or by directly 
enhancing individuals' attention to the choice process, affects the decisional 
process underlying travel mode choice; both lead to more effortful modes of 
processing. Moreover, enhanced attention to the choice process seems to 
increase the impact of intentions on subsequent behavior. However, the effects 
of habit and situational motivation appear to be independent, suggesting that 
effects of habit and situational motivation on decision making processes are 
guided by different mechanisms. The results of the present research indicate 
that the two types of situational motivation failed to overrule the effects of 
habit strength. To the extent that it is possible to evoke a deeper mode of 
information processing in strong habit subjects, this effect rapidly wears off 
over time. Finally, based on the results of Study 2 and additional efforts to 
validate the new habit measure in other studies, it is concluded that the 
measure satisfies the criterion of both validity and reliability. 
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In dit proefschrift staat de vraag centraal hoe mensen vervoermiddelkeuzes 
maken. Dat wil zeggen, het huidige onderzoek bestudeert de psychologische 
antecedenten van vervoermiddelkeuze en het beslisproces dat aan dit type 
keuze ten grondslag ligt. Het repetitieve karakter van veel verplaatsingen doet 
vermoeden dat vervoermiddelkeuze eerder een kwestie van gewoonte dan van 
beredeneerdheid is (dat wil zeggen, een keuze die gebaseerd is op een af-
weging van voor- en nadelen van opties). Met andere woorden, verondersteld 
wordt dat veel vervoermiddelkeuzes routinematig en automatisch worden ge-
maakt, en dat daarbij een omvangrijk afwegingsproces niet hoeft op te treden. 
Hoofdstuk 1 geeft een overzicht van de belangrijkste theoretische kwesties. 
Allereerst wordt ingegaan op modellen die de rationele grondslag van 
vervoermiddelkeuzes en soortgelijke gedragingen benadrukken door te stellen 
dat mensen de voor- en nadelen van verschillende opties afwegen voordat ze 
een keuze maken. Dit rationele aspect van keuzegedrag ligt ook ten grondslag 
aan Fishbein en Ajzen's benadering van attitudes. Dit laatste model suggereert 
dat attitudes - via gedragsintenties - leiden tot gedrag. Vervolgens wordt de relatie 
tussen voorgaand repetitief gedrag, gewoonte en toekomstig gedrag besproken 
en wordt deze relatie opgenomen in het attitude-gedrag model. Geconstateerd 
wordt echter dat dit model weinig inzicht biedt in het onderliggende 
beslisproces van repetitief keuzegedrag. Vervolgens wordt successievelijk 
ingegaan op verschillende beslisregels die mensen kunnen hanteren om een 
keuze te maken uit meerdere opties en onderzoek dat deze beslisregels 
bestudeert in termen van informatiezoekgedrag. Daarna wordt de literatuur over 
gewoonte nader besproken en is er aandacht voor de effecten van gewoonte op 
beslisprocessen. Voornaamste constatering hierbij is dat bij sterke gewoontes, 
gedrag minder sterk gestuurd wordt door attitudes en intenties dan bij zwakke 
gewoontes. Dus, verondersteld wordt dat sterke gewoontes gepaard gaan met 
minder afwegingen en minder complexe beslisregels. Gewoonte wordt in dit 
onderzoek opgevat als een persoonsgebonden, stabiele factor, die het beslis-
proces op repetitieve basis beïnvloedt. De mate waarin een keuze wordt afge-
wogen kan echter ook afhangen van situationele factoren, die mensen moti-
veren om na te denken over de keuze en zodoende een meer inspanning 
vergend beslisproces te weeg brengen. Dit soort tijdelijke motivatie wordt in dit 
onderzoek aangeduid als situationele motivatie. De veronderstelling is dat ge-
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woonte en situationele motivatie beiden het beslisproces beïnvloeden: gewoon-
te leidt tot minder en minder complexe afwegingen, terwijl situationele motiva-
tie diepere en meer complexe afwegingen van attributen van opties tot gevolg 
heeft. Een aantal studies zijn uitgevoerd om deze veronderstellingen te toetsen. 
Allereerst, hoofdstuk 2 presenteert een nieuwe methode om gewoontesterkte 
te meten en de resultaten van een veldstudie waarin deze nieuwe gewoonte-
maat werd getoetst in een model voor autogebruik voor een specifieke reis 
(studie 1). De nieuwe gewoontemaat is gebaseerd op de aanname dat habituele 
keuzes en gedragingen mentaal gerepresenteerd zijn: wanneer er een sterke ge-
woonte is opgebouwd ten aanzien van een bepaald gedragsalternatief, dan zal 
dit alternatief dominant zijn in mentale representaties met betrekking tot dat 
gedragsdomein. In tegenstelling tot traditionele meetmethodes voor gewoonte 
wordt de gewoonte ten aanzien van een specifieke vervoersoptie in het huidige 
onderzoek gemeten door respondenten een aantal globaal beschreven reizen 
aan te bieden waarvoor snel het vervoermiddel moet worden genoemd dat als 
eerste in gedachten komt om te gebruiken. De gewoontesterkte wordt vervol-
gens berekend door te tellen hoe vaak een specifiek vervoermiddel (bijvoor-
beeld de auto) wordt genoemd. De prevalentie van autogebruik (dus autoge-
woonte) in mentale representaties over verplaatsingsgedrag zal in de maat tot 
uiting komen in het relatief vaak noemen van de auto in de aangeboden reizen. 
De resultaten van de veldstudie laten zien dat autogebruik enerzijds voorspeld 
werd door attitudes ten op ziehte van autogebruik en treingebruik, en ander-
zijds door de gewoonte ten aanzien van autogebruik. Daarnaast bleek dat ge-
woonte de effecten van attitudes op gedrag te modereren: de attitude-gedrag 
relatie wordt zwakker wanneer de gewoonte sterker wordt. Tenslotte werd 
gevonden dat autogewoonte gerelateerd is aan autobeschikbaarheid (de mate 
waarin men beschikt over een auto) en keuzebetrokkenheid (de persoonlijke 
motivatie om afwegingen te maken voordat een keuze wordt gemaakt). 
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt een studie beschreven (studie 2) die ontworpen is om 
de discriminante, predictieve en convergente validiteit en de betrouwbaarheid 
(test-hertest correlatie) van de nieuwe gewoontemaat vast te stellen. Allereerst, 
de resultaten ondersteunen de predictieve validiteit van de maat: vervoer-
middelkeuze voor woon-werk verkeer over een korte afstand - een extern 
gedragscriterium waarvan theoretisch mag worden verondersteld dat het sub-
stantieel beïnvloed wordt door gewoontesterkte - bleek goed voorspeld te 
worden door de nieuwe maat. Ten tweede, convergente validiteit van de 
nieuwe maat werd aangetoond door de bevinding dat de maat substantieel 
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correleert met traditionele meetmethodes van gewoonte, en in het bijzonder 
met zelf-gerapporteerde frequentie van gedrag in het verleden. Verder bleek de 
nieuwe gewoontemaat te voldoen aan het criterium van discriminante 
validiteit: de gewoontemaat correleert matig maar niet-significant met een maat 
voor attitude. Tenslotte, een hoge test-hertest correlatie over een periode van 4 
maanden suggereert dat de nieuwe gewoontemaat zeer betrouwbaar is. 
Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft twee experimenten waarin de effecten van gewoonte 
en situationele motivatie werden onderzocht op het beslisproces voorafgaande 
aan een vervoerskeuze in een bekende reis (studie 3) en een relatief onbekende 
reis (studie 4). Gewoonte (ten aanzien van fietsgebruik) werd gemeten met het 
nieuwe instrument en situationele motivatie werd experimenteel gemani-
puleerd. Het beslisproces werd getraceerd door middel van een gecomputer-
iseerde informatiezoektaak, waarin proefpersonen informatie konden opvragen 
over attributen (voor- en nadelen) van mogelijke vervoersopties voordat zij een 
keuze maakten (bijvoorbeeld de reistijd van de trein, fiets en bus, het comfort 
van de trein, enzovoorts). Uit de resultaten van beide studies bleek dat 
gewoonte direct gerelateerd is aan de beslissing om het gewoontegedrag uit te 
voeren, en negatief gerelateerd is aan de diepte en complexiteit van afwegingen 
voordat een keuze wordt gemaakt. Dit effect was onafhankelijk van het effect 
dat een gemanipuleerde motivatie (in de vorm van de verwachting de keuze te 
moeten verantwoorden) had op de diepte van het afwegingsproces. 
Hoofdstuk 5 rapporteert de resultaten van studie 5 en 6 waarin de effecten 
van gewoonte en situationele motivatie zijn onderzocht op het verwerven en 
verwerken van informatie in een eerder stadium van het keuzeproces, namelijk 
de omstandigheden waaronder een reis moet worden gemaakt. In het eerste 
experiment werd aan autobezitters 27 verplaatsingssituaties voorgelegd, 
waarbij men steeds zelf moest "ontdekken" wat deze precies inhielden (studie 
5). Men kon in iedere situatie informatie opvragen over 5 kenmerken: de 
reisafstand, tijdstip van vertrek, gewicht van de bagage, weersomstandigheden 
en beschikbare tijd voor de reis. Wanneer men vond dat men voldoende was 
geïnformeerd, moest men aangeven met welk vervoermiddel men de reis wilde 
maken. Gewoonte (ten aanzien van autogebruik) werd weer gemeten en situa-
tionele motivatie gemanipuleerd door een deel van de proefpersonen expliciet 
te wijzen op het belang van de kenmerken voordat een vervoerskeuze werd 
gemaakt. Ten eerste, de resultaten laten zien dat proefpersonen met een sterke 
gewoonte er vaker voor kiezen om het gewoontegedrag uit te voeren dan een 
alternatief gedrag. Verder blijkt dat een sterke gewoonte tot minder acquisitie 
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van relevante informatie leidt voordat een vervoerskeuze werd gemaakt. De 
verhoogde aandacht voor het belang van reiskenmerken bleek de hoeveelheid 
verzamelde informatie bij personen met een sterke gewoonte in eerste instantie 
te verhogen, maar dit effect verdween na verloop van tijd. In de controle-
conditie bleek over de hele linie door de sterke-gewoonte groep minder 
informatie te worden gezocht dan door de zwakke-gewoonte groep. 
In een informa tiezoektaak wordt vooral gekeken naar hoeveel en welke in-
formatie subjecten nodig hebben om tot een keuze te komen. Een dergelijke op-
zet laat echter niet toe uitspraken te doen over de vraag in hoeverre de informa-
tie werkelijk wordt gebruikt om tot vervoerskeuzes te komen. In een tweede 
experiment (studie 6) werd derhalve een ander onderzoeksparadigma ("policy 
capturing" paradigma) gebruikt om de effecten van gewoonte en situationele 
motivatie op de diepte en complexiteit van informanegebruik te onderzoeken. 
Proefpersonen werd een taak voorgelegd, waarin ze het gebruik van een ver-
voermiddel (de fiets) moesten beoordelen op geschiktheid. Ze kregen hierbij 
een aantal keren informatie aangeboden over 4 kenmerken betreffende de om-
standigheden waaronder de reizen moesten worden gemaakt. Maten voor in-
formatiegebruik werden verkregen door per proefpersoon multipele regressie 
analyses uit te voeren met de kenmerken als predictoren en de beoordeling van 
het vervoermiddel (fiets) als criterium. De resultaten laten zien dat gewoonte 
negatief gerelateerd is aan de diepte en complexiteit van het verwerken van 
informatie over de reisomstandigheden. Dit effect is wederom onafhankelijk 
van het effect dat een gemanipuleerde motivatie (de verwachting de evaluaties 
te moeten verantwoorden) heeft op de diepte van informatiegebruik. 
In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt verslag gedaan van een longitudinaal veldexperiment 
waarin werkelijke vervoermiddelkeuzes voorspeld worden door tevoren ge-
meten attitude, subjectieve norm, gedragsintentie en gewoontesterkte (studie 
7). Het doel van deze studie was om de bevindingen van de eerdere studies te 
testen in een natuurlijke keuzesituatie. Werkelijke keuzes werden geregistreerd 
door middel van een dagboekje dat 7 dagen werd bijgehouden. Voorafgaand 
aan deze periode werd door de respondenten een vragenlijst ingevuld, waarin 
ondermeer gevraagd werd naar de attitude, subjectieve norm, gedragsintentie 
en gewoontesterkte. Het doelgedrag in deze studie was autogebruik voor een 
verplaatsing buiten het dorp. Effecten van situationele motivatie werd onder-
zocht door bij de helft van de deelnemers de aandacht voor het keuzeproces 
tijdens de registratieperiode van vervoermiddelkeuzes te verhogen. De resul-
taten laten zien dat gewoonte, naast attitude en subjectieve norm, unieke 
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variantie deelt met de intentie. Belangrijker is de constatering dat werkelijke 
autokeuzes alleen substantieel voorspeld worden door de sterkte van gewoon-
te. De intentie is alleen gedragsvoorspellend wanneer er geen gewoonte is op-
gebouwd. Dit resultaat steunt de veronderstelling dat habituele vervoermid-
delkeuzes automatisch worden gemaakt. Tenslotte, een verhoogde aandacht 
voor het keuzeproces bleek de keuzes zelf niet te beïnvloeden; wel bleek dat bij 
verhoogde aandacht de eerder aangegeven intentie werkelijk keuzegedrag over 
7 dagen te voorspellen, terwijl dit niet het geval was in de controlegroep. 
In hoofdstuk 7 worden de bevindingen van de uitgevoerde studies 
samengevat en besproken. Tevens worden de belangrijkste conclusies geformu-
leerd die van deze bevindingen kunnen worden afgeleid. Tenslotte wordt de 
nieuwe gewoontemaat becommentarieerd. Geconcludeerd wordt dat gewoon-
tegedrag een belangrijke rol speelt bij het maken van vervoermiddelkeuzes. 
Ten eerste, gewoonte heeft een directe invloed op intenties en werkelijke 
keuzes. Ten tweede, een sterke gewoonte leidt ertoe dat het gedrag niet of 
nauwelijks gebaseerd is op attitudes en intenties. Ten derde, gewoonte redu-
ceert de uitgebreidheid van het beslisproces: sterke gewoontes gaan gepaard 
met minder informatie verwerving en -verwerking en minder complexe of 
meer heuristische beslisregels. Dit effect laat zich gelden op verschillende 
niveau's van het keuzeproces: (1) de perceptie van voor- en nadelen van aan-
wezige vervoersopties en (2) het gebruik van kenmerken van de verplaats-
ingssituatie. Verder wordt geconcludeerd dat situationele motivatie, geïndu-
ceerd hetzij door de verwachting verantwoording te moeten afleggen voor 
gemaakte keuzes of door een verhoogde aandacht voor het keuzeproces, 
invloed heeft op het keuzeproces; beide manipulaties leiden tot diepere afwe-
ging van vervoersopties. Bovendien lijkt het mogelijk om door een verhoogde 
aandacht voor het keuzeproces de invloed van intenties op werkelijke keuzes te 
vergroten. De effecten van gewoonte en situationele motivatie zijn echter 
onafhankelijk. Dit suggereert dat de effecten van gewoonte en situationele 
motivatie op het beslisproces door verschillende mechanismen worden 
gestuurd. De resultaten wijzen er op dat de in dit onderzoek gebruikte 
manipulaties van situationele motivatie er niet in slagen om de effecten van 
gewoonte te ondermijnen. Voorzover mensen met een sterke gewoonte zijn aan 
te sporen tot uitgebreidere afwegingen blijkt dit effect slechts van korte duur te 
zijn. Tenslotte, op basis van de resultaten van studie 2 en additionele pogingen 
om de nieuwe maat voor gewoonte te valideren in andere studies, kan 
geconcludeerd worden dat de maat voldoende valide en betrouwbaar is. 
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